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3Abstract
This thesis studies the role of information on the promotion of political accountability 
using empirical analysis of data from Brazil.
The first chapter investigates whether the use of participatory budgeting (an al­
ternative budgetary process that gives citizens the ability to interact with the elected 
politicians in the drafting of the local budget) in Brazilian municipalities has affected the 
pattern of public expenditures and had any impact on living conditions. By analysing 
a panel of Brazilian municipalities between 1990 and 2004 I show that the municipali­
ties that used this participatory mechanism favoured an allocation of expenditures that 
closely matched the “popular preferences” , channelling a larger fraction of their bud­
gets to key investments in sanitation and health services, and registered a pronounced 
reduction in the infant mortality rates. The second chapter analyses the impact of an 
Internet-based information dissemination campaign about political candidates’ criminal 
records launched in Brazil in 2006 on that same year’s election results. Using difference- 
in-difference estimates around the information release date, I find that politicians with 
criminal records register a significantly worse electoral performance once that information 
is revealed to the electorate through the Internet campaign. This suggests that voters do 
value and make use of information that allows them to distinguish the “crooks” from the 
law-abiding politicians at the time of the election. The third chapter complements this 
analysis by investigating the effects of the information campaign on the elected politi­
cians’ detected criminal behaviour. By inspecting the lawsuits brought against Brazilian 
politicians in two different terms, before and after the Internet campaign, I find sugges­
tive evidence of the existence of both selection and discipline effects of the information 
campaign on the politicians’ criminal propensity and behaviour. Greater access to infor­
mation seems to enhance accountability by improving the selection of politicians and by 
disciplining their behaviour while in office.
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1.1 Introduction
Public expenditures are a powerful tool to guarantee access to essential goods and ser­
vices for all strata of society. However, in many cases distortion and misallocation of 
public monies -  more often than the lack of resources -  prevent this from happening. 
The lack of political accountability is a key problem in much of the developing world. 
Traditional mechanisms of horizontal accountability, via internal audits, checks and bal­
ances or constitutional constraints, are clearly not enough to make politicians take full 
responsibility and provide full justification for their actions and performance. Neither is 
electoral accountability in democratic countries: too often we see basic services failing to 
reach the poor even when they represent an important fraction of the electorate.
Identifying mechanisms to reinforce political accountability has been a key challenge 
for economists (and policy makers) and the object of intense research in the political 
economy literature. In the developing world several innovations to improve political 
accountability have been put into practice. Over the last decade these have tended to be 
bottom-up mechanisms that imply a greater involvement and participation of citizens, 
the ultimate service beneficiaries, in decision-making processes and service delivery.
One of the most famous innovations was the participatory budgeting model devel­
oped in Porto Alegre. This is an alternative budgetary process that allows citizens to 
negotiate with government officials over the municipality’s budgetary allocation and its 
investment priorities. Participatory budgeting brings in two key elements to the tradi­
tional budgetary practices. First, it improves information flows between policy-makers 
and service users, leaving the former better equipped to provide goods and services that 
more closely match the citizens’ needs and preferences. Second, it also strengthens ac­
countability by functioning as a commitment device for the politicians as it stimulates 
more frequent checks on their (publicly promised) actions by the common citizen. Despite 
having attracted considerable attention for the improvement in political accountability 
claimed to have been achieved1 and despite the fact that the participatory budgeting 
model spread across Brazilian municipalities in the 1990s and 2000s and was adopted in
1 For the city of Porto Alegre the World Bank reports a rise in the rate of households with access to  
water services from 80% to 98% between 1989 and 1996, an increase in the number of children in primary 
schools to twice as many in the same period and even a growth in the tax revenue collected by 50% 
due to a higher motivation to pay taxes given the increased transparency brought along by participatory 
budgeting.
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a number of other countries, no sound empirical evidence exists of its impact on local 
public expenditures and living standard outcomes. My contribution is to fill that missing 
gap by analyzing a panel of Brazilian municipalities for the period 1990-2004 in order to 
understand what effects participatory budgeting had on municipal public expenditures 
and associated living standard outcomes.
Brazil’s decentralized politico-administrative system, in place since the late 1980s, 
provides an ideal setting for this analysis. All municipalities are entitled to ample powers 
in service delivery and can therefore be important players in fundamental sectors such as 
health or education. Furthermore, with the first experiences of participatory budgeting 
taking place in the late 1980s the data allows me to identify four different waves of 
adoption in the four legislative periods between 1989 and 2004, where each legislative 
period is bounded by a mayoral election. The decision to adopt participatory budgeting 
depends solely on the existing mayor, who is subject to election every four years, and 
it can be reversed.2 For this reason, there exists substantial variation not only in the 
time of adoption but also in the length of the period in which participatory budgeting 
is in place. This variation in the use of participatory budgeting will be essential for the 
identification strategy employed in the paper.
By observing the evolution of budgetary allocations across time in different munic­
ipalities I find a robust pattern linking the use of participatory budgeting to a change 
in government expenditures in a way that seems to match the “popular preferences” as 
expressed in the participatory forums. This pattern shows that within the period un­
der analysis the adopting municipalities tend to increase the spending on health and 
sanitation significantly more than their non-participatory counterparts. More precisely, 
my findings suggest that participatory budgeting increases the proportion of the public 
budget spent on health and sanitation by 2 to 3 percentage points, which is as much as 
20 to 30% of this category’s budget share sample mean in 1990.3 This is in line with 
the participatory meetings’ outcomes that systematically place investments in sanitation 
(improving water and sewage connections, drainage and waste collection) as a top mu­
nicipal priority. Crucially, this result does not seem to be a consequence of adopting 
units having larger fiscal budgets. Participatory budgeting appears to be a “budget neu­
tral” mechanism as it is not significantly associated with greater per capita budgetary 
expenditures.
To show that these changes do generate real effects4, I further investigate whether 
there was any subsequent impact on living conditions among the adopting municipalities.
2 This budgetary model can be dropped at any point by the adopter or one of the following mayors 
(more details on participatory budgeting functioning and variation in adoption are provided later).
3To be precise, in the econometric analysis, the unit of observation is what I will designate by “min­
imum comparable areas” (MCAs), which I can track across the 1990 to 2004 period. MCAs refer to 
municipal boundaries in 1970 and are the minimum geographical areas that can be tracked across my 
sample period. The MCAs typically contain one municipality but owing to population growth and splits 
some MCAs may contain more than one municipality. Further details on these MCAs are provided in 
the next section.
4 Beyond the potential satisfaction derived by the citizens from direct political participation, as, for 
example, was observed by Olken (2008) in the evaluation of a direct democracy mechanism in Indonesia.
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It is a well accepted fact that poor sanitation is a leading factor in infant mortality, mainly 
driven by higher vulnerability of this age group to waterborne diseases (see Black et al, 
2003; Victora, 2001; Sastry and Burgard, 2005). If we believe that the new spending 
pattern brought by participatory budgeting did result in better sanitary conditions as 
demanded in the participatory forums, a consequent fall in the infant mortality rates 
might be expected. My data set allows testing for this. Using a panel of municipal infant 
mortality rates for the period between 1990 and 2004 I am able to observe a significant 
drop in the number of deaths among children up to one year old. Municipalities which 
adopted participatory budgeting recorded a drop in infant mortality of between 1 to 4 
infants for every 1,000 infants, which is about 5 to 20% of the total infant mortality 
rate at the beginning of the period in 1990.5 This is a significant result for a country 
which had an average infant mortality rate of 48 out of every 1,000 newborns at the 
beginning of the 1990s (World Development Indicators). This rate was above the Latin 
American and Caribbean average for the same period and singled out Brazil as one of the 
worst performers in the region, below countries of inferior economic development such as 
Paraguay, Belize or Ecuador (World Development Indicators).
These basic results were subjected to a series of robustness checks in order to address 
concerns about potential endogeneity of the participatory budgeting adoption decision 
and the validity of its estimated effects. First, in order to deal with potential omitted 
variable bias, a set of variables reflecting the political orientation of each municipality in 
the panel across the period under analysis was added to the baseline specification.6 The 
estimated effects (on expenditure allocation and infant mortality) axe not significantly 
affected by the inclusion of these political controls. This indicates that the effects of 
participatory budgeting are wider than those stemming from specific party policies. This 
result is in line with the observation that a number of political parties in Brazil imple­
mented participatory budgeting. Indeed if I exclude municipalities under the control of 
mayors from the Workers’ Party (the main political party behind the introduction of 
participatory budgeting in Brazil) my main results continue to hold.
Second, we might also worry about the comparability of municipalities that adopted 
participatory budgeting and those that did not. Ex-ante differences between the two sets 
of units (adopters and non-adopters) might make the latter an unsuitable comparison 
group and consequently cast doubt on the validity of the estimated effects. Brazil’s 
huge territorial diversity in terms of socioeconomic development allows me to match 
adopting municipalities to non-adopting municipalities that are comparable in indicators 
considered relevant for the outcomes under analysis. I use two variables in this matching: 
per capita household income levels and average education among adults -  where the
5 These results are in line with recent estimates for the impact of improved sanitary conditions on 
infant mortality in Brazil in Soares (2007) and Gamper-Rabindran et al (2008).
6 In the econometric analysis the term municipality refers to minimum comparable areas (MCAs) which 
I can track across the 1990 to 2004 period. The MCAs typically contain one municipality but owing to 
population growth and splits some MCAs may contain more than one municipality. Tracking MCAs as 
opposed to municipalities allows me to follow the same geographical unit across the 1990 to 2004 period.
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matching is carried out at the beginning of my sample period. In this matching exercise 
each adopting municipality is matched with its closest non-adopting counterpart along 
these two dimensions. This approach restricts the sample I have available for econometric 
estimation but implies that I am comparing adopting municipalities to municipalities that 
are similar in terms of these two indicators at the beginning of my sample period. The 
main results I observe for the full sample go through for the restricted matched samples 
when I ex -ante match on either per capita household income or adult education level.
Third, a similar and potentially more serious concern is that unobservable factors 
might be at the basis of these ex-ante differences, conditioning both the outcome variables 
of interest and the decision to adopt participatory budgeting. Once again the timing 
and duration of the participatory budgeting adoption across the Brazilian municipalities 
provides us with a “natural” setting to address this problem. By taking advantage of 
the variation in the time of adoption I am able to restrict the analysis to the group 
of adopters (228 units in the sample) and can then estimate, within this group, the 
effect of participatory budgeting. With such a procedure I am able to “control” for 
whatever particular non-observable factors the set of adopting municipalities share that 
may have affected both the decision to adopt participatory budgeting, the allocation 
of public expenditures and associated living standard outcomes. Again the pattern of 
results I observe for the full sample holds with the restricted sample of municipalities 
that adopted participatory budgeting during my sample period.
I interpret these findings as evidence that participatory budgeting can be an important 
tool in improving information flows between citizens and their political representatives, 
enhancing government accountability and ensuring that citizens’ preferences are reflected 
in the actual implementation of public policies on the ground.
My paper contributes to three main strands in the political economy of development 
literature. First, given the focus of the participatory mechanism on improving informa­
tion exchanges between elected politicians and common citizens, my paper contributes 
to the literature that views citizens having information on the actions of politicians and 
bureaucrats as being key to improving political accountability and government respon­
siveness (see Besley and Burgess, 2002; Stromberg, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2007 and 
Bjorkman and Svensson, 2006).
Second, my paper contributes to the growing literature on the analysis and evalu­
ation of different participatory mechanisms. This ranges from the setting of political 
reservations for minority groups in order to ensure that their interests are reflected in 
policy-making (Pande, 2003; Besley et al., 2004a; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004); the 
introduction of service report cards (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2006); the direct involve­
ment of community members in school and health sector management (Banerjee, Deaton 
and Duflo, 2004a; Jimenez and Sawada, 1999; Kremer and Vermeesh, 2005); involving 
citizens and community organizations in the monitoring of public programs (Olken, 2007, 
2008) or the setting up of participatory institutions (such as the Gram Sabhas in India 
(Besley, Pande and Rao, 2005). Participatory budgeting is most similar to this last mech­
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anism for encouraging participation in policy making but is truly innovative in its scope 
and scale. Participatory budgeting aims to improve accountability and responsiveness 
by opening up the “black-box” of budgetary design and implementation to the whole 
of society. This allows narrowing down the information asymmetries between policy­
makers and citizens and encourages further checks by the latter on the former’s activities
-  particularly relevant in a context characterized by wide-spread clientelistic and corrupt 
practices as is the case in Brazil.7 It has been implemented on a large scale in Brazil
-  by 2004 about 30 percent of the Brazilian population lived in municipalities which 
used participatory budgeting as a means of deciding the allocation of local resources. Its 
objectives line up with those outlined in the 2004 World Development Report, “Making 
Services Work for Poor People”, of “putting poor people at the centre of service provi­
sion: enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, amplifying their voice in 
policy-making, and strengthening the incentives for service providers to serve the poor”. 
The scope, scale and ambition of participatory budgeting twinned with the distinct lack 
of concrete evidence of its effects makes evaluation of this new form of encouraging citizen 
participation in public policy making all the more urgent.
Third, this paper contributes to a wider debate on the merits of the decentralization 
of government. Empirical results in this area have been divergent and inconclusive and 
have not crystallized into a coherent whole. This paper, by focusing on an institutional re­
finement within a decentralized governance framework (that is, the enhanced community 
participation), provides a test of the (argued) advantage of decentralized and participa­
tory regimes for tailoring policies to the demands and needs of the local population (see 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Ahmad et al., 2005 and Faguet, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 focuses on background 
and data. Under each of the sub-sections in Section 1.2 -  on participatory budgeting, 
public expenditures and health outcomes -  I provide the necessary institutional back­
ground, define the variables used in the empirical analysis and examine how they have 
evolved over my sample period. Section 1.3 presents my analysis of the relationship be­
tween participatory budgeting and public expenditures and associated living standard 
outcomes for Brazilian municipalities over the 1990 to 2004 period. Basic results pre­
sented in the first sub-section of Section 1.3 are then subjected to a raft of robustness 
checks in the second and third sub-sections. Section 1.4 concludes.
7 There are well-known examples of these corruption scandals at different levels of government in Brazil. 
At federal level, for instance, they led to the impeachment of a President, in 1992, and to the resignation 
and expulsion of several members of the Brazilian Congress and of President Luiz Inacio da Silva’s former 
cabinet in more recent years. At municipal level Trevisan (2003) provides a good account of different 
forms of corruption found in Brazil.
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1.2 Background and Data
1.2.1 P a rtic ip a to ry  B udgeting
O rigins Participatory budgeting was one of several institutional innovations introduced 
in Brazil in the late 1980s which took advantage of the re-democratization process and 
its focus on decentralization.
During the two decades of military dictatorship Brazil’s politico-administrative struc­
ture was centralized in the federal government and based on a network of political ap­
pointees in each state and capitals. However, since re-democratization considerable power 
and autonomy has been devolved to the sub-national governments, which are currently 
(as of 2008) comprised of 26 states (plus a Federal district - Brasilia) and 5,562 munici­
palities (the smallest politico-administrative division).8
In reality, during the military regime the municipalities remained responsible for the 
provision of some local services (such as inner-city transport or waste collection and 
disposal); however, the scope for locally-defined policies was very limited as municipal 
governments were, above all, executors of an agenda set by Brasilia. Following democ­
ratization and decentralization in the late 1980s, their responsibilities were significantly 
enlarged. Not only did municipalities gained co-responsibility in the provision of several 
services and greater fiscal autonomy to handle them9, they also became freer to develop 
their own laws and to encourage new forms of democratic participation (other than those 
provided via mayoral elections).10 Community organizations were legitimated as active 
political actors,11 particularly in the management of public expenditures which had been 
a typical instrument employed in the “patron-client” type of politics which had been 
common in Brazil (Wampler, 2004).
In essence, through the decentralization effort which took place at the end of the 1980s 
municipal governments gained the status of fundamental players in the provision of basic 
services for households and communities. Municipalities were given access to increased 
levels of funds from upper-levels of government, along with the tools to implement their 
newly granted responsibilities. This context hugely facilitated the introduction of partic­
ipatory budgeting programs, initially by mayors from the Workers’ Party (“Partido dos 
Trabalhadores”), in different municipalities across Brazil. Porto Alegre, the capital of 
the southernmost Brazilian state, would become the benchmark for this model.
8 For administrative purposes municipalities can divide their territory into districts and sub-districts, as 
happens in Sao Paulo. These sub-divisions have no political or financial independence from the municipal 
administration, though.
9 The constitution codified more resources to be transferred to sub-national units and increased the 
range of taxes and tariffs that could be levied by the municipal governments (Baiocchi, 2001).
10 See article 14 in the Brazilian Constitution and Baiocchi (2001).
11 Actually the constitutional text goes further than this with regards to popular participation. Article 
26 requires the participation of civic associations in city policies. Articles 204 and 227 require popular 
participation in the formulation and control of health and social security policies (Avritzer, 2006). Several 
governments have created these popular councils for issues of health, education, housing and other fields. 
They clearly differ from the institution under analysis in this paper as they are not open to all citizens 
but rather made up of representatives of associations, which are “bequeathed the right to participate and 
that rarely have any decision-making power” (Abers, 1998).
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The Workers’ Party was created in 1979 and it was often considered as a novelty 
among the Brazilian leftist parties for its origins in the union movements and its strong 
links to the country’s grassroot and community associations (Keck, 1992; Abers, 1996). 
Early on, in its political agenda, the Workers’ Party emphasized the relevance of pro­
moting government accountability, community participation and the reversal of priorities 
away from the elites towards the poor and the working classes. Budgetary policy was a 
critical instrument in these goals (Abers, 1996). In the words of Abers (1996: 39)
“PT [the Workers’ Party] has made the transformation of budget policy 
one of its central government objectives because the manipulation of city 
spending has historically been the backbone of local clientelistic structures. 
Typically, local government spending favours large scale, centrally located 
public works at the expense of services and projects providing basic needs 
for the poor. Such big infrastructure projects fill the coffers of the powerful 
construction companies that finance political campaigns. At the same time, 
what limited funds are spent on the urban periphery are usually dependent 
on promises by local neighborhood leaders to support particular mayoral or 
city-council candidates in the upcoming elections.”
The development of the participatory budgeting model was in accordance with the 
party’s platform and objectives. Its implementation took place as soon as the Workers’ 
Party elected its first mayors. By promoting the joint management of public resources, 
participatory budgeting could not only make the municipal government more responsive 
and transparent but it could also reverse the cycle of patronage politics that was in danger 
of being perpetuated by the newly empowered local elites. In effect it was a mechanism 
for strengthening the credibility of the Workers’ Party. As a consequence, it became the 
hallmark of the municipal governments controlled by the Workers’ Party. The successful 
results achieved “helped to define the meaning of “good government” in Brazil, which 
now emphasizes direct participation and transparency” (Avritzer and Wampler, 2005). 
This point cannot be dismissed in understanding the party’s steady trajectory from a 
few minor mayoralties, in the mid-1980s, to the presidency, in 2002 (Santos, 1998).
O pera tion  In Brazilian municipalities, expenditures are mainly composed of four classes:
i) personnel, ii) debt repayments, iii) public services (health/sanitation and education 
taking the lion’s share), and iv) investments in works and equipment (including those 
in health/sanitation and education). It is precisely in these last two categories, which 
in financially healthy municipalities represent close to half of the budget, that munici­
palities have more autonomy and are therefore the focus of the participatory budgeting 
processes.12
12In some municipalities, the participatory mechanisms also affect other spending categories and even 
the revenue collection. This usually happens when participatory budgeting has been in place for a longer 
period.
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The way participatory budgeting is implemented has had several variants across 
Brazil, tailored to each municipality’s characteristics. There is variation in the structure 
and timing of meetings, in the rules for electing citizen representatives, in the manner 
in which municipal investment rankings are defined and even on the percentage and 
components of the municipal budget covered by participatory budgeting.
The main features of participatory budgeting can be summarized as follows:13 the 
program is logistically structured by the city council, which is in charge not only of 
the organization and advertisement of meetings, but also of providing all the necessary 
technical information to any participant. As such, for organizational purposes the council 
officials start by dividing the municipality into different “administrative” regions (roughly 
corresponding to the existing neighborhoods). In a first stage, the process formally begins 
with a set of parallel neighborhood assemblies, open to all residents, where an update of 
the previous years approved works is given, local needs are discussed, desired investments 
are listed, and neighborhood representatives are elected by the attendants.14 These 
representatives are responsible for collecting the local demands and effectively interact 
and negotiate with the elected officials in the drafting process of the budget. For logistical 
and technical reasons, participatory budgeting is not simply a direct democracy process 
-  in reality it combines elements of both direct democracy (i.e. direct mobilization 
of citizens in decision-making venues) and representative democracy (i.e. by electing 
representatives from among the attendants).
It is worth noting that in many municipalities, such as Porto Alegre and other large 
urban centres, this representation is made up of two tiers due to reasons of scale and 
the degree of technicality involved in the decisions at later stages. These two tiers are 
comprised of “councillors” and “delegates” and both are elected through popular assem­
blies. The councillors (“conselheiros”) form the “participatory council” which together 
with elected municipal officials are responsible for defining the criteria used to rank de­
mands and allocate funds and vote on the investment plan presented by the mayor and 
her executive team. These councillors are the elected citizen representatives who interact 
directly with the elected bodies. The delegates (“delegados”) function as intermediaries 
between the citizens and the participatory council (which are comprised of councillors 
and elected municipal officials) and supervise the implementation of the budget.
In a second stage, these delegates take part in municipality-wide coordinating meet­
ings where a final draft for the different regions’ investment priorities is drawn up and 
passed to the executive.
Under the ordinary budget cycle (i.e. without formal citizen participation) the execu­
13The purpose here is not to give a detailed description of a participatory budgeting process, especially 
given its specificity in each one of the adopters, but rather to underline the common features that consti­
tute the essence of this participatory innovation in Brazil. For case studies with a thorough description of 
participatory budgeting (gross majority with reference to Porto Alegre) see Santos (1998), Abers (1996, 
2000) or Souza (2001).
14 Only the registered inhabitants of the region have the right to vote. In order to promote participation, 
it is also usually the case that these neighbourhood representatives are elected proportionally to the 
number of participants at a meeting.
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tive is solely responsible for the elaboration of the budget proposal, which has to include a 
plan of all revenues and expenditures programmed for the subsequent year. This proposal 
has to be approved by the city’s legislature (comprised of elected municipal officials) in 
order to become official.
Under the participatory model, the allocation of investments in the budget proposal is 
defined by the executive together with the participatory council. Under this model public 
budgeting takes into account the popular priority ranking (obtained by the delegates) 
together with a set of weights (such as the share of population affected by the project, the 
index of local poverty and measure of need/shortage of the good demanded) which are 
designed to promote equity in the distribution of resources as well as to take account of 
the projects’ technical and financial feasibility. The elected municipal officials also have 
the capacity to initiate projects of general interest or even works considered necessary for 
a given part of the city and these are also the object of discussion with the participatory 
council.
In the last stage, once the budget has been approved by the legislature, the elected 
delegates and councillors are responsible for supervising its execution and reporting any 
faults or delays to the mayor.
To summarize, compared to the ordinary budgetary process, differences can occur 
mainly at two stages: 1) the direct input of citizens’ demands and the direct interaction 
between popular representatives and executive in the elaboration of the budget proposal;
2) oversight of the approved works by the (elected) popular representatives (delegates 
and councillors) once the investment plans become public.
The role of the legislature is not affected, at least in theory, since the budget still 
has to be approved by this chamber. However, some studies point to the fact that the 
budget proposal reaching the legislature comes, under participatory budgeting, with the 
direct approval and demands of the population and this may constrain the ability of the 
legislature to vote against it (Santos, 1998). This can be relevant since the decision of 
whether or not a municipality adopts participatory budgeting depends on the mayor and 
her executive team and does not have to be at any moment ratified by the legislature. 
Participatory budgeting may therefore be seen as a means for the mayor and her executive 
to increase their public decision making power.
A scheme with a reference design of the year-round participatory process (based on 
Porto Alegre’s schedule) is presented in Figure 1.1.
E volu tion  The expansion of participatory budgeting across Brazilian municipalities 
closely matched that of the Workers’ Party in the first years. Likewise, it evolved slowly, 
first in the southern urban centres, then in the smaller neighbouring municipalities and 
northern municipalities. From the mid-1990s onwards, as the publicity of the most suc­
cessful experiences spread and participatory budgeting became internationally recog­
nized, it started being replicated by other parties -  most, but not all, with political 
orientations close to the Workers’ Party. For a better understanding of participatory
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budgeting’s geographic evolution, maps with the distribution of participatory budgeting 
experiences across time are provided in Figure 1.2.
Table 1.1 shows the evolution of the number of municipalities adopting participatory 
budgeting and also of municipalities with Workers’ Party mayors. Although the total 
number of adopting municipalities (169 at the last available count in 2000) seems small 
in a country as big as Brazil (which contained a total of 5,561 municipalities at the same 
date) it is worth noting that in 2000 the 169 municipalities that had adopted participatory 
budgeting accounted for approximately 27% of Brazil’s 175 million inhabitants.
As can be seen from Table 1.1, not all municipalities with Workers’ Party mayors 
used participatory budgeting (for example between 2001 and 2004 only 78 of the 186 mu­
nicipalities with Workers’ Party mayors employed participatory budgeting). The reason 
for this typically lies with a fragile financial situation (where debt repayment obligations 
and labour costs did not allow for new investments) or with the Workers’ Party mayor 
having to govern in coalition with other political parties (see Shah, 2007).
During the period under analysis (1990 to 2004), and, in part, resulting from the 
decentralization process, the municipal divisions of Brazil changed considerably mainly 
due to municipalities splitting as a result of population growth. Between 1980 and 2004, 
for example, more than 1,500 new municipalities were created. To address this fact and 
in order to follow the same geographical units across the 1990 to 2004 period, the econo­
metric analysis in this paper will be based on the municipal borders as of 1970 (which 
are almost identical to the existing ones in 1980).15 These units are known as “minimum 
comparable areas” (MCAs). My panel data consists of 3,651 MCAs which I can track 
across the 1990 to 2004 period. Each MCA typically contains one municipality but owing 
to population growth and splits, as mentioned above, some MCAs can contain more than 
one municipality.16 Since these MCAs will be the relevant unit of observation for all 
the analysis presented hereafter, in Table 1.2 I replicate the analysis for the evolution of 
participatory budgeting shown in Table 1.1 for MCAs as opposed to municipalities. As 
can be seen from comparing Tables 1.1 and 1.2 the patterns of change look highly similar 
at municipality or MCA level.
It is worth noting that the number of participatory budgeting occurrences as shown 
in the tables is not cumulative over time. At the end of every period there are MCAs 
dropping out of the program as well as new MCAs adopting participatory budgeting. 
This variation in the time of adoption both within and across MCAs will be essential for 
the identification strategy.
15 If we consider a municipality A that in the course of the 1990s split into two municipalities B and C 
then, in order to have a comparable geographical unit across time, I will add up data from B in C in the  
years after the split.
16 Owing to the intense splitting activity in Brazil from the 1980s use of MCAs as opposed to munic­
ipalities is standard practice in the analysis panel administrative data for Brazil. All my econometric 
analysis has also been carried out just using a sub-sample of municipalities that suffered limited or no 
territorial changes (less than 10% change in total area) between 1970 and 2004. The results from this 
restricted sample do not significantly differ from the ones presented below.
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D a ta  The information on participatory budgeting adoption comes from the following 
sources: a compilation I made in collaboration with members of the Workers’ Party, which 
provided data for the period 1986-1992, surveys conducted by the “Fdrum Nacional de 
Participagao Popular” (National Forum of Popular Participation) - an association of 
NGOs interested in the theme of citizens’ participation - for the period 1992-2000, and 
data provided by Avritzer and Wampler (2005), for 2001-2004. The survey studies are 
based on questionnaires sent to all municipalities in the country and collected by local 
NGOs. I also checked that for years where there is overlap the data that I collected 
for the earlier years matched the survey based estimates and found that the match was 
exact.
The data set I collected indicates for all Brazilian municipalities whether the municipal 
government engaged in any form of participatory budgeting during budgetary design and 
implementation. The data used in this paper refer uniquely to a listing of municipalities 
that in each year, from 1986 to 2004, reported using participatory budgeting. Further 
information regarding individual experiences is not publicly available. Therefore, it is 
not possible to identify potential nuances in the degree of participation mentioned above, 
nor the investment priorities voted for by the participants in each and every municipality. 
My knowledge about citizen priorities is based on data published by some municipalities 
and NGOs for a subset of municipalities.
1.2.2 P ub lic  E xpen d itu res
D ecen tra liza tion  By law, the municipal executive has been responsible for the provi­
sion of goods and services considered to be of “local interest”, that is, whose relevance is 
essentially restricted to the municipality. In practice, this has traditionally been limited 
to garbage collection, disposal and general cleaning services, sewerage networks construc­
tion and maintenance, public lighting, roads, general urban infrastructure works, public 
transportation and, in some cases, also water treatment and delivery. Although there 
was also some municipal activity in primary education and primary health care, these 
services were far from being an exclusive municipal responsibility as there was a strong 
presence of state, and even federal, managed schools and health centres. The same was 
also true for water treatment and delivery services. Despite being considered a municipal 
responsibility, state companies were still the predominant provider of water services in 
the 1980s as a consequence of the model used for the development of this sector during the 
military regime, which was based on a state company’s management through concession 
contracts.17
After the new constitutional charter of 1988, although the presence of federal and 
state governments was not completely dismissed (as they are still encouraged to inter­
17For its own nature, and different from the water services, during the military period the maintenance 
and enlargement of the sewage systems was kept mostly as a municipal responsibility. The delivery rates 
for this service (i.e. number of houses connected to public sewerage network) were in any case extremely 
low at the end of the dictatorship.
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vene in case of insufficient local capacity), municipalities were strongly stimulated to 
enlarge their participation in the education and health sectors and progressively received 
larger transfers from upper levels of government in order to assume those tasks.18 As a re­
sult primary health care, pre-school and primary education are now (almost) exclusively 
municipal responsibilities. In the sanitation sector municipal governments have also been 
assuming an increasing role in the water services since the end of the existing contracts 
with state companies. This complements their pre-existing central role in providing local 
sewerage services.
C om position  and  E volu tion  of E x p en d itu res  Brazilian public accounts have, by 
law and since 1990, assigned all the budgetary expenditures by “function”, depending 
on the governmental service/responsibility they refer to.19 Since 2002, there are 28 of 
these functions or categories considered, for which total spending has to be presented 
separately. In Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix, I provide a listing and description 
(as defined by the Brazilian law) of these categories.
It should be added that before 2002 the expenditures disaggregation level was not so 
extensive and some of the actual classes were bundled together. This is the case with, 
for instance, health, sanitation and environmental policy, which were added up under the 
general “Health and Sanitation” category, or education, culture, sports and leisure that 
fell under the general “Education and Culture” category (all other changes before/after 
2002 are made explicit in Table A.4 in the Appendix). As this “bundling” affects most 
of the period under study, it determines the expenditure categories (16 in total) that can 
be effectively tracked across the whole of my 1990 to 2004 period: “Administration and 
Planning”, “Legislative” , “Judiciary”, “National Security” , “External Relations” , “Social 
Assistance”, “Health and Sanitation”, “Labour” , “Education and Culture” , “Housing 
and Urbanism”, “Agriculture”, “Industry” , “Services” , “Communications” , “Energy” , 
and “Transport” .
Figure 1.3 shows the average expenditure allocation for the Brazilian MCAs in 1990 
and in 2004. Expenditures in “Education and Culture” absorb the largest share of the 
budget in both years accounting for 27% of the budget in 1990 and 30% of the budget 
in 2004. There is thus modest increase in MCA budgets dedicated to “Education and 
Culture” across the 1990 to 2004 period. In contrast, the share of the MCA budget dedi­
cated to “Health and Sanitation” rises from 13% to 23% - a 10 percentage point increase 
over this 14 year period. The losing sectors in share terms are “Housing and Urbanism” 
and “Other Expenditures” (which includes the remaining classes). This observation is 
in line with the usual evaluation of the Brazilian decentralization process that highlights 
the success achieved in health/sanitation and education sectors as opposed to the limited 
progress made as regards municipal housing or social welfare programs (see Souza, 2001).
18 The level of fiscal decentralization in Brazil is considerably high. According to the BNDES (the 
Brazilian Development Bank) the transfers from central government amount on average to USD 35 
billion per year, which represents approximately 15% of the federal government’s total revenue.
19 The basic structure of Brazilian municipal accounts is provided in Table A .l in the appendix.
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D a ta  The financial data on expenditures classified by the categories mentioned above 
and used in this paper is originally from the National Treasury (“Secretaria do Tesouro 
Nacional”) and is available for every municipality since 1990. To simplify the data collec­
tion process I made use of the tabulations already available from the Institute of Applied 
Economic Research (“Instituto de Pesquisa Econdmica Aplicada” - IPEA). This data 
allowed me to build a panel of budgetary expenditures for 3,651 Brazilian MCAs for the 
period 1990-2004. Summary statistics for the main classes of expenditures considered, at 
the beginning of the period as well as for the whole sample are presented in Tables 1.4 
and 1.5.
1.2.3 H ea lth  O utcom es
B ackground Indicators from the Brazilian Population Census and from international 
organizations show that, right after democratization in 1985 and prior to the first ex­
periences with participatory budgeting, there existed substantial room for improvement 
of social indicators on several fronts. Although access to goods and services and overall 
well-being varied vastly within the country (as well as within states and even within mu­
nicipalities), with the densely populated southern states performing significantly better, 
the level for most relevant indicators was generally low when compared to other Latin 
American countries. Summary statistics for some “living standards” variables for 1991 
can be found in Table 1.4. At the beginning of the 1990s the infant mortality rate was 
close to 50 infants for every 1,000 newborns (UNDP) with systematic high rates of mor­
bidity and mortality from infectious and parasitical diseases (diarrhoea being one of the 
most prevalent).20 At this time there was a major deficit in the sanitation infrastructure 
as less than 20% of the country’s households were connected to the public sewage net­
work. According to the Census of 1991, there was also a serious lack of access to proper 
housing and education levels were extremely low as the average illiteracy for adults (over 
25) and school drop-out rates were both above 20%. With such widespread deficiencies, it 
is not immediately obvious which investments should be prioritized. In this context, the 
information channels opened by participatory budgeting might serve as a useful tool for 
identifying what citizens in Brazilian municipalities saw as the expenditure priorities.21
Table 1.3 illustrates a typical list of investment priorities as voted in the popular as­
semblies that are part of the participatory budgeting process. Although the information 
presented here refers to Porto Alegre, anecdotal evidence and the existing literature, as 
well as data published by other municipalities corroborate that it is also representative 
of expenditure priorities among adopting municipalities. Investments in basic sanita­
tion (which mainly refers to extension and improvement of sewage networks, drainage, 
anti-erosion, anti-slippage measures and waste removal), street paving (which usually
20See, for instance, Simoes (2002) or Sastry and Burgard (2004).
21 Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) highlight the relevance of this political participation by observing 
that ’’From the electoral outcome alone, the winning candidate cannot discriminate which of dozens of 
factors, from the position taken on a particular issue to the inept campaign run by the opposition..., was 
responsible for the electoral victory.” (as quoted by Besley et al, 2005).
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accompanies installation of sanitation infrastructure22), land regulation (referring to the 
definition of property rights over occupied land - a major issue in the poor areas of 
Brazilian cities) and street lighting (which fall under the “Housing and Urbanism” ex­
penditures) are regularly top-ranked in the first rounds of participatory budgeting (across 
the full range of adopting municipalities for which there is data). Investments in basic 
education and health are also demanded (usually referring to building and improvement 
of facilities), as the basic infrastructure (sanitation, paving, housing and lighting) needs 
are gradually met.
These voted priorities can be interpreted from different perspectives, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. On one hand, they can simply reflect the preferences of the 
group of citizens that took part in the participatory forums23, and on the other hand, they 
can indicate a clear bias towards very visible, easily monitorable works where checking 
the government’s role is more easily done. In either case the relevance of the analysis 
proposed in this paper is not affected. It still remains important to investigate what 
average impact this additional information has had on the government’s budgeting or, 
on the contrary, whether participatory budgeting has been in practice an empty populist 
trick with none or limited impact on the observed pattern of municipal expenditures.
Evolu tion  and  P o ten tia l R ole of P a rtic ip a to ry  B udgeting  Over the last 10- 
15 years, Brazil’s commitment to improving educational and health outcomes yielded 
considerable gains. Infant mortality has decreased by almost 40% and overall mortality 
from infectious and parasitical diseases has been substantially reduced (World Bank, 
2004). This decline in infant mortality rates is clearly registered in the Census data, 
presented in Table A.4 in the Appendix, which shows that the average infant mortality 
rate in Brazil dropped from 48 to 33 out of 1,000 newborns between 1991 and 2000 - a 
decline of over 30%. For a better understanding of the regional variation and evolution 
in infant mortality rates in Brazil, Figure 1.4 illustrates how this indicator varied and 
evolved across municipalities in 1991 and 2000 (UNDP and IPEA). There has also been a 
large expansion in basic school enrolments and widespread reductions in grade repetition.
The demands listed in the participatory forums suggest that improvements in basic 
sanitation were an early and urgent priority. Figure 1.5 charts the share of MCA budgets 
dedicated to health and sanitation separately for MCAs which adopted participatory 
budgeting and those that did not between 1990 and 2004. In Figure 1.5, we can observe 
that there has been a gradual channelling of resources to this sector for all MCAs, but 
that among adopting MCAs the increase became more accentuated precisely at the point 
when adoption of participatory budgeting became more widespread, after 1996 (the bars
22 For that reason the expenditures in street paving usually fall under the “Health and Sanitation” class 
of the municipal accounts.
23 Although the meetings are open to the whole municipal population, surveys conducted at the par­
ticipatory budgeting forums reveal a higher participation of women, the elderly and retired workers, 
generally with higher than average associative life and income below the city mean (NGO Cidade, 
www.ongcidade.org).
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in the graph indicate the percentage of MCAs that in each period were effectively using 
participatory budgeting). In the next section I investigate in a more systematic manner 
whether this apparent divergence in budgetary behavior between adopting and non­
adopting MCAs can be linked to the adoption of participatory budgeting. Following the 
existing consensus in the public health literature on the leading role of improved health 
and sanitation in reducing infant mortality, I also investigate whether the adoption of 
participatory budgeting can be linked to improvement in living standards along this key 
dimension.
D a ta  The mortality rates used in my econometric analysis are measured as a ratio of the 
number of deaths to the number of living residents in the same age group (up to 1 and up 
to 4 years old, respectively, for infant and child mortality). The infant and child mortality 
data used to evaluate health outcomes in this paper is from Datasus, the official data 
centre of the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Its database includes yearly mortality figures, 
by age group, for every Brazilian municipality since 1979, from which I compiled infant 
and child mortality for every MCA. The municipal infant and child resident populations, 
necessary to compute the mortality rates, have been available since the early 1990s from 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Summary statistics for these 
two variables (infant and child mortality rates) are presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, for 
the cross-section in 1990 and also for the whole sample 1990-2004.
1.3 M ethod and Results
1.3.1 M echanism s
Participatory budgeting is expected to add two key elements to the conventional bud­
getary process. First, by bringing together citizens and elected politicians to discuss the 
allocation of public expenditures, participatory budgeting is expected to generate a pure 
informational gain regarding the citizens’ needs and preferences. As a result, policy­
makers are able provide goods and services and to develop policies that better match 
these preferences, as revealed in the participatory forums. This might be particularly 
useful in contexts characterized by several service failures and deficiencies. Second, by 
opening-up the “black-box” of budgetary design and implementation to the whole of soci­
ety, participatory budgeting is expected to strengthen political accountability as it works 
as a commitment device for the elected politicians. At the end of each participatory 
cycle, the citizens know the amount of public money that is supposed to be spent and 
the exact projects or services that are supposed to result from spending that money (see 
sub-section 1.2.1 above and Figure 1.1). As a result, under the participatory budgeting 
model they can more accurately monitor and evaluate the elected politicians’ actions.
These two mechanisms - the pure information mechanism and the increased account­
ability/commitment mechanism - have implications that can be empirically tested. The 
information mechanism predicts that when participatory budgeting is adopted I should
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be able to observe an allocation of public expenditures that more closely matches the 
popular demands. As described in sub-section 1.2.3 this should imply a larger allocation 
of public resources to the health and sanitation sector. The commitment mechanism, 
in its turn, has implications that go beyond the allocation of public expenditures. It is 
through the commitment mechanism that the budgeted expenditures do indeed result 
in the goods and services demanded by the population. As a result, when participatory 
budgeting is adopted I should be able to observe changes in the allocation of public 
expenditures as well as changes in the population living standards resulting from the 
additional goods and services provided in line with the popular demands. More specif­
ically, for the reasons presented in sub-section 1.2.3 above, with respect to the living 
standard outcomes I expect to observe an improvement in the infant and child mortality 
rates following the adoption of participatory budgeting. Notice that this improvement 
is a consequence not of the level effect of participatory budgeting adoption per se but 
of the interaction between its adoption and the public expenditure allocations - namely, 
expenditures in health and sanitation.
In the remainder of this section, I investigate whether the adoption of participatory 
budgeting can effectively be linked to these predicted effects on public expenditure allo­
cation and associated living standards outcomes by analyzing a panel of Brazilian MCAs 
between 1990 and 2004.
1.3.2 Identification
The empirical test requires variation in the adoption of participatory budgeting across 
my sample of MCAs. As described in sub-section 1.2.1, the timing and duration of par­
ticipatory budgeting adoption across the Brazilian MCAs provides a significant amount 
of variation both between and within MCAs during my sample period 1990-2004 (see 
Table 1.2). I will exploit these different sources of variation in my identification strategy.
In the baseline specification (sub-section 1.3.3), the econometric analysis makes use of 
the full sample of 3,650 MCAs. Thus, the effects associated with participatory budgeting 
on the allocation of public expenditures and on the infant and child mortality rates will 
be estimated both from the cross-sectional variation in adoption (adopting MCAs versus 
non-adopting MCAs) and from the within time variation in adoption among the 228 
adopting MCAs.
In the matching specification (sub-section 1.3.4), I also make use of these two sources 
of variation in order to estimate the effects associated with the adoption of participatory 
budgeting. The difference, with respect to the baseline specification, is that I no longer 
make use of the full sample of non-adopting MCAs. Instead, I take advantage of the cross- 
sectional variation found for several socioeconomic measures across Brazil to restrict the 
sample of non-adopting MCAs to the ones that more closely match the adopting MCAs 
in indicators considered relevant for the adoption of participatory budgeting and for the 
outcomes under analysis, as of 1991. This procedure restricts the sample to approximately
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450 MCAs that are substantially more comparable in terms of the indicators considered, 
at the beginning of my sample period, and increases my confidence in the validity of the 
estimated results.
Finally, in the “adopters only” specification in sub-section 1.3.5,1 restrict the sample 
available for econometric analysis to the group of 228 adopting MCAs. That is, MCAs 
with some occurrence of participatory budgeting adoption between 1990 and 2004. I am 
able to estimate the effects associated with the adoption of participatory budgeting within 
this restricted sample because there is considerable variation in the time of adoption 
among the adopting MCAs across my sample period. As shown in Table 1.2, at the start 
of every legislative period24 there are new MCAs adopting participatory budgeting, as 
well as MCAs dropping out of the program. This restriction is an important test for my 
results. By focusing on the sub-sample of adopting MCAs, I am able to control for all 
the possible characteristics this sub-group of MCAs shares that might have justified the 
adoption of participatory budgeting as well as a specific pattern of public expenditures 
allocation and its associated living standard outcomes.
Further econometric details as well as the estimation results associated with each one 
of these specifications are provided in the next sub-sections.
1.3.3 Baseline Specification
My econometric analysis is based on panel data regressions of the form:
V i t =  a i + ~ f t + p P B i t +E i t (1 -1 )
where yu is the outcome variable of interest in MCA i at time t, and PBa  is the measure 
of participatory budgeting in the MCA. oti is a MCA fixed effect to account for MCA- 
specific and time-invariant factors, such as culture or geography, that might affect the 
outcome of interest, and ryt is a year fixed effect, that captures time-specific but MCA- 
invaxiant shocks, such as macro shocks and country-wide policies.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by MCA to deal with 
potential problems of serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).
P ub lic  E xpen d itu res  Table 1.6 links the adoption of participatory budgeting to the 
allocation of budgetary expenditures at the MCA level. The right hand side variable 
measures the presence of participatory budgeting in a given MCA across time. This 
would typically be a binary variable, indicating the use (or not) of participatory budget­
ing in the allocation of public resources. However, because some of the MCAs include 
more than one municipality, the right hand side variable is the proportion of the MCA 
total budgetary expenditure that belongs to municipalities using participatory budgeting 
(within the MCA). Thus, this variable can assume any value between 0 (for the years 
when participatory budgeting was not used anywhere in the MCA) and 1 (for any year
24The legislative periods are bounded by the mayoral elections, which take place every 4 years.
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when the whole MCA is using participatory budgeting). The left hand side variables 
are the different classes of expenditures from the public accounts.25 More precisely, I 
measure the proportion of the total MCA budget that is allocated to each one of the 
categories. For brevity, out of the existing 16 categories I only include the most impor­
tant in size: “Administration and Planning”, “Health and Sanitation”, “Housing and 
Urbanism” , “Education and Culture” and “Legislative”. Other expenditure categories 
are grouped under “Other” which includes expenditures in “Social Assistance” , “External 
Relations” , “National Security” , “Judiciary” , “Labour”, “Communications” , “Energy”, 
“Transport”, “Agriculture”, “Industry” and “Services” . Table A.2 in the Appendix pro­
vides a description of the type of expenditures considered under each of these categories.
The findings in Table 1.6 suggest that there are significant differences in the alloca­
tion of expenditures associated with adoption of participatory budgeting. MCAs with a 
greater share of participatory budgeting spend a larger proportion of their total budget 
on health and sanitation (see column 2), at the expense of education and culture (column
4), administration and planning (column 1) and housing and urbanism (column 3). This 
is consistent with evidence of investments in sanitation being a top priority outcome of 
the popular forums. The estimated effect suggests an average difference of above 3 per­
centage points, between an MCA without participatory budgeting and an MCA that fully 
adopts participatory budgeting, of the budget share allocated to health and sanitation, 
which is as much as 30% of the variable’s sample mean at the beginning of the period 
(see Table 1.4).
Interestingly, it seems that this incremental effect does not follow from a superior 
financial capacity of adopting MCAs. In Table 1.7 I run the same regressions as in Table 
1.6 but where budgetary expenditures are expressed in per capita terms as opposed 
to budget shares26. In column 1 of Table 1.7 we observe that participatory budgeting 
appears to be budget neutral as the coefficient associated with per capita total budgetary 
expenditures is not significant. The pattern of coefficients for the key heads of budgetary 
expenditure, in columns 2 to 7 of Table 1.7, is similar to that in Table 1.6.
Effects on H ea lth  O utcom es Focusing on health outcomes, Table 1.8 looks at the 
link between the adoption of participatory budgeting and infant and child mortality. As 
before, the participatory budgeting variable is a continuous variable between 0 and 1 that 
measures the presence of participatory budgeting within the MCA27. On the left hand
25In an alternative specification, and in order to simplify interpretation, the same regressions are also 
run treating P B  as a binary variable by setting a minimum share above which we consider P B = 1 for the 
MCA (e.g.: if I observe that the percentage of the MCA aggregate budget that belongs to municipalities 
with PB is equal to or above 50%, P B  takes the value 1 in that particular period). Adopting this coding 
does not affect the results I observe in any significant way.
26These regresssions are for the period 1994-2004 only. Due to the absence of adequate deflators I opt 
for not comparing nominal figures before the introduction of the “Plano Real” , in 1994. Running the 
regressions for the 1990-2004 period using the available deflators produces an identical pattern of results, 
though.
27I have rerun all the health outcome regressions using an alternative definition for the PB variable 
where it instead measures the percentage of infants and children living in municipalities with participatory
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side, infant and child mortality rates at the MCA level are measured as the ratio of the 
number of deaths to the number of living residents of age up to 1 and 4 years old in the 
MCA, respectively. The results, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.8, suggest the existence of 
a negative association between these two variables and the use of participatory budgeting. 
Moreover the magnitude of the estimated effects of participatory budgeting adoption on 
mortality reduction is considerable. They represent about 12% and 10% of the infant 
and child mortality rates sample means in 1990, respectively.
It is likely that these effects on the mortality rates arise from the greater expendi­
ture on health and sanitation associated with participatory budgeting. To investigate 
whether this is the case, I run the following regression that includes an interaction term 
between the expenditure share on health and sanitation and the adoption of participatory 
budgeting:
Vit =  +  I t  +  Pi PBu  +  p 2ExpShare(HealthfoSanitation)it+  (1-2)
+(33P B  * ExpShare(HealthSz,Sanitation)it -I- Eu
where the coefficient P3 captures the differential impact of this category of expenditures 
between MCAs with and without participatory budgeting.
The results in columns 3 and 5 of Table 1.8 display, not surprisingly, a negative 
association between having a greater proportion of the budget spent on health and san­
itation and mortality rates. This estimated effect persists when I include a measure for 
the presence of participatory budgeting and its interaction with the health and sanitation 
budget share (columns 4 and 6). More importantly, in columns 4 and 6 we see that al­
locating more resources to health and sanitation (out of the total budget) seems to have 
a significantly larger effect on infant and child mortality rates when it appears together 
with the use of participatory budgeting. The estimated /?3 coefficient is negative and 
significant and six times larger than the estimated /32. This suggests that there is an 
efficiency gain from introducing participatory budgeting. Thus, every Real allocated to 
the health and sanitation sector has a larger impact on infant and child mortality when 
it is introduced in an MCA which has adopted participatory budgeting relative to one 
that has not.
O m itted  V ariables The adoption of participatory budgeting and budgetary and health 
outcomes may be being driven by other variables which vary across time at the MCA 
level. Given that in the period under analysis approximately half of the municipalities us­
ing participatory budgeting were governed by Workers’ Party (“PT ”) mayors, one could 
argue that the participatory budgeting variable is quite simply a proxy for the presence 
of the Workers’ Party and its particular model of government. To address this concern 
variables measuring the presence of different parties in the MCA are added to the baseline
budgeting within the MCA. This produces no significant impact on the estimated results.
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specification above:
V i t — (1-3)
where MPft stands for mayor’s party and is a vector of variables for the percentage of 
budget in MCA i which is under the control of mayor of party p in year t.28
By including this full range of political controls in my regressions I am trying to 
ascertain whether participatory budgeting had any effect on public expenditures or health 
outcomes which is separate from that due to the political orientation of different mayors.
Table 1.9 contains the results for public expenditures where I regress in columns 1 to 
6 the main MCA budget shares on participatory budgeting and also include my political 
controls. The results look highly consistent with the results from columns 1 to 6 of 
Table 1.6 which only include the participatory budgeting variable. Health and sanitation 
remains the main beneficiary from an MCA adopting participatory budgeting. The 
findings in Table 1.9 increase my confidence that the relationship between participatory 
budgeting and public expenditures is not being driven by omitted variables.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.10 for infant and child mortality respectively, we observe 
that the inclusion of the additional information on the mayor’s political party does not 
affect the relationship between participatory budgeting and these health outcomes. The 
results for columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.10 line up exactly with those in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 1.8. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.10 we find that having greater control 
by Workers’ Party mayors (or by mayors from P L ,P T B ,P M D B  or P SD B )  within 
an MCA is associated with greater infant and child mortality. Despite these “party 
effects” the participatory budgeting effect remains robust and significant. This increases 
our confidence that changes in local government activity associated with adoption of 
participatory democracy (such as the prioritization of health and sanitation expenditures) 
resulted in improvements in health outcomes such as infant and child mortality.
To test further for the existence of an independent participatory budgeting effect 
separate from a possible “Workers’ Party model” effect, I exclude from the sample all 
MCAs with any occurrence of Workers’ Party mayors and re-run my regressions. This 
is possible given that participatory budgeting has also been adopted by rival parties 
to the Workers’ Party. The results are presented in Table 1.11 where columns 1 to 6 
present the results for public expenditures and columns 7 and 8 present the results for
28 Given that the Brazilian multiparty system implies that there is a (very) large number of political 
parties (many of which with a tiny representation at the polls), I have decided to focus on the 8 largest 
parties, as defined by the performance in the last decade’s municipal elections (the remaining parties 
are the omitted category).Therefore, p  =  { P M D B ,  P S D B ,  P F L ,  PL ,  P P B ,  P T B ,  PT,  P D T }  where P T  
refers Partido dos Trabalhadores (i.e. Workers’ Party), P P B  -  Partido Popular Brasileiro, P F L  -  Partido 
da Frente Liberal, P L  -  Partido Liberal, P T B  -  Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, P M D B  -  Partido do 
Movimento Democrdtico Brasileiro, P S D B  -  Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira and P D T  -  Partido 
Democr&tico Trabalhista. Parties that merged or acted in coalition over the period are also taken into 
account. This means that PST and PGT results were coded as PL; PDS, PPR  and PP as PPB; and PSD  
as PTB.
In terms of political orientation PDS ,  P F L ,  P L  and P T B  are right wing, P M D B  is centre right, 
P S D B  is centre left and P T  and P D T  are left wing.
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infant and child mortality. The basic pattern of results observed in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 
hold. The share of MCA budgets dedicated to health and sanitation increases whereas 
administration and planning, housing and urbanism, education and culture and legislative 
shares decline. As these effects are being identified by non-Workers’ Party mayors which 
adopted participatory budgeting they strongly suggest that adoption of this system of 
local government produces effects on public expenditures and health outcomes which are 
independent of the political orientation of a given political party.
A plausible scenario is that demand for basic health and sanitation is high in a number 
of Brazilian MCAs, however the adoption of participatory democracy is needed to align 
the preferences of citizens and politicians. In effect participatory democracy represents 
a mechanism for unlocking this demand and for allowing for it to be expressed in the 
actual public policies which are implemented at the MCA level in Brazil. Just electing 
mayors of a particular political hue is not sufficient to achieve this. What we are likely 
observing is the effect of changing the system of local government as opposed to changing 
the political orientation of the governing mayor. The fact that this may be a system effect 
is encouraging as it suggests that participatory democracy may be successfully adopted 
and implemented by a range of political parties as indeed has been the case in Brazil and 
elsewhere. In essence, it represents a system for potentially improving the aggregation 
of citizens’ preferences in the formulation of public policy at the local level.
1.3.4 M atching Specification
A separate concern from that of the omitted variables, is that adopters and non-adopters 
are not comparable. Differences between these two groups which pre-date the adoption 
of participatory budgeting may both affect the propensity to adopt and also influence 
public expenditure and health outcomes. For example, based on data from the Brazilian 
Census, I observe that MCAs which adopted participatory budgeting tend to be, on 
average, richer, more educated, more urbanized, more densely populated and to have 
better housing infrastructure than non-adopting MCAs.29
To mitigate this concern, I match adopting MCAs (MCAs with some occurrence of 
participatory budgeting) with non-adopting MCAs (MCAs with no experience of partici­
patory budgeting) at the beginning of my sample period. I match on two 1991 indicators 
-  the MCA average per capita household income level and the MCA average education 
level among adults over 25 years old. These are likely to affect the propensity for an 
MCA to adopt participatory budgeting and are also likely to be instrumental in affecting 
public expenditures and health outcomes. Separate matching exercises are carried out 
for each one of these indicators.
In these matching exercises I rank all 3,650 MCAs based on the level of these two 
1991 indicators, and for each adopting MCA I select its closest non-adopting MCA. In
29 MCA level data on these variables is not available on a yearly basis which constrains my ability 
to include them in the panel data regressions reported above. The Brazilian Population Census, which 
produces socioeconomic data for all the municipalities in the country, is only available every 10 years.
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cases where more than one non-adopting MCA was available for matching, I select the 
non-adopting MCA which is geographically most proximate to my adopting MCA. This 
procedure substantially reduces the size of the sample available for econometric analysis, 
but increases my confidence that I am effectively tracking MCAs across time that are 
more comparable in aspects that are relevant for the effects I want to estimate.
Panels A and B of Tables 1.12 contain the results for public expenditures where 
the matching exercise is based on, respectively, the MCA average per capita household 
income level and the MCA average education level among adults over 25 years old in 1991. 
The pattern of results for the key heads of budgetary expenditure, in columns 1 to 6 of 
both panels, is similar to that in Table 1.6 for the full sample, although the magnitude 
of the estimated effects is now smaller. The estimation results in panel A, where the 
matching between adopting and non-adopting MCAs is based on the average per capita 
household income level, suggest an average difference of approximately 2.1 percentage 
points on the budget share allocated to health and sanitation between an MCA that fully 
adopts participatory budgeting and an MCA without participatory budgeting (instead 
of the 3.4 percentage points estimated for the full sample - see column 2 in Table 1.6), 
which is as much as 20% of the variable’s mean at the beginning of the period, in 1990, 
for this sub-sample. As before the larger allocation of expenditures to the health and 
sanitation sector is made at the expense of housing and urbanism (column 3). The use of 
participatory budgeting in this sub-sample of MCAs also remains negatively associated 
with the allocation of administration and planning, education and culture and legislative 
expenditures, although this link is no longer statistically significant (columns 1, 3 and
5).
In panel B of Table 1.12 the matching between adopting and non-adopting MCAs is 
based on the MCA average education level among adults as of 1991. The difference in 
the matching criterion with respect to panel A - average education levels instead of per 
capita household income - results in different samples being available for the econometric 
analysis. However, the estimates for public expenditures in columns 1 to 6 of panel B 
are very similar to the ones found in panel A.
Table 1.13 presents the results for infant and child mortality. As before, panels A 
and B contain the results for the matching based on, respectively, the MCA average per 
capita household income and the average education level among adults over 25 years old in 
1991.The estimated results in both panels of Table 1.13 follow a similar pattern to the ones 
estimated for the full sample in Table 1.8, although the magnitude of the estimated effects 
is smaller. Columns 1 and 2 once again suggest the existence of a significant association 
between the use of participatory budgeting and lower infant and child mortality rates. In 
both panels, the estimated effect suggests an average reduction in infant (child) mortality 
of approximately 2 (0.4) infants (children) for every 1,000 residents up to 1 (4) years of age 
for an MCA that fully adopts participatory budgeting as compared to an MCA without 
participatory budgeting. These estimated effects represent approximately 8% and 6% of 
the infant and child mortality rates sample means at the beginning of the period (which,
1 PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING 31
for both subsamples in panel A and B, were around 26 infants and 6 children for every 
1,000 residents, respectively). More important, once the MCAs budget share on health 
and sanitation is controlled for (columns 3 to 6), we see that allocating more resources 
to this category of expenditure only seems to have a significant effect on the mortality 
rates when it comes together with the use of participatory budgeting (see columns 4 
and 6). Evaluated at the health and sanitation expenditure share whole sample mean 
(approximately 17.3% for the sub-sample of 453 MCAs in panel A and 17% for the sub­
sample of 440 MCAs in panel B), an MCA that fully adopts participatory budgeting 
is expected to have an infant (child) mortality rate around 0.2 (0.03) percentage points 
smaller than an MCA with no participatory budgeting, which is in line with the effect 
estimated in column 1 (2) in the same Table 1.13.
The similarity between the estimates found throughout both panels in Tables 1.12 and 
1.13 and their overall consistency with the results obtained using the full sample of MCAs 
in Tables 1.6 and 1.8 increases my confidence that adoption of participatory budget both 
skews municipal expenditures towards health and sanitation and is associated with a 
fall in infant and child mortality.
1.3.5 A dopters O nly Specification
The matching procedure above does not completely eliminate concerns about the exis­
tence of unobservable factors that might systematically affect the likelihood of adopting 
participatory budgeting and also affect the outcome variables of interest. It is possible, for 
instance, that adopting MCAs could have developed different preferences for improving 
health and sanitation and for reducing infant mortality relative to non-adopting MCAs. 
These preferences might have led them to both use participatory budgeting and to take 
actions to reduce infant and child mortality. The positive correlation between adop­
tion of participatory budgeting and spending on health and sanitation and the negative 
correlation between adoption of participatory budgeting and infant and child mortality 
observed in the full sample may be wrongly interpreted as capturing the causal impact 
of participatory budgeting on these outcomes. If this is case the group of non-adopting 
MCAs in the full sample no longer serves as a valid comparison group with adopting 
MCAs. To address this concern I restrict the sample available for analysis to the group 
of MCAs that at some point during the 1990 to 2004 period adopted participatory bud­
geting. This exercise is possible given that there is substantial variation in the timing 
and the duration of participatory budgeting adoption across MCAs (see Table 1.2). As 
a result, I am able to identify the participatory budgeting effects on public expenditures 
and on health outcomes by exploiting the time-variation in the time of adoption within 
the group of adopting MCAs across my sample period. The rationale behind this identifi­
cation strategy is that by restricting the sample to the group of adopting MCAs I am able 
to “control” for all specific and non-observable factors shared by adopting MCAs that 
may have both influenced their decision to adopt participatory budgeting and to change
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the allocation of public expenditures and reduce infant and child mortality.30 This al­
lows me to more cleanly estimate the effects associated with the adoption of participatory 
budgeting.
Columns 1 to 6 of Table 1.14 provide the estimated effects of participatory budgeting 
on public expenditures after imposing this sample restriction. Again, they confirm the 
main results that we obtained for the full sample in Table 1.6. As we can see in column 
2 (Table 1.14), the use of participatory budgeting is associated with a significantly larger 
allocation of public expenditures to the health and sanitation sector. The estimated 
coefficient in column 2 suggests an average increase of about 1.2 percentage points in 
the budget share allocated to health and sanitation once the MCA adopts participatory 
budgeting, which is about 11% of the “adopters only” sub-sample average budget share in 
health and sanitation at the beginning of the period (10.8%). At the same time, the use 
of participatory budgeting significantly reduces the share of the public budget directed 
to housing and urbanism (column 3) expenditures by around 1.5 percentage points.
Table 1.15 looks at the link between the adoption of participatory budgeting, health 
and sanitation expenditures and infant and child mortality rates within the sample of 
adopting MCAs. The estimated results for this restricted sample suggest the existence 
of a negative association between these variables and the use of participatory budgeting, 
in line with the full sample results found in Table 1.8 and with the results found in 
the matching specifications discussed above. Within the sample of adopters, the use of 
participatory budgeting appears to be associated with an average reduction in infant 
mortality of approximately 1 infant for every 1,000 residents up to 1 year old, which is 
about 4.5% of this sub-sample average infant mortality rate in the period (approximately 
22 infants for every 1,000 residents up to 1 year old). As in the previous specifications 
in Table 1.13 , we see that allocating more resources to health and sanitation (out of the 
total budget) only seems to have a significant impact in reducing infant mortality rates 
when it appears together with the use of participatory budgeting.
Overall, the results estimated within the sample of adopting MCAs for the 1990-2004 
period strongly suggest that adoption of participatory budgeting by MCAs results in a 
change in the allocation of public expenditures which is in line with popular demand as 
expressed in participatory forums. The results from the matched sub-samples reinforce 
this view. Adoption of participatory budgeting across a range of specification is associated 
with an increase in the share of the MCA budget allocated to health and sanitation. 
Moreover, the changes in the infant and child mortality rates associated with adoption 
of participatory budgeting strongly suggest that the expansion in health and sanitation 
spending within adopting MCAs results in significant and substantial declines in infant 
and child mortality rates. Again these results linking adoption of participatory budgeting 
to key health outcomes are robust across a whole range of specifications.
These health improvements are likely to have come about because participatory bud­
30 This is true provided that these specific factors or preferences that characterize the adopting MCAs 
do not vary across time.
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geting led to more attention being paid to health and sanitation in the overall allocation of 
public expenditures. Further, in MCAs that adopted participatory budgeting each Real 
on health and sanitation expenditure had a large impact on infant and child mortality 
relative to that in non-adopting MCAs. This efficiency gain in public money allocation 
associated with the use of participatory budget is possible not only because participatory 
budgeting narrows down the information asymmetries between the elected politicians 
and the citizens, but also because it promotes a greater monitoring, by the citizens, on 
the projects that integrate the public budget. Thus, results from this paper importantly 
suggest that adoption of participatory budgeting can have important impacts both be­
cause it allows citizens’ views to be better represented in the policy making process and 
also because it provides a means for citizens to monitor the actions of elected politicians.
1 .4  C o n c lu s io n
The adoption of participatory budgeting has been a highly popular reform at the munici­
pal level in Brazil. The perceived success of participatory budgeting in key municipalities 
like Porto Alegre led to its widespread adoption across Brazilian municipalities and stim­
ulated the development of similar budgeting programs across the developing and also 
the developed world. In Brazil, the Workers’ Party, the political party responsible for 
its development and initial implementation, came to national power on the back of this 
reform, which has since been emulated by other parties.
However, very little evidence exists of its effects in Brazil, or elsewhere, on local 
finances and living standards. Despite all the praise and endorsement received from in­
ternational organizations such as the United Nations (whose city development program 
praised participatory budgeting as an important innovative experience in city manage­
ment) and the World Bank (which is a strong advocate of the relevance of community 
participation in improving development outcomes), whether participatory budgeting is 
effective in improving political accountability and government responsiveness is an open 
question.
To fill this important gap in the literature I have put together a municipality panel 
data set covering the whole of Brazil for the period 1990 to 2004. This data set includes 
municipal level information on adoption of participatory budgeting, public expenditures 
and health outcomes. Using this unique data set I identify the effects on public expendi­
ture and associated living standard outcomes associated with adoption of participatory 
budgeting by exploiting the rich variation in time of adoption and duration of adoption 
both within and across municipalities across time.
Although general welfare conclusions cannot be drawn, it is clear from my results that 
the direction of changes in the allocation of resources across budgetary heads do seem 
to match with what we know from the citizens’ expenditure preferences. In particular 
adoption of participatory budgeting at the municipal level is associated with increased ex­
penditure on basic sanitation and health services (such as water and sewage connections,
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waste removal) leading to these services occupying an increased share of total municipal 
budgets. Associated with this reallocation of resources at the municipal level we also 
observe a significant reduction in the infant mortality rates among municipalities that 
adopted participatory budgeting. In this sense the reform appears to have brought gov­
ernment functioning closer to citizens’ preferences and to have resulted in improvements 
in living standards along this key dimension.
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1.5  F ig u re s  a n d  T ab le s
F igu re  1.1: Participatory Budgeting - Yearly Cycle
start
March
Informal citizen 
gatherings in the 
differen t city regions 
to collect demands
April
Plenary with Mayor: 
evaluation of previous 
years projects, 
discussion of new 
proposals 
& election of delegates
April - June
Delegates meet citizens 
who rank their claims. 
These are aggregated 
together with other 
criteria (e.g.. how much access 
neigh, has to service and 
its population size)
Sept -  Dec
Group of selected delegates 
follows debate in the
Chamber and lobbies. 
Rules are set for next 
year’s meetings September
New budget approved by 
executive 
and send to legislature 
for debate and 
endorsement
July -  Sept
Group of selected delegates 
meets to debate 
chosen criteria, demands 
of their constituents and 
allocation of resources 
as proposed by the 
mayor’s office
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F igure  1.2: Geographic Evolution of PB
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F igure 1.3: Municipal Expenditures by Category
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F ig u re  1.5: Evolution of Expenditure Share on Health and Sanitation - Adopters
versus Non-Adopters
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Table 1.1: Municipalities with Participatory Budgeting Across Time
No. of municipalities 1986-1988 % pop 1989-1992 % pop 1993-1996 % pop 1997-2000 % pop 2001-2004 % pop
with PB 1 0.18% 12 9.31% 51 11.67% 119 15.62% 169 27.04%
with Workers' Party mayor 2 0.22% 37 10.44% 55 5.54% 115 5.04% 186 17.56%
Workers' Party & PB 1 • 10 20 - 55 78 -
Total no. municipalities 3,991 139,287 4,491 145,336 4,974 154,544 5,507 163,793 5,561 175,394
Note: I take every 4-year legislative period bounded by a mayoral election as the indicative date for the beginning (or end) of a participatory
Table 1.2: MCAs with Participatory Budgeting Across Time
No. of MCA's 1986-1988 1989-1992 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004
with PB 1 
w ith Workers' Party mayor 2
12
37
50
52
108
100
157
158
Workers' Party & PB 1 10 20 51 73
Total no. MCA’s 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652
Note: I take every 4-year legislative period bounded by a mayoral election as the indicative date for the beginning (or end) of a participatory
o
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Table 1.3: Priorities Voted in PB Forums in Porto Alegre
Year 1st 2nd 3rd
2004 Housing Social Education
2003 Housing Education Paving
2002 Housing Education Paving
2001 Paving Housing Basic Sanitation
2000 Housing Paving Health
1999 Basic Sanitation Paving Housing
1998 Paving Housing Basic Sanitation
1997 Housing Paving Basic Sanitation
1996 Paving Basic Sanitation Land Use Reg
1995 Paving Land Use Reg Basic Sanitation
1994 Land Use Reg Paving Basic Sanitation
1993 Basic Sanitation Paving Land Use Reg
1992 Basic Sanitation Education Paving
Source: Municipality of Porto Alegre
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics as of 1990
42
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Census Data (1991)1
area (Km2) 3,650 2,336 14,320 3.7 361,329
resident population 3,650 40,204 212,487 751 9,646,285
urban population (%) 3,650 54.9 22.8 2.2 100
people in houses with garbage collection (%) 3,650 56.4 30.6 0 100
people in subnormal housing (%) 3,650 0.6 2.9 0.0 65.9
houses w / electricity connection (%) 3,650 73.4 22.2 3 100
houses w / w ater connection public network (%) 3,650 42.2 23.9 0 96.9
houses w / sewage connection public network (%) 3,650 18 26.6 0 95.7
avg yrs education >25 yrs old 3,650 3.1 1.2 0.4 8.8
enrolment rate 7-14 year olds (%) 3,650 72.7 14.1 9.2 99
illiterate population > 15 yrs old (%) 3,650 30.1 16.4 1.8 1.4
per capita monthly hh income (R$ 2000) 3,650 0.7 0.4 0.1 3.5
theil index 3,650 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.4
resident doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 3,650 0.3 0.5 0.0 6.9
graduate nurses over total residents (%) 3,650 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
life expectancy 3,650 62.8 3.8 50.4 73.8
infant mortality (UNDP) 2 3,650 49.7 24.5 11.1 125.2
Ministry of Health Data
infant mortality (<1 yr old)3 
child mortality (<4 yr old)3
3.270
3.270
0.02
0.006
0.02
0.006
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.05
Treasury Data
total per capita budgetary expenditure 4 (1990) 3,270 85.1 64.7 2.2 1417.4
total per capita budgetary expenditure 4 (1994) 3,509 116.4 84.9 19.9 1481.8
% spending administration & planning 3,270 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.92
% spending housing & urbanism 3,270 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.63
% spending health & sanitation 3,270 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.52
% spending education & culture 3,270 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.68
% spending legislative 3,270 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.69
% spending new investment 3,270 0.25 0.11 0.00 0.83
Note: based on minimal comparable areas (MCA's)
1 Census Data is from 1991.
2 Infant mortality rate as defined by the UN - number of deaths per 1,000 live births.
3 Mortality rate calculated as the ratio of number of deaths by the number of residents.
4 BRL at constant prices of 1994
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Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics - whole sample (1990-2004)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observation
% spending admin. & 
planning
overall
between
within
0.180 0.089
0.047
0.076
N = 47684 
n = 3650
% spending housing & 
urbanism
overall
between
within
0.120 0.078
0.050
0.061
N = 47684 
n = 3650
% spending health & 
sanitation
overall
between
within
0.167 0.076
0.046
0.061
N = 47684 
n = 3650
% spending education & 
culture
overall
between
within
0.290 0.073
0.042
0.060
N = 47684 
n = 3650
% MCA budget spent using overall 0.022 0.141 N = 47684
PB between
within
0.092
0.103
n = 3650
overall 0.020 0.019 N = 44401
infant mortality (<1 yr old) between
within
0.012
0.014
n = 3650
overall 0.005 0.004 N = 47679
child mortality (<4 yr old) between
within
0.003
0.003
n = 3650
Note: based on 3,650 minimal comparable areas (MCA's)
Table 1.6: The Effect of PB on Budget Allocations
OLS - FE
Administration 
& Planning /  
BME
Health & 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing & 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education 
& Culture /  
BME
Legislative
/BME
Others /  
BME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1 -0.011** 0.034*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.002 0.008*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707
Nr categories (MCA's) 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650
R-squared 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.26 0.49
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, c lustered a t "MCA" level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%
1 PB represents the  % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with participatory  budgeting.
The d ep en d en t variables m easure the proportion of the total MCA public budget ("BME") allocated to each one of the categories.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of PB on per capita Expenditures
OLS - FE
Total budgetary 
expenditure pc
Exp on 
Administration 
& Planning pc
Exp on 
Health & 
Sanitation
Exp on 
Housing & 
Urbanism 
pc
Exp on 
Education 
& Culture 
pc
Exp on 
Legislative 
pc
Other Exp 
pc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PB1 -7.27 -3.65** 5.58*** -5.31*** -3.70** -0.93* -4.21
[5.098] [1.449] [1.846] [1.369] [1.671] [0.530] [4.91]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 34,781 34,781 34,781 34,781 34,781 34,781 34,781
Nr categories (MCA's) 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650
R-squared 0.84 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.81 0.53 0.48
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, clustered a t "MCA" level. * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1% 
Per capita expenditures, a t constan t prices, fo rth e  period 1994-2004 (after Real).
1 PB represen ts the % of people within the MCA living in m unicipalities with participatory budgeting.
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Table 1.8: The Effect of PB and Health Expenditures on Mortality
OLS - FE
infant child infant infant child child
mortality mortality mortality mortality | mortality mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1 -0.003*** -0.001*** -o.ooi ! -0.000
[0.0007] [0.0001] [0.001] | [0.000]
Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME -0.003*
[0.002]
-0.002 ! 
[0.002]
-0.001*
[0.0004]
-0.0004
[0.0004]
(Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME) * PB -0.012***
[0.004]
-0.002***
[0.001]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707 47,707
Nr categories (MCA's) 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 | 3,650 3,650
R-squared 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.44
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, clustered a t "MCA" level. ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1%
1 PB represen ts the % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with participatory budgeting.
Mortality rates calculated as the ratio of num ber of deathes by the num ber of residents in the relevant age group.
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Table 1.9: The Effect of PB and Mayor’s Party on Budget Allocation
OLS - FE
Administration 
& Planning /  
BME
Health & 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing 8t 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education 
& Culture /  
BME
Legislative
/B M E
Others /  
BME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1 -0.011** 0 .030*** -0.014*** -0 .012*** -0.003* 0.009*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
PT2 0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.006 0.003* -0.010**
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
PPB2 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
PFL2 -0.000 0.000 0.005** -0.004 0.001 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
PL2 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0 .004*** -0.006
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
PTB2 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
PMDB2 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
PSDB2 -0.003 -0.003 0 .007*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
PDT2 0.004 -0.006* 0.003 -0.002 -0.000 0.003
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
other parties yes yes yes yes yes yes
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 43,680 43,680 43,680 43,680 43,680 43,680
Nr categories (MCA's) 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650
R-squared 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.26 0.61
NOTES: R o b u s t  s .e . in b rack e ts ,  c lu s t e r e d  a t  "MCA" level . * s ig n i f i can t  a t  10%; ** s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  5%; *** s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
1 PB r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  % of  b u d g e t  w i th in  t h e  MCA d e c id e d  in m u n i c ip a l i t i e s  with  p a r t ic ip a to ry  b u d g e t in g .
2 % of  b u d g e t  in t h e  MCA u n d e r a  m ay o r  from th i s  party.
Political o r ie n ta t io n :  Right w ing  - PPB, PFL, PL, PTB; Centre- right : PMDB; Centre - le f t :  PSDB; Left wing: PT, PDT
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Table 1.10: The Effect of PB and Mayor’s Party on Mortality
OLS - FE infant mortality child mortality
(1) (2)
PB1 -0.004*** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.0002]
PT2 0.003*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.0001]
PPB2 0.002*** 0.0004***
[0.001] [0.0002]
PFL2 0.001* 0.0002
[0.001] [0.0002]
PL2 0.002*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.0002]
PTB2 0.002*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.0002]
PMDB2 0.002** 0.0004**
[0.001] [0.0002]
PSDB2 0.001* 0.0003*
[0.001] [0.0002]
PDT2 0.001 0.0003
[0.001] [0.0002]
other parties yes yes
year effects yes yes
MCA effects yes yes
Observations 43,680 43,680
Nr categories (MCA's) 3,650 3,650
R-squared 0.39 0.42
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, c lustered a t "MCA" level.
* significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t 1% 
1,2 see  notes in Table 1.9
Table 1.11: The Effect of PB on Budget Allocation and Mortality (non-PT municipalities only)
OLS - FE
Administration 
& Planning /  
BME
Health & 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing & 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education & 
Culture /  
BME
Legislative /  
BME
Others /  BME
infant
mortality
child
mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB1 -0.009 0.036*** -0.013** -0.011** -0.007** 0.005 -0.004*** -0.001***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.001] [0.0002]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 40,504 40,504 40,504 40,504 40,504 40,504 40,504 40,504
Nr of categories (MCA's) 3,412 3,412 3,412 3,412 3,412 3,412 3,412 3,412
R-squared 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.25 0.49 0.40 0.42
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, c lustered a t MCA level. * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1%
1 PB represen ts the % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with participatory budgeting.
In columns 1-6 the d ep en d en t variables m easure the proportion of the total MCA public budget ("BME") a llocated  to each one of the categories. In columns 7-8 the 
d ep en d en t variables m easure the ratio betw een the num ber of d eath es and the num ber of residents up to 1 and 4 years old, respectively.
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Table 1.12: Nearest Neighbour - Budget Allocation
A - Household per capita Income
OLS-FE
Administration & 
Planning /  BME
Health & 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing & 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education & 
Culture /  BME
Legislative /  
BME
Others /  
BME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1
-0.005 0 .021*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.001 0.012**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,818 5,818 5,818 5,818 5,818 5,818
Nr of categories (MCA's) 453 453 453 453 453 453
R-squared 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.47 0.48 0.52
B - Average Education Level
OLS-FE
Administration & 
Planning /  BME
Health 81 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing & 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education & 
Culture /  BME
Legislative /  
BME
Others /  
BME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1
-0.003 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.003 -0.002 0.009**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,676 5,676 5,676 5,676 5,676 5,676
Nr of categories (MCA's) 440 440 440 440 440 440
R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.51
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, clustered a t MCA level. * significant a t 10%; ** significant a t 5%; *** significant a t 1%
Sample restricted to 228 adopting MCA's and the ir nearest control neighbours based  on household per capita income (panel A) and 
on avg num berof years of education in 1991 (panel B).
1 PB represents the % of budget within the MCA decided in municipalities with participatory budgeting.
The dependen t variables m easure the proportion of the total MCA public budget ("BME") allocated  to each one of the categories.
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Table 1.13: Nearest Neighbour - Mortality
A - Household per capita Income
OLS - FE
infant
mortality
child
mortality
infant
mortality
infant
mortality
child
mortality
child
mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1
-0.002***
[0.001]
-0.0004***
[0.0001]
-0.0004
[0.0013]
0.000
[0.000]
Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME
-0.001
[0.003]
0.002
[0.003]
-0.0002
[0.0006]
0.0005
[0.0007]
(Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME) * PB
-0.010**
[0.005]
-0.002**
[0.001]
year effects 
MCA effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations
Nr categories (MCA's)
R-squared
5,818
453
0.39
5,818
453
0.43
5,818
453
0.39
5,818
453
0.39
5,818
453
0.43
5,818
453
0.44
B - Average Education Level
OLS-FE
infant
mortality
child
mortality
infant
mortality
infant
mortality
child
mortality
child
mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1
-0.002***
[0.001]
-0.0004***
[0.0001]
-0.0003
[0.0013]
-0.000
[0.000]
Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME
-0.001
[0.003]
0.002
[0.003]
-0.0004
[0.0006]
0.0003
[0.0006]
(Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME) * PB
-0.009*
[0.005]
-0.002*
[0.001]
year effects 
MCA effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
^es
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations
Nr categories (MCA's)
R-squared
5,676
440
0.41
5,676
440
0.45
5,676
440
0.40
5,676
440
0.41
5,676
440
0.45
5,676
440
0.45
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, clustered a t "MCA" level. ** significant a t S%; *** significant a t  1%
Sample restricted to  228 adopting MCA's and their nearest control neighbours based on household  per capita  
income (panel A) and on avg num ber of years of education in 1991 (panel B).
1 PB represents the % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with partic ipato ry  budgeting.
M ortality rates ca lcu la ted  as th e  ratio  of number of deathes by the number of residents in the relevant age group.
Table 1.14: The Effect of PB on Budget Allocation (PB adopters only)
OLS - FE
Administration 
& Planning /  
BME
Health & 
Sanitation /  
BME
Housing & 
Urbanism/ 
BME
Education & 
Culture /  BME
Legislative /  
BME
Others /  
BME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PB1 -0.000 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.003 0.007
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
MCA effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,229 3,229 3,229 3,229 3,229 3,229
Nr of categories (MCA's) 228 228 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.50 0.61 0.57 0.48 0.43 0.55
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, clustered  a t  MCA level. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%
1 PB represents the % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with participatory
The dependent variab les m easure the proportion of the total MCA public budget ("BME") a llocated  to each one of the categories.
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Table 1.15: The Effect of PB on Mortality (PB adopters only)
OLS - FE
infant
mortality
child 1 
mortality j
infant
mortality
infant 
mortality j
child
mortality
child
mortality
(1) (2) I! (3) (4) 1 (5) (6)
PB1 -0.001**
[0.001]
-0.0002* 1 
[0.0001]
0.001
[0.001]
0.0001
[0.0003]
Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME
0.004
[0.004]
0.008
[0.005]
0.0004
[0.0009]
0.001
[0.001]
(Exp on Health & 
Sanitation /  BME) * PB
-0.010*
[0.001]
-0.002
[0.001]
year effects 
MCA effects
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Observations
Nr categories (MCA's)
R-squared
3,229
228
0.53
3,229
228
0.54 1
j  3,229 
228 
0.53
3,229
228
0.53 |
3,229
228
0.54
3,229
228
0.54
NOTES: Robust s.e. in brackets, c lustered a t "MCA" level. ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%
1 PB represents the % of budget within the MCA decided in m unicipalities with participato ry  budgeting. 
M ortality ra tes calcu lated  as the ra tio  of num ber of deathes by the  num ber of residents in the relevant age 
group.
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A p p e n d ix
Table A .l: Municipal Accounts (Basic Structure)
I. Total Revenue________________________________________________________________
1.1. Current Revenues
1.1.1. Fiscal Revenue
1.1.1.1.Taxes
1.1.1.2. Fees
1.1.2. Intergovernemental Transfers
1.1.3. Other Current Revenues
1.1.3.1 Patrimonial
1.1.3.2 Contributions for Municpal Improvements
1.1.3.3 Municipal Services
1.2. Capital Revenues
1.2.1. Credit Operations
1.2.2. Assets Sold
1.2.3. Capital Transfers
1.2.4 Others
II. Total Budgetary Expenditure_________________________
11.1. Current Expenditures
11.1.1. Operating Costs
II. 1.1.1. Personnel
11.1.1.2. Others
11.1.2. Current Transfers
11.1.3. Other Current Expenditures
11.2. Capital Expenditures
11.2.1. Investments
11.2.2. Financial Investments
11.2.3. Capital Transfers
Source: IPEA
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Table A .2: Categories of Governmental Expenditures
55
Category Sub-category
1. Legislative legislative action
external control
2. Judiciary judiciary action
defense of public interest in judiciary process
3. Essential to Justice defense of juridical order
judicial and extra-judicial representation
4. Administration planning and budgeting
general adm inistration
financial adm inistration
internal control
supervision and inspection
inform ation technologies
territorial planning
human resources training
revenue adm inistration
concessions adm inistration
mass media
5. National Defense air security
m aritime security
terrestrial security
6. Public Security police
civil protection
inform ation and intelligence
7. External Relation diplomatic relations
international cooperation
8. Social A ssistance assistance  for the elderly
assistance  for the disabled
assistance  for children and teenagers
communitary assistance
Category Sub-category
9. Social Provident Care basic previdence 
estatutary previdence 
additional previdence 
special previdence
10. Health basic care
hospital and am bulatory care
therapeutic and prophylactic care
sanitary  surveillance
epidemiologic surveillance
food and nutrition
11. Labour workers' protection and benefits
working relations
employability programs
12. Education fundamental education
secondary education
professional education
pre-school education
adult education
special education programs
13. Culture historical and artis tic  heritage
cultural diffusion
14. Citizen Rights social rehabilitation
individual and collective rights
assistance  to indigenous groups
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Table A .3: Categories of Governmental Expenditures (cont.)
Category Sub-category Category Sub-category
15. Urbanism urban infrastructure
urban services
urban collective transports
16. Housing rural housing
urban housing
23. Trade and Services trade promotion
marketing
external trade
financial services
tourism
17. Sanitation rural basic sanitation 
urban basic sanitation
24. Communications mail
telecom munications
18. Environmental Policy environmental preservation 
environmental control 
rehabilitation of degraded areas 
w ater resources management 
meteorology___________________
25. Energy m aintenance
electrical energy
oil
alcohol
19. Science and Technology scientific development
technology and engineering 
___________________________ scientific and technological diffusion
26. Transports air transport
terrestrial transport
railroad tran spo rt
water tran spo rt
special transport
20. Agriculture vegetal production promotion
anim al production promotion
vegetal san itary  care
anim al sanitary  care
supply
rural expansion
irrigation
27. Sports and Leisure competitive sport
community sports
leisure
21. Agrarian Organization agrarian  reform 
colonization
28. Special Duties refinancing internal debt
refinancing external debt
internal debt service
external debt service
transfers
others
22.Industry industrial promotion
industrial production
mining
industrial property
inspection and quality
Source: Decree no. 42/1999; Ministry of Planning
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Table A .4: Categories of Governmental Expenditures
category until 2002: after 2002 splits into:
- Administration and Planning 4. Administration
19. Science and Technology
28. Special Duties
- Education and Culture 12. Education
13. Culture
27. Sports and Leisure
- Health and Sanitation 10. Health
17. Sanitation
18. Environmental Policy
- Assistance and Social Care 8. Social Assistance
9. Social Provident Care
- Public Security 5. National Defense
6. Public Security
-Judiciary 2. Judiciary
3. Essential to Justice
Source: Decree no. 42 /1999; M inistry of Planning; Treasury
Table A .5: Infant Mortality by Brazilian Region
1991 2000 % var.
North 44.0 33.0 -25
Northeast 72.9 52.3 -28
Southeast 33.6 24.1 -28
South 28.7 20.3 -29
Centre-W est 33.3 24.0 -28
Brazil 48.4 33.6 -30.6
S ource: IBGE and  Sim oes (2002)
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2 D oes Exposing Corruption on  
the Internet Affect Electoral 
Performance?
2 .1  I n tr o d u c tio n
The promotion of transparency in political affairs has become over the last few years a 
fundamental tool to combat political corruption and a requisite for good governance. Dif­
ferent countries have set up information dissemination programmes targeted to increase 
public scrutiny of the elected officials and, as result, decrease the scope for wrongdoing.31 
Better informed voters can more easily distinguish the “bad” from the “good” politicians 
and throw the former out at the time of elections. But to what extent can this rela­
tionship between increased information about corruption and greater accountability be 
observed in reality? Do informed voters effectively use their electoral power to “throw the 
rascals out” of office? This is the main question I will address in this paper - whether giv­
ing the voters reliable information about the politicians involvement in corrupt activities 
does have an impact on their voting decisions. On a first approach the answer seems to 
be unambiguously “yes” . But the many examples of convicted politicians consecutively 
elected to office, do make one wonder whether voters have become totally insensitive 
to corruption among the political class.32 In practice, the fact that there are not many 
cases where we can find a significant amount of objective, politically unbiased information 
about political wrongdoing being disclosed to the electorate makes this question hard to 
test empirically. In this paper, I will take advantage of an information dissemination 
project conducted by the Brazilian non-governmental organization Transpar&ncia Brasil 
in order to address this question.
In July 2006 Transparencia Brasil, which is dedicated to fighting political corruption 
in Brazil, released on its Internet page a list with all criminal records of the incumbent 
federal deputies (FDs henceforth) running for re-election in the upcoming congressional 
elections of October 1st. The list included all past convictions and pending lawsuits 
against this group of deputies, as long as they were related to some sort of wrongdoing
31 Programs aimed at promoting transparency and government accountabiliy are in place, for instance, 
in Colombia ( “Internet para la rendicion de las cuentas”), Argentina ( “Programa Cristal”); South Korea 
(programme “Open”) and Philippines (programme TAG). In these programmes a variety of information 
related to local governments is published online for public knowledge and scrutiny.
32 Obviously, there are different reasons, beyond information asymmetries, why someone may decide 
to cast her vote for a corrupt politician. She might be exchanging her vote for some personal economic 
advantage in a patron-client type of relationship, or might perceive corruption as not only inherent but 
essential and generalized in the political system (the “oil that greases the machine”) or she might simply 
take corruption as a candidate characteristic to be weighed up along with many (more positive) others. In 
this paper, I am not going to empirically test these alternatives. Instead I am going to focus particularly 
on the impact of a information dissemination project of politicians’ corruption on their electoral results.
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in the exercise of their public functions.33
The timing of this information dissemination project, which was launched under the 
name “Projeto Excelencias” (this is “Project Excellencies”, following the way federal 
deputies address each other in Congress), was not random. Its release coincided with a 
period when political corruption was a particularly salient issue for the Brazilian elec­
torate following a succession of corruption scandals involving several top government 
officials and members of the federal Congress. As a result, “Projeto Excelencias” soon 
became very popular among the Brazilian media and electorate: during the two-month 
period prior to the elections alone, the project’s website attracted a record number of 
more than 2 million visits.
My objective in this paper is to identify the effect of the information revelation about 
the incumbents’ criminal records brought by “Projeto Excelencias” on their electoral 
performance in October 2006. Several features of this project are advantageous for my 
empirical analysis. First, its focus on the federal Chamber of Deputies allows me not only 
to have access to a “large enough” sample of over 400 deputies from different states and 
parties, but also to a considerable amount of deputy level information, since the federal 
executive is one of the best documented political bodies in the country. This allows me 
to control for several candidate-level variables, such as state, political party, seniority in 
Congress or campaign expenditures, that might be correlated both with the candidate’s 
electoral performance and with her probability of being listed with criminal charges by 
Transparencia Brasil.34
Second, because Brazilian congressmen typically have long political careers (in 2006 
more than 60% of the candidates to re-election were running for at least their third con­
secutive term) I am able to track the electoral performance of several candidates for more 
than two Congressional elections. This gives me the possibility to exploit both between 
and within candidate variation in the existence of criminal charges for identification of 
their impact on the electoral outcomes. It also allows me to test for eventual pre-existing 
trends in the candidates’ electoral performance. This way I guarantee that I will not 
wrongly associate with the Transparencia Brasil’s project any pre-2006 differential trends 
in electoral results between criminally charged and non-charged candidates. Finally, the 
fact that the project covered all incumbent candidates, without discriminating by region 
or political party, making use of an independent platform - the Internet - that can be 
accessed throughout the country, is also beneficial to my analysis. It alleviates concerns 
related to the non-randomness of the information disclosed that usually affect this type 
of empirical studies.35
33 A few exceptional crimes were also listed for their severity, such as the crimes of tax evasion, homicide, 
rape, pedophilia and forced labour.
34 The word “charge” is being used in a broad sense here. It covers both the existence of former 
convictions or pending lawsuits against the deputy. In the latter case, it might refer either to a formal 
criminal investigation or to an indictment against the candidate in the Supreme Federal Court.
35 Despite the unbiasedness of the Transparencia Brasil work - as the content published effectively 
reflected all the existing judicial records involving the incumbent candidates - I can not rule out that 
the list of criminally accused candidates obtained is clean of any sort of non-randomness in the way the
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My findings show that, contrary to the commonly shared idea that corrupt politi­
cians are unduly tolerated in Brazil,36 the Brazilian voters do not seem to be indifferent 
to information about corruption involving politicians. The incumbent politicians who 
were listed with criminal charges in “Projeto Excelencias” in 2006 did register, on av­
erage, approximately a 24% significantly lower chance of re-election and did observe a 
statistically significant drop in their vote shares of around 0.3 percentage points (roughly 
15% of the sample mean incumbents’ vote share of 2%) after their criminal record was 
revealed as compared to their fellow deputies with a “clean” criminal record. Moreover, 
and very important, I also show that the observed results do not arise as a consequence of 
a differentiated trend between these two groups of politicians. By analysing the electoral 
performance of the incumbents in previous electoral contests (1998 and 2002) I observe 
that there were no statistically significant differences between the electoral performance of 
the candidates listed with criminal charges under “Projeto Excelencias” and that of their 
peers with a clean criminal record. This is an encouraging result, particularly when a 
closer look at the criminal records listed by Transparencia Brasil reveals that many of the 
candidates’ charges were in fact previous to 2002. This suggests that the Transparencia 
Brasil anti-corruption campaign and information dissemination project allowed voters to 
identify and punish, in the 2006 elections, a group of candidates that, despite an historical 
record of criminal offences, had managed to survive previous elections unscathed.
These are important findings - they show that voters do value and make use of 
information that allows them to better distinguish the “crooks” from the law-abiding 
politicians. In this sense, greater access to information does seem to have enhanced 
electoral accountability. Obviously, it has to be stressed that the effectiveness of “Projeto 
Excelencias” (or of any other information project of similar nature) in throwing corrupt 
politicians out of office is conditioned by a fundamental element of the electoral race: the 
perceived quality of the challengers in the election. Except for a few selected cases37, the 
Transparencia Brasil project did not provide any information about the criminal record 
of the 4,943 challengers standing for election in October 2006. However, the perceived 
quality of these challengers vis-a-vis that of the incumbents is an important determinant 
of the latter’s electoral performance and, therefore, of the effectiveness of the programme 
under analysis. In particular, the more voters perceive the challengers as (at least) as 
corrupt as the incumbents “black-listed” in “Projeto Excelencias” , the less effective the 
project will be in throwing the latter out of office. This should be bear in mind when 
interpreting the project’s estimated effects in the next sections.
lawsuits were instituted and charges were made across different regional jurisdictions and/or electoral 
parties or politicians. This type of bias, if existent, is not going to be addressed in this paper as it is out 
of the scope of my empirical question.
36An example of this tolerance for “less honest” politicians in Brazil is a well known popular saying, 
regarding politicians, that goes, “he steals but he makes things!” , or “Ele rouba mas faz!” in Portuguese 
(as striking as it may seem this was even used as the political slogan for the Sao Paulo governor Adhemar 
Barros between 1950-60). It shows that corruption was seen as a widespread, tolerated phenomenon 
across politicians.
37A few famous challengers with a knwon record of crimes against the public administration were also 
listed in “Projeto Excelencias” .
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The results in this paper also underline the powerful role of the Internet in the diffusion 
of information. Different from the information transmitted by radio and TV broadcasters 
or available from the printed media, the content published on the Internet can reach a 
very vast audience within a short period of time at a very little cost. The Internet 
is an (almost) “free” platform that virtually everyone can access and can use for the 
exchange and diffusion of information. Because the Internet users do not have to choose 
the content they post in order to please their sponsors or guarantee a minimum amount 
of sales, projects such as the one by Transparencia Brasil can additionally benefit from 
far more independence than the ones originating from the conventional media.
The results in this paper are in line with the ones found by Peters and Welch (1980) 
and Chang and Golden (2004), who assess the electoral impact of charges of corruption 
on accused political candidates respectively for the United States and Italy. They find 
that although re-election rates remained considerably high among the criminally charged 
candidates, these candidates experienced a significant loss of between 6 and 10 percent in 
their vote share. Although the fundamental empirical question these studies aim to an­
swer is the same I address in this paper, there is a difference in the setting and approach 
used. While I focus on the organized and timed effort by one institution, Transparencia 
Brasil, and on one specific means of communication, the Internet, in making that infor­
mation accessible to the Brazilian electorate, they rather look at the existence of criminal 
charges (whose existence they themselves investigate) as one among many factors that 
characterize the politician and may impact on her electoral success, without addressing 
how the existence of these charges gets to the knowledge of the voters.
My study also contributes to the literature that examines the impact of information 
dissemination mechanisms, and of the media in general, on enhancing political account­
ability and improving the quality of government. Brunetti and Weder (2003), using a 
large cross-section of countries as well as panel data find evidence that a free, inde­
pendent press is one of the most important controls against bureaucratic corruption. 
Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) on a study based on household data from India show that 
improved information flows at village level reduce politician opportunism and improve 
resource allocation. Besley and Burgess (2002) and Stromberg (2004) show, using data 
from India and the US, respectively, that governments are on average more responsive 
to population needs in regions with greater access to information through newspapers 
or radio stations. Snyder and Stromberg (2008) find evidence that American political 
districts with lower press coverage have less active Congressmen and receive significantly 
less money from the federal government, and that their voters are less likely to recall and 
rate their representatives. Closer to the focus of my study on political corruption and 
also applied to Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2007) look at a municipality anti-corruption 
audit program in Brazilian municipalities and estimate the impact of the release of the 
audit results on the electoral outcomes. Based on the audit results they are able to 
construct an objective measure of corruption and exploit, for identification, the random 
timing of information disclosure across municipalities. Their estimations indicate that
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the pre-electoral release of the audit results reduced the probability of re-election by, 
on average, 20% for the mayors found to be involved in fraudulent activities and that 
this effect increased with the number of radio broadcasters in the municipality, which 
underlines the relevance of information dissemination in strengthening political account­
ability. Likewise, my paper also discusses a specific and powerful way through which 
media can be used to promote accountability and reduce corruption. I show that a free 
and increasingly accessible platform such the Internet can disseminate in a fast and al­
most costless way information which the voters find relevant when exerting their electoral 
power. To my knowledge, this is one of the first works that studies the electoral impact 
of an Internet based project aimed at curbing political corruption. Finally, this work 
is also complementary to the vast literature that analyses the way media exposure of 
candidates shapes their electoral outcomes, such as Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder 
(2006) and Levy and Squire (2000) who study the relationship between political com­
petition and TV coverage in the US elections, or Bergan, Gerber and Karlan (2009), 
who analyse the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political opinions. Different 
from these, however, my work sets the focus on a new but increasingly relevant medium 
- the Internet - and explores its potential in shaping electoral outcomes by serving as 
a platform for an information dissemination campaign about the political candidates. 
As a result, this paper also contributes to the literature that specifically focus on the 
Internet’s impact on elections. This is still a small field of the literature and it has been 
so far very much based on evidence from the United States and Europe and focused on 
the Internet’s impact on political campaigning (see for example Gibson and Ward, 2001; 
Bimber and Davis, 2003; Kluver et al, 2007) and political participation (namely through 
“e-voting” , see for instance Gibson, 2001 or Treschel et al, 2007). McNeal and Tolbert 
(2001) and Lusoli (2005) also look at the Internet’s impact on promoting voting turnout 
and political engagement through the dissemination of information about candidates and 
political parties. To the best of my knowledge, however, the work in this chapter is one of 
the first to specifically look at the link between Internet, corruption and electoral results 
in the context of a developing country.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section I provide 
an overview of the Brazilian context at the time Transparencia Brasil’s project was re­
leased, give details of “Projeto Excelencias” , the type of criminal charges that were found 
among incumbents, and describe the data used in the analysis. Section 2.3 presents my 
empirical strategy and section 2.4 a discussion of the results found and robustness checks 
made. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2 .2  C o n te x t  a n d  D a ta
2.2.1 In ternet E xposure o f Politicians: th e  “P ro jeto  E xcelencias” by Transparen­
cia B rasil
The second half of President Lula da Silva’s first term, between 2005 and 2006, was 
plagued by an unprecedented number of corruption scandals that involved not only many 
top cabinet members but also several federal deputies from across the political spectrum.
The severity of the situation forced some of these politicians to, voluntarily or involuntar­
ily, withdraw (at least temporarily) from political life. However, many of the politicians 
involved in the scandals suffered no immediate political sanctions and emerged as candi­
dates for re-election in the federal elections of 2006. In Brazil, a politician is considered 
eligible even if she is under criminal investigation and facing pending lawsuits as long as 
her right to appeal against court decisions has not been exhausted. This explains why, 
by October 2006, 165 out of the 467 incumbent federal deputies standing for re-election 
had criminal charges pending against them.38
Not surprisingly, as voters grew increasingly distrustful of the quality of its federal 
representatives39 and the approval ratings of the federal Congress dropped to its lowest 
levels in over a decade40, political corruption became one of the most salient issues in the 
electoral campaign. This context motivated the development of “Projeto Excelencias” 
by the anti-corruption NGO Transparencia Brasil. According to this NGO’s founders 
the project responded to a demand from the Brazilian electorate, who amidst countless 
accusations, newspaper covers, TV and radio reports of the scandals looked for objective 
and clear information in order to distinguish the crooks from the law-abiding candidates.
The Internet was the medium of choice for the information dissemination project 
since, as explained by Transparencia Brasil’s founder and board member Neissan Mon- 
adjem “it is cheap to maintain, it is permanent and accessible [throughout the country]” 
(Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity, April 2007).
“Projeto Excelencias” went online in July 2006 and rapidly became a success on the 
Internet, attracting over 2 million visitors during the 3 month-period before election 
day. Its purpose was to provide the Brazilian voter with all the available information 
about the incumbent candidates seeking re-election to the Chamber of Deputies. The 
candidate level information was obtained through research and compilation work done by 
Transparencia Brasil of existing data originally spread throughout several different federal 
and state institutions, some of which are difficult to access by the common citizen. In 
effect, none of the information presented in “Projeto Excelencias” was new or private.
The merit of the project was to compile all the different pieces of existing information and
38In these figures I also include the 23 FDs in power that entered the Congress as stand-ins between 
2003 and 2006.
39In a survey conducted by the best-selling weekly news magazine “Veja” in 2006, only 3% of the 
surveyees agreed that the country’s congressmen effectively represent and defend the [Brazilian] society’s 
needs and interests.
40Datafolha public opinion surveys in 2006 showed that the Brazilian Congress reached in 2005-2006 
the lowest rate of public approval in 12 years.
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make them easily available, through a single website, in order to facilitate the comparison 
of different candidates.
Due to capacity and time constraints the project, as of July 2006, was initially re­
stricted to the 467 incumbent federal deputies standing for re-election together with a 
few “famous” challengers with well known political careers (these included, for instance, 
former members of the cabinet, mayors of large cities and senators). Since then it has 
been enlarged to the whole Congress, including all the 513 federal deputies in power and 
senators, members of the 27 state assemblies as well as of the municipal assemblies of 
state capitals.
Its most innovative and attention grabbing piece of information was the listing of all 
the federal deputies who had either been criminally convicted in the past or had any 
pending inquiry or indictment against them at the time the information was published. 
This resulted in a list of 165 federal deputies with criminal charges among the 467 that 
were standing for re-election (see Table 2.2). Furthermore, the website also allowed the 
user to access the federal deputy individual page where further details on each one of the 
criminal lawsuits listed could be obtained (as long as they were public knowledge, since 
serving deputies can request confidentiality in the legal proceedings by the Supreme 
Federal Court). These included a summary description of the offence, the lawsuit’s 
legal details such as number and institution in charge, its opening date and current 
legal status and, for most cases, a weblink to the existing original judicial data in the 
responsible court’s website. Despite the wealth of the legal information available, its 
technical language made the learning and full understanding of each case’s particulars 
considerably difficult. As a result, the information from “Projeto Excelencias” that 
was subsequently replicated and that circulated in the Internet consisted of the list of 
incriminated federal deputies, by party and state of election, with a minimal description 
of the respective charge(s).
“Projeto Excelencias” also provided other candidate level information beyond the 
eventual existence and description of criminal charges. At the time of the elections, in 
October 2006, the website also listed the federal deputies that were part of religious 
or “ruralist” organizations, professional unions or of the police service, as well as the 
owners of radio/TV licenses and private schools, as these represent important lobby 
groups in the Congress. It was also possible for the Internet user to access detailed 
biographical information (such as age, date and locality of birth, education and former 
professional activities), details on parliamentary activity (attendance record), expenses 
claimed,41 campaign accounts (including campaign contributors and expenditures), asset 
declarations (compulsory for every political candidate since 2002), and press coverage 
during the two years up to the election.42 This last is the result of a parallel project
41 Each FD is entitled to claim R$180,000/year (approximately GBP 40,000 at the average exchange 
rate in 2006) in expenses considered relevant for the execution of their own mandates. The main categories 
of expenses claimed include travelling (other than the commuting between their own states and Brasilia, 
which is separately paid by the Congress), fuel, consulting services, advertising and promotion.
42 Since 2006 the project enlarged not only the range of politicians covered, but also the scope of
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by Transparencia Brasil called “Deu no Jornal” (“In the News”) which consists of an 
electronic database of news about political corruption published by all main newspapers 
and magazines of national coverage since 2004. Through keyword-based searches in this 
database it is possible to access articles published in over 70 newspapers and magazines 
from across the country for each one of the 467 incumbents. Finally, the website also 
publishes its own access statistics, both globally (total number of visits to the website) 
and also by politician’s page (the politicians’ individual pages are accessible from a drop­
down menu in the home page). These statistics show that there is a considerable variance 
across candidates in the number of pageviews received, as can be seen from the summary 
statistics in Table 2.2. Unfortunately, Transparencia Brasil did not keep a record of the 
access statistics by candidate as of 1st October 2006. Thus, the statistics provided in 
Table 2.2 refer to the total number of visits accumulated up to the date of my collection 
(February 2009).
In te rn e t in B razil The Internet offers an (almost) free and uncensored space to ex­
press views, debate ideas and release information to an ever increasing audience.
In Brazil Internet usage has increased at a fast speed over the last decade. According 
to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations agency for in­
formation and communication technology, between 2000 and 2006 the amount of Internet 
users in Brazil rose from 5 to over 53 million people, which corresponded to a shift in 
Internet usage rates from 2.87 to 28.18 users per 100 inhabitants. For comparison, during 
the same period the world Internet usage rates increased from 6.84 to 17.34%.
Despite being still far from the usage and access levels registered by some “Internet 
super-powers” such as Canada, USA (both with usage rates above 70% in 2006) or 
northern Europe (Sweden, Denmark and Iceland had usage rates above 80% in 2006), 
Brazil had already in 2006 a considerably high rate of Internet usage for its development 
level. With 53 million users Brazil had the world’s fifth largest population of Internet 
users in 2006, and its Internet usage rate (28.18%) was the second highest in South 
America, after Chile, and comparable to that of Israel or Greece.
As a result of the economic growth registered over the last years as well as of several 
government initiatives to connect the population to the Internet, access and Internet 
usage rates have kept increasing at a fast pace, faring at 37.52% of the population in 
2008 (this is over 70 million users). Moreover, the effective use of the Internet in Brazil, 
measured by the number of hours the average citizen spends online, is also one of the 
world’s largest. Recent data published by the IWS (Internet World Stats) reveals that, 
as of May 2008, Brazilians were the people who spent the largest amount of time surfing 
the Internet at home - more exactly, an average of 23 hours and 48 minutes per month 
(Germans were the runner-ups with an average of 20 hours and 11 minutes).
information covered by including details of the parliamentary activity of every FD, like projects proposed 
and voting patterns in Congress and, at municipal level, details on public tenders, such as the description 
of projects and respective winning bids.
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The use of the Internet as a vehicle for information dissemination and social mobiliza­
tion campaigns is not a novelty in Brazil. Freedom House reports that the Internet has 
been widely used in Brazil for this purpose and as a vehicle for protesting against govern­
ment policies, citing the aids campaigns, gay rights or open and free software movements 
as examples (Freedom on the Net Report, Freedom House, 2008). As mentioned above, 
the Transparencia Brasil initiative was very effective in mobilizing a large audience in 
a short period of time. Within less than 3 months its “Projeto Excelencias” had had 
more than 2 million visits and had counted approximately 7 million individual pageviews 
(Transparencia Brasil and Revista Veja). It attracted the attention of other Internet 
based means of information and became a popular topic in blogs and Internet forums 
interested in debating politics and transparency. But, more important, the project also 
received extensive coverage by the conventional media channels. Newspapers,43 TV and, 
especially, the radio, which is the most diffused source of information in Brazil, took a 
very active role in emphasizing the project’s innovative role in allowing the Brazilian vot­
ers to distinguish the “corrupt” from the law-abiding candidates. This was fundamental 
to propel the project’s reach across different regions of the country and socioeconomic
44groups.
C rim inal C harges According to the data released by Transparencia Brasil, at the 
time of the 2006 general elections 165 out of the 467 federal deputies standing for re- 
election had been convicted or were being investigated/accused of some sort of crime 
committed either as federal deputies or in other posts previously taken.
The Transparencia Brasil project focused on crimes committed by the federal deputies 
while in the exercise of their political functions. Hence, it deliberately excluded cases of 
a purely private nature, such as post-divorce disputes, as well as crimes against honour 
since politicians are very often a target for defamation-related accusations. As a result, 
the gross majority of the crimes listed by “Projeto Excelencias” fell under the category 
of crimes against the public administration. Roughly 75% of the 165 incumbents had 
at least one charge either for managerial wrongdoing, abuse of office, embezzlement, 
fraudulent bidding or public procurement, or active or passive corruption, while 12% of 
them had charges for electoral crimes such as vote buying or campaign irregularities. In 
total, at the time of the elections, in October 2006, 145 of the incumbents standing for
43 According to Transparencia Brasil approximately 100 newspaper articles dedicated to the project 
were published between the 1st July and 30th September of 2006.
44 As expected in a country with as many inequalities as Brazil, access to the internet is not equally 
distributed across the different socio-economic groups. According to a UN study in 2007, Brazil had the 
most unequal access to the internet across income groups among 14 countries from the LAC region. Its 
internet usage rate, in 2006, varied between a rate of 52%, among the richest, and 1.7% among the poorest 
of its population. There were also, at the time, some regional inequalities due to lack of infrastructure, 
particularly in rural areas. Government investment in networks and programmes for digital inclusion 
are paramount to overcome these inequalities. Among other projects, ongoing federal programmes aim 
at giving free access to the internet to all primary and high school students registered in public schools 
located in urban areas until the end of 2010.
A list with all government programmes can be found in the following address (in Portuguese): 
http://www.inclusaodigital.gov.br/outros-programas
2 INTERNET EXPOSURE OF CORRUPT POLITICIANS 67
re-election had charges for crimes directly related to their political life.
A few exceptional private crimes, however, were taken into account and listed by 
Transparencia Brasil due to their severity. These included crimes of tax evasion, crimes 
against the environment or public health, homicide, rape or pedophilia, and crimes of 
enslavement (i.e. forced labour, which is still common in some regions of Brazil). In total, 
according to Transparencia Brasil 49 of the incumbents standing for re-election in 2006 
had charges for crimes unrelated to their political functions. 28 out of these 49 deputies 
accumulated charges both for crimes of public and private nature at the same date. 
Within the private sphere the most common charges related to fiscal crimes, followed by 
crimes against the environment and/or public health and violations of the employment 
law. In addition to these, a few cases (9 deputies in total) were being investigated for or 
charged with “offences against the person”, which included cases of homicide, rape and 
criminally inflicted injuries.
A fraction of these federal deputies (at least 20%) were subject to more than one 
charge.45 Because the legal system gives politicians, who usually can afford the best 
lawyers, many opportunities to extend and delay the legal proceedings, some of the 
lawsuits listed have been transiting in the judicial system for over a decade.
Despite the richness of the information available in the Transparencia Brasil’s website 
with respect to the federal deputies’ criminal charges, it is unlikely that the nuances in 
legal status or history across the different charges listed resulted in a differentiated ap­
praisal by the voters. This is because most of the information was available in technical 
juridical language, with which the average user was unlikely to be familiar. As a result, 
the information from the project that was mostly retained and was subsequently diffused 
on the Internet and on the traditional media consisted of a list of federal deputies’ names, 
with respective party and state of election, that were being criminally investigated, ac­
companied by a minimal classification of the type of charge.46
For estimation purposes this implies that throughout my analysis I will mainly focus 
on electoral impact of the existence (or not) of criminal charges without differentiating by 
the type of crime. In fact, besides the difficulties associated with classifying the crimes 
in the correct categories given the quality of the information available, the relatively 
small number of observations per category would render such a disaggregation exercise 
inconclusive for estimation purposes. However, it is possible to make a more general
451 do not know with precision the fraction of FDs accused of more than one crime because the detail 
of information available for each lawsuit is variable, depending on its legal stage or the institution in 
charge. It is often the case that the same criminal incident generates more than one type of criminal 
charge, leading to several parallel lawsuits. For instance, many of the FDs involved in the “Escandalo 
dos Sanguessugas” (a major corruption scandal in 2006) were simultaneously accused of embezzlement, 
active/passive corruption and gang formation.
On the other hand, it also happens that the same criminal offence appears listed more than once, under 
different legal documents, by the Transparencia website depending on the legal status of the process and 
the institution in charge. In these cases it is not always possible to distinguish the new from old, already 
existing lawsuits.
46Even today a simple internet search using key words such as “Projeto Excelencias” +  “Deputados” 
-I- “eleigoes 2006” ( “Project Excellencies” +  “Deputies” +  “elections 2006”) can produce a list of names, 
which usually come under the title of “Em quern nao votar”, this is, “Who not to vote for”.
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distinction among all the charges listed by Transparencia Brasil based on whether they 
have resulted for offences related to the deputies’ public or private life (as described 
above). Thus, in my empirical analysis I will also take this distinction into account in 
order to investigate whether voters perceive and treat these two types of crimes differently.
2.2 .2  O ther D ata  Sources
Three other data sources, besides Transparencia Brasil, were used in this paper. The 
electoral outcomes for all candidates come from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE - 
the Brazilian electoral commission), which provided electoral results at state level for all 
electoral contests since 1998. In addition to the electoral results, the TSE also provides 
data on the candidates’ profile including gender, professional occupation, eligibility, party 
affiliation, campaign contributions and expenditures for the three last congressional elec­
tions,47 as well as further electoral statistics such as the size of the electorate, turnout 
rate and total of valid votes for each electoral contest. The candidate information was 
matched across electoral contests in order to identify the incumbents running for re- 
election in each period and to construct measures of electoral performance such as the 
vote share within the state of election or the percentage change in vote share between 
contests, which will be used as outcome variables in my empirical analysis.
The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is another source of information for current and 
former federal deputies. Its database, available online, contains not only basic biographi­
cal data for each federal deputy (date of birth, origin, education and professional career), 
but also several details of their political careers such as electoral status (whether directly 
elected or in power as a stand-in deputy), licenses taken, current and former party affilia­
tions, posts or commission memberships in Congress or any special distinction or activity 
relevant to their political life. While the data from the electoral commission illustrates 
the outcome of each electoral contest, the information available from the Chamber of 
Deputies is continuously updated in order to illustrate the current profile of each federal 
deputy and of the whole chamber. Through the Chamber of Deputies database it is pos­
sible to track all the movements that occurred in the federal deputies political life, such 
as changes in party affiliation (frequent in the Brazilian Congress) or state of election, 
licenses taken as well as resignations or sackings. Given that there are 513 deputies in 
the chamber there is also a considerable seat turnover in the Chamber in each legislative 
period, as some elected federal deputies take leave of absence or resign and have to be 
substituted by stand-in deputies.48 It is through the Chamber of Deputies database that 
I can clearly identify the federal deputies effectively in office in each period.
47Political campaign accounts are only available since 2002, though.
48These stand-in deputies are chosen according to the party’s electoral result ranking in each state.
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2.2 .3  D escrip tive S tatistics
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide basic descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this 
paper. Table 2.1 reports basic statistics on the turnout, candidates and re-election rates 
for the last Congressional elections. It shows that the re-election rate of the incumbent 
FDs was 66% and 60%, respectively in 2002 and 2006, which is suggestive of the existence 
of an incumbent advantage in the Congressional elections in Brazil. It can also be seen 
that the turnout rates remained high49 throughout the period in analysis and registered 
a slightly increased from 1998 to 2006.
Table 2.2 presents data on the profile of the 467 incumbents standing for re-election as 
of October 2006, for the whole group and by criminal status. I observe that besides being 
disproportionately male, the majority of the incumbents already had a considerable career 
in Congress since more than 60% of them were running for, at least, their 3rd consecutive 
term in office. Over one-third of these incumbents had lawsuits pending against them and 
approximately 12% were direct owners of TV and/or radio concessions. The latter figure, 
however, underestimates the influence of the Brazilian federal deputies on the control of 
media outlets throughout the country since it is a known fact that several other licenses 
are owned by their relatives or associates.
For many of the characteristics summarized in Table 2.2 there is a considerable vari­
ance across the federal deputies. For instance, the declared campaign expenditures ranged 
from a few Brazilian Reais to a maximum above 2.7 million Reais (approximately USD 
1.25 million) as of 2006. The media exposure of the candidates, measured by the number 
of times the federal deputy’s name was mentioned in newspaper articles about corruption 
between 2004 and the election date, also varied significantly: two-thirds of the candidates 
had their names mentioned in newspaper articles less than 100 times during this period, 
while approximately 5% of the candidates went above the barrier of 1,000 articles. The 
number of visits each candidate received on her page in the Transparencia Brasil’s web­
site ranged from zero to over 100 thousand pageviews. Finally, the incumbent federal 
deputy’s state vote-share in 2006 fared an average of 2.2% among the 476 incumbents 
(and 2.8% among the 282 of them who were effectively elected). The relatively low av­
erage vote-share among the elected federal deputies, as well as it’s high variance, is in 
part a result of the Brazilian electoral system. The Brazilian Congressional elections are 
based on an open list proportional representation system. In this system each state is 
allocated a number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in proportion to its population.50 
Within the state allocation each party’s quota is proportional to its total vote share in 
that same state. The party’s seats are then distributed across its different candidates by 
descending order of number of votes. As a result, if a given candidate in a party performs 
particularly well at the polls she might be able to bring many seats to her party total
4 9 This is not surprising given that voting is compulsory for every literate Brazilian citizen aged between 
18 and 70 years old.
50This proportionality rule is not perfect. The number of seats one state can get in the Chamber is 
bounded by minimum and maximum values.
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quota and, with that, allow fellow party candidates with tiny vote-shares to be elected.51
Comparing incumbent federal deputies with and without criminal charges, in the 
same table, it is possible to see that most of the variables are well-balanced across the 
two groups. The main exceptions are the seniority in the Chamber of Deputies and the 
number of references in the printed media, both significantly greater among the accused 
candidates, and the rate of affiliation to the Workers’ Party (PT), the re-election rate 
and the change in vote-share between 2006 and 2002, which are significantly lower for 
this same group.
2 .3  E m p ir ica l M e th o d  an d  R e s u lts
2.3.1 Estimation Strategy
At the time of its release the Transparencia Brasil “Projeto Excelencias” focused on the 
incumbent federal deputies standing for re-election in October 2006. Hence, the analysis 
in this paper is performed for this subsample of 467 candidates out of the 4,943 who ran 
for the Chamber of Deputies in 2006. This subsample includes candidates from all the 
26 federal states and main political parties in Brazil.
My aim is to identify the impact of the Internet based information campaign launched 
by Transparencia Brasil in July 2006 on the electoral results of that same year. For each 
candidate in my working sample I observe whether or not she was listed with criminal 
charges in 2006, as well as other political and biographical data, such as her party and 
state of election, age or education. With respect to the candidates’ electoral results, 
the dependent variable, I observe whether or not the candidate was reelected into office 
and her respective vote-share (within her state) in 2006. This data allows me to exploit 
between candidate variation in the existence of criminal charges to estimate its effects on 
both the candidates’ probability of re-election and state vote-share in 2006 controlling 
for several candidate-level characteristics that might also have an impact on her electoral 
performance.
Despite the attractiveness of focusing on the probability of re-election as the main 
outcome of interest, it is worth mentioning that in the specific setting of my analysis 
the candidate’s vote-share is a more informative dependent variable of the effects of 
the Transparencia Brasil’s project. This is because for the reasons explained above the 
electoral system used at the Brazilian federal elections makes the probability of (re­
flection depend not only on the candidate’s individual performance but also on her 
party’s overall performance. By focusing on the candidate vote-share instead, I get 
a cleaner measure of the individual electoral performance and of direct effects of the 
Transparencia Brasil’s information campaign on her results.
By construction, all the 467 candidates in my sample stood for election to the Cham­
ber of Deputies both in 2006 and in 2002. A subset of 288 candidates had also stood
51 This explains why approximately 25% of the incumbents standing for re-election in October 2006 
had got into office in 2002 with a state vote-share below 1.5%.
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for election in 1998. Thus, by putting together the electoral results of the last three 
contests I am able to track the electoral performance of every candidate for at least two 
consecutive periods. This results in a working sample of 1222 observations of vote-share 
at candidate-year level which allows me to exploit not only between but also within can­
didate variation in the existence of criminal charges in order to estimate its impact on the 
candidates’ vote-share. More details on the empirical strategy used and on the estimates 
obtained are provided below.
2.3.2 Specification and  R esu lts
C ross-Section Specification I start by estimating the effect of the Transparencia 
Brasil’s project on the re-election probabilities of the incumbents using the following 
linear probability model for the cross-section of 467 candidates in 2006:
Ri — Oi +  (3Ci X id  +  Hi (2 .1)
where Ri is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if politician i was reelected in 2006 
and 0 otherwise, Ci is an indicator of whether or not federal deputy i was listed in the 
Transparencia Brasil’s website with criminal charges in that same year and X{ is a vector 
of deputy characteristics that might affect the candidates’ electoral outcomes, including 
the state and party of election (which allow me to control for any state and/or party 
shocks that affect the incumbents’ electoral performance), her gender, the number of 
terms and age as of 2006, an indicator variable for whether she changed party with respect 
to the previous election (party change seems to be a usual strategy among Brazilian 
politicians in Brazil in order to increase their re-election probabilities, particularly after 
corruption allegations), media ownership status, the amount of press coverage received 
between 2004 and the election date (measured by the number of name citations in all main 
newspapers across the country), the state vote share in the 2002 election, and the amount 
of electoral campaign contributions available. The last variable is a known determinant 
of a political campaign success. In my specific setting it is a particularly interesting 
control variable as some of the criminally accused candidates might have made use of 
more aggressive electoral campaigns to compensate for the potential negative impact of 
“Projeto Excelencias” on their electoral performance.52
Estimation of equation 2.1 relies on data from 2006 using the variation found across 
the 467 candidates and provides a first test on the project’s impact.
Table 2.3 reports regression results from estimating equation 2.1 on the cross-section 
of 467 incumbent candidates. The dependent variable is the probability of re-election 
in the 2006 elections and I estimate the impact of the project (through the “criminal
52 A note of warning remains since the data available is, of course, based on the candidates’ “declared” 
contributions. The existence of slush funds for electoral campaigns is a well known fact of Brazilian 
politics and it would not be surprising if, for obvious reasons, these were larger among the criminally 
accused candidates. This being the case results in an underestimation of the coeffient associated with 
the existence of criminal charges.
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charges” dummy) by adding different controls to the regression in columns 1 to 3.
Column 1 shows that, unconditionally, criminally accused candidates are associated 
with a lower probability of re-election in 2006. The estimated effect size is -0.25 and 
statistically significant at 0.1% level. Columns 2 and 3 show that this result is robust 
to the inclusion of several candidate-level controls, such as party and state of election 
(column 2), number of terms, age, gender, campaign contributions, ownership of media 
concession and newspaper coverage, as well as the candidate’s vote-share in the previous 
election, in 2002 (column 3). Some of these variables also seem to have a significant impact 
on the re-election probability. The amount of campaign contributions and the vote-share 
in 2002, in particular, are both associated with significantly higher re-election rates. The 
magnitude of these variables’ estimated effects seems however smaller when compared to 
the one associated with the existence of criminal charges. For instance, according to the 
estimation results, everything else being constant, the impact of the existence of criminal 
charges on the probability of re-election is comparable to a decrease in the candidate’s 
campaign contributions by 2.4 standard deviations (this is, approximately BRL 1 million 
or USD 450 thousand in 2006 prices).
For the reasons presented above, I also estimate equation 2.1 using as a dependent 
variable the candidate’s state vote-share in 2006 and the candidate’s change in state-vote 
share between 2002 and 2006.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the estimate results for the effect of “Projeto Excelencias” 
on these two measures of electoral performance: the candidates vote-share in their state 
of election and the difference in vote-share between 2002 and 2006. As explained above, 
the vote share offers a cleaner measure of the candidate’s individual performance since the 
candidate’s re-election probability can be very much determined by her political party’s 
overall performance. Table 2.4 shows that, once state and political party are controlled 
for, the existence of criminal charges is associated with a significantly lower vote share 
by 0.33 percentage points, which represents approximately 15% of the candidates sample 
mean vote-share in 2006 (2.2%). At the same time, the estimation results suggest that 
the candidate’s age is significantly and negatively associated with her vote-share in 2006, 
while larger electoral campaigns are associated with a significantly larger vote-share. 
The size of the electoral campaign has, as expected, a strong estimated impact on the 
candidate’s electoral performance, as measured by her vote-share in the election state: 
a 1 standard deviation in the amount of campaign contributions (approximately BRL 
420 thousand in 2006 prices) is estimated to increase the candidate’s vote share by 0.43 
percentage points, which is almost as much as 20% of the sample mean vote-share in 2006. 
These results suggest that, everything else being constant, the effect of the existence of 
criminal charges on the candidate’s vote-share is comparable to a drop in her campaign 
size by approximately 325 thousand Brazilian Reais, which is more than 75% of the 
latter variable sample mean in 2006. Like in Table 2.3 for the re-election probability, 
the candidate’s gender, experience in Congress, media ownership status or the amount 
of newspaper coverage do not seem to have any significant impact on explaining the
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differences in vote-share across candidates in 2006 once the candidate’s age, criminal 
status and the size of her electoral campaign (plus electoral state and political party) are 
taken into account. The lack of a significant impact of the candidate’s newspaper coverage 
on her electoral results is not surprising. This is because the candidates’ coverage and 
consequent visibility in the traditional media does not necessarily translate into a better 
(or worse) electoral performance as the coverage can be either positive or negative.
Finally, Table 2.5 presents the estimation results for equation 2.1 using the change 
in the candidate’s vote-share between 2002 and 2006 as dependent variable. Different 
from estimating the impact of the Transparencia Brasil’s project on the candidate’s re- 
election probability or vote-share, the focus on the candidate’s change in vote-share has 
the advantage of allowing me to implicitly control for any candidate time invariant char­
acteristics between the 2002 and the 2006 elections. This provides a further test to my 
results since there might be candidate specific time invariant factors driving both the like­
lihood of criminal charges and her electoral performance. The coefficient associated with 
the criminal charges, in columns 1 to 3, is again systematically statistically significant 
and negative. Its estimated size, conditional on several candidate’s characteristics (in 
column 3), is -0.286, which means that the change in vote-share between 2002 and 2006 
is almost 0.3 percentage points lower for the candidates listed with criminal charges by 
Transparencia Brasil. This represents more than 60% of the difference in the vote-share 
sample mean found between these two groups of incumbents in 2006 (-0.46 percentage 
points). The coefficients associated with the remaining control variables in this specifi­
cation are similar to the ones found for the models in Table 2.3 and 2.4. The candidate’s 
age is negatively associated with her electoral performance whereas larger electoral cam­
paigns are linked to significantly better results at the polls. On the other hand, both the 
ownership of a media license or the amount of press coverage received by the candidate 
have no statistical significant impact on any of the outcome variables considered.
P an e l D a ta  Specification The cross-sectional analysis so far is not free of concerns. 
As mentioned above, by estimating the project’s impact out of the variation in the ex­
istence of criminal charges and in the candidates electoral results found across the 467 
incumbents in 2006, I am inevitably leaving out several candidate characteristics that 
are determinant for her electoral performance either because there is no data available or 
because those characteristics are actually impossible to quantify (e.g. political charisma). 
As long as these “ignored” explanatory variables are also somehow correlated with the 
candidate’s criminal status as presented by Projeto Excelencias in 2006, I will end up 
with a biased estimation of the latter variable’s impact on the candidates’ electoral per­
formance. Using the change in candidate share between 2002 and 2006 as dependent 
variable, as in Table 2.5, addresses part of the problem by controlling for time invariant 
candidate characteristics between these two elections, but it is not entirely satisfactory. 
The negative coefficient associated with the criminal charges in Table 2.5 might be in 
reality capturing a deteriorating electoral performance of this restricted group of candi­
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dates that is anterior to and independent of the information released by Transparencia 
Brasil in 2006.
To address these concerns I will fully exploit the panel structure of my dataset by 
taking advantage of the considerably long political careers of federal deputies in Brazil 
who, different from the president or from the city mayors, axe not subject to term limits. 
As a result, I observe that more than half of the 467 incumbent candidates in my working 
sample were running for their 3rd consecutive term in 2006.
The fact that I can track the candidate’s results across different Congressional elec­
tions, from 1998 to 2006, means that I am able to exploit within federal deputy variation 
in the existence of criminal charges and on electoral performance across time for the 
estimation of the average effects of “Projeto Excelencias” . I make use of the following 
panel data specification for this purpose:
Eist =  a* +  7  st +  PCit +  XuS  +  fiist (2.2)
where E{st is candidate i from state s vote share within her state of election in election year 
t. ai is a deputy fixed effect that captures all time invariant individual characteristics that 
might have an impact on her electoral performance, while 7st is a state-year fixed effect 
that captures state-specific shocks affecting all incumbents in a particular congressional 
race, such as changes in voting-patterns or in the quality of the challengers. X u  is a vector 
of deputy time variant characteristics that might affect her electoral performance, such 
as whether the candidate changed party between elections. As in the previous equation 
Cu is an indicator for whether or not federal deputy i was listed in the Transparencia 
Brasil’s website with criminal charges at time t. Since this list came out in the Winter of 
2006, Cu assumes a value of zero for all federal deputies in the elections before 2006. ft 
is the parameter of interest and measures the impact of the Projeto Excelencias on the 
candidate’s electoral outcomes. The term fiist captures unobserved candidate and state- 
year specific determinants of the vote-share. It is likely that candidates’ vote-share (and 
the determinants driving it) are not independent over time. Thus, following Bertrand et 
al (2005) I decided to cluster the error term at candidate level throughout the analysis.
Estimation of equation 2.2 is done for a panel of 467 incumbent federal deputies seek­
ing re-election in 2006, by exploiting the variation in electoral results across candidates 
within a state-year to identify the effect of the existence of criminal charges. The esti­
mates will be based on an unbalanced panel of deputies across three electoral contests, 
from 1998 to 2006.
Table 2.6 presents the estimation results for equation 2.2 using the vote-share as 
dependent variable. Column 1 again shows that, unconditionally, the existence of criminal 
charges is associated with significantly lower vote-shares by -0.34 percentage points, which 
is in line with the results obtained in Table 2.4 and represents approximately 14% of this 
variable’s whole period sample mean. Once I control for election year and federal deputy 
fixed effects (in column 2), the estimated coefficient associated with the criminal charges
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appears even larger (-0.5 percentage points) suggesting that the Transparencia Brasil’s 
project has a significant effect on the within candidate electoral performance between 
1998 and 2006. The specification in column 2, however, ignores the state-level nature 
of the electoral contests under analysis since the within candidate estimation makes it 
impossible to identify any state specific effects, such as (changes in) political preferences, 
attitudes with respect to corruption or the quality of the political challengers. In order 
to take this into account in column 3 I replace the electoral year dummies by state-year 
fixed effects taking advantage of the disaggregate nature of my dataset. The coefficient 
associated with the criminal charges goes back to -0.33 percentage points. Adding time 
variant factors such as change in the candidate’s party (which is also negatively associated 
with electoral performance, although not in a statistically significant way), in column 4, 
produces no significant change in the criminal charges coefficient.
Overall, the results estimated so far strongly suggest that the online release of the 
incumbent candidate’s political records by Transparencia Brasil in 2006 did have a signif­
icant and negative impact on the electoral results of the candidates listed with criminal 
charges. In this sense, “Projeto Excelencias” seems to have played an important role in 
promoting political accountability.
2.3.3 T he E ffects o f “P rojeto  E xcelencias” by T yp e o f  Crim e
The diversity of criminal offences found among the members of the Chamber of Deputies 
and listed by “Projeto Excelencias” in 2006 raises the question of whether the project’s 
impact on the candidates’ electoral results has been different depending on the type of 
crime (allegedly) committed.
As mentioned above, more than 80% of the federal deputies listed with criminal 
charges by Transparencia Brasil in 2006 carried charges for crimes that can generically 
be classified as crimes against the public administration. This is a wide category which 
includes crimes ranging from managerial wrongdoing to embezzlement, abuse of public 
office, active and passive corruption or electoral fraud. The level of detail of the infor­
mation available and the usual overlapping of categories within the same criminal case, 
makes it difficult to precisely identify and distinguish each one of the charges at such 
disaggregated level. However, a much broader distinction among the existing charges as 
of 2006 is clear and possible to be made between crimes of a public or a private nature. 
That is, respectively, crimes committed while in office and which affect the performance 
of the deputy’s public duties, versus crimes related to the deputy’s private affairs. As 
described above, “Projeto Excelencias” listed 49 deputies with charges for crimes of a 
private nature as of October 2006. Out of these, 21 deputies only carried charges for 
crimes of a “private nature”. I make use of this information to estimate the following 
variants of equations 2.1 and 2.2 for the cross-section and the panel, respectively:
R , = a  + 0 1C ?ub + 0 2C f riv + XiS + f t (2.3)
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Eist =  a» +  l st +  ^ C f t uh +  faiOftriv +  X it5 +  n u  (2.4)
where C£ub is an indicator for whether or not federal deputy i was listed in the Transparen­
cia Brasil’s website with charges for crimes of a public nature at time t , while C ^rw is the 
analogous indicator variable for crimes of a private nature. The remaining variables are 
as defined for equations 2.1 and 2.2 above. In this specification the difference between the 
parameters and j32 measures the differential impact of the criminal charges revealed 
by “Projeto Excelencias” for crimes of a public or a private nature.
Table 2.7 presents the results for equations 2.3 (columns 1 to 3) and 2.4 (column 
4), where I disaggregate the deputies’ criminal charges between crimes of a public and a 
private nature.
The results in columns 1 to 3 are estimated from the cross-section of 467 incumbent 
candidates in 2006, using the candidate’s probability of re-election (column 1), vote-share 
(column 2) and difference in vote-share between 2006 and 2002 (column 3) as dependent 
variable. The results in column 4, on the other hand, are estimated using the panel of 
467 incumbent candidates across three congressional elections, from 1998 to 2006. In this 
last specification the dependent variable is the candidates’ vote-share in their electoral 
state.
In every specification, from columns 1 to 4, the candidates’ electoral performance 
appears to be negatively and significantly associated with the existence of criminal charges 
for crimes of a public nature only. The existence of charges for crimes not directly 
related to the candidates’ political life does not seem to have a significant impact on 
the candidates’ electoral performance measured either by the probability of re-election or 
vote-share: the coefficient associated with the existence of charges for crimes of a private 
nature is in all specifications close to zero in addition of not being statistically significant.
In fact, the results in Table 2.7 suggest that the existence of criminal charges for 
crimes of a public nature has an even larger negative impact on the candidates’ electoral 
performance than the one estimated before, in Tables 2.3 to 2.6, when all charges - 
“public” and “private” - were bundled together under a single category. The estimates 
for the panel specification in column 4, for instance, show that conditional of candidate 
and state-year fixed effects, the existence of criminal charges for offences directly related 
to the candidates’ political life (“public”) is associated with a significantly lower vote- 
share by -0.38 percentage points (instead of -0.33, when all charges are bundled together, 
in Table 2.6), which is as much as 16% of the variable’s whole period sample mean. 
Overall, these results suggest that the electorate is likely to have treated the candidates 
listed by Transparencia Brasil with criminal charges differently depending on the type of 
charges they were facing. In particular, voters used their ballots to punish the candidates 
facing charges for crimes directly related to their (former or current) political duties. This 
result is not surprising given the salience of political corruption as a key issue at the time 
of the 2006 election.
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2.3.4 V alidity  Checks
Falsification Test All the estimation results so far have found a statistically significant 
association between the candidates’ criminal status, as presented in the Transparencia 
Brasil’s website, and their electoral performance. They suggest that candidates with a 
criminal record on average registered lower probability of re-election and vote-share in 
2006 than candidates with a clean record, as well as a relatively worse performance as 
compared to 2002. The negative effect in the candidates’ vote-share is robust to control­
ling for time (or state*time) and candidate fixed-effects, which proves that the results are 
not being driven by any unobserved time invariant characteristics of the candidates (or 
by differences in the congressional races across states). However, based on the previous 
specifications I still cannot rule out the possibility that the deterioration in electoral per­
formance for the group of prosecuted candidates might have been anterior to the project’s 
release. That being the case, the significantly worse performance of this group of candi­
dates in 2006 found in the estimations above might be the result of a differentiated trend 
rather than of the Transparencia Brasil’s project itself. I address this concern with a 
simple falsification test where I restrict my analysis to the electoral results between 1998 
and 2002 and observe the electoral performance of the two groups of candidates - with 
and without criminal charges, as defined by the Transparencia Brasil’s project in 2006. 
In case the electoral results were already significantly different between these two groups 
of candidates in these earlier elections, I will know that the results found in the previous 
estimations are driven by other factors than the information published by Transparencia 
Brasil in 2006. Table 2.8 reports the results of this falsification exercise, using the change 
on the candidates’ vote-share between 1998 and 2002 as dependent variable.53 Given the 
unbalanced structure of the dataset, this exercise can only be done for the subsample of 
288 federal deputies who were candidates in the three electoral contests of 1998, 2002 
and 2006. The estimates in column 1 show that on average the electoral performance 
of the candidates listed by Transparencia Brasil with criminal charges in 2006 was not 
statistically significantly different, between 1998 and 2002, to that of the candidates with 
a clean criminal record. This result is not due to the fact that the Transparencia Brasil’s 
project had no observable effect among this subsample of 288 candidates. In column 2 I 
present the estimation results of (the original) model 2.1 for this group of 288 deputies 
using the change in vote-share between 2002 and 2006 as dependent variable. The coef­
ficient associated with the existence of criminal charges remains statistically significant 
and negative and of similar magnitude to the one obtained for the full sample in Table 
2.5.
P rev ious C rim inal H isto ry  The results obtained throughout the paper show that 
when given objective information about the incumbents criminal history, Brazilian voters 
do seem to use their ballots to punish the candidates with a “dirty criminal record”. This
53Using the candidates’ vote-shareas dependent variable, in alternative, leads to the same conclusions.
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is an important fact in itself. However, a more detailed analysis of the politicians criminal 
charges reveals that political corruption was not exclusive to the 2003-2006 legislative 
term. In fact, the majority of the deputies listed with criminal charges by Transparencia 
Brasil in 2006 (more precisely 80% of them) already had a criminal record of previous 
convictions and/or criminal lawsuits at the beginning of the term in February 2003.
In table 2.9 I present the estimation results of model 2.1 and 2.2 for a restricted 
sample that excludes the candidates who were found involved in criminal scandals dur­
ing the period between 2003 and 2006 only (i.e. candidates that did not have charges 
against them for crimes committed before 2003) using the change in the candidates’ 
vote-share between 2002 and 2006 (column 1) and the candidates’ vote-share (column 2) 
as dependent variables. Both the cross-sectional (column 1) and the panel (column 2) 
specifications are line with the results obtained throughout the paper. Despite the fact 
that all the candidates listed with criminal charges in this sample already had a criminal 
record by 2002, the negative impact of the criminal record, as listed by Transparencia 
Brasil, on their electoral performance is only statistically significant in the 2006 election, 
once the “Projeto Excelencias” is online.
The Transparencia Brasil’s project (and the attention it received from the voters) 
might have its origins in the corruption scandals that in 2005 and 2006 hit the Chamber 
of Deputies and made corruption a key issue in the congressional race. However, the 
results presented in this paper suggest that the impact of the Transparencia Brasil anti- 
corruption campaign and information dissemination project are of wider magnitude: they 
allowed the voters to better identify and punish not only the “latest crooks” in the 
Chamber of Deputies, but also, in doing that, a larger group of politicians with a historical 
record of crimes that had gone unpunished until the 2006 election.
A dditional C onsiderations: C andidate selection  and Program m e Effectiveness
A question that arises with the impact evaluation of “Projeto Excelencias” is whether 
this project has had an additional and preceding effect on the selection of the candidates 
standing for re-election. As some of the criminally accused federal deputies learned about 
the project launch and the information it would bring to the public domain, they might 
have decided not to stand for re-election (or might have been prevented from doing so by 
their parties) in 2006, for fear of the damaging effects of such exposure on their political 
careers and on their parties’ performance. If that is the case, I could expect to see, on 
average, the candidates with the most severe charges - and, hence, the least chances of 
re-election - withdrawing from the election. As a result, any estimation of the project’s 
effects on electoral outcomes would suffer from selection bias. While I cannot rule out 
this scenario totally, I have strong reasons to believe that it is quite unlikely. First of all, 
the electoral candidates are chosen and the respective campaign contributions start being 
collected months, sometimes even years, before the election date. By the time the project 
was launched, or by the time the federal deputies learned about its planned release, the 
large majority of the candidates had already been selected and possibly registered on
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the electoral commission. A proof that the Transparencia Brasil’s project did not lead to 
substantial changes in the candidates’ decision to stand for election is that the proportion 
of federal deputies standing for re-election in 2006 (around 75% of the incumbents) was 
even larger than the one registered in the previous election.54 Finally, it is important 
to remember that the information released by the Transparencia Brasil’s project was 
effectively not private. As I mentioned above, “Projeto Excelencias” resulted from a 
compilation work of existing information that was scattered through several institutions 
across the country. Hence, it is improbable that after learning about the Transparencia 
Brasil’s project, the criminally charged federal deputies would step down and renounce 
the electoral contest. In fact, the success and publicity that the initiative achieved was 
probably unexpected among political circles.
Finally, there is an important point of note regarding the effectiveness of “Projeto 
Excelencias” . As discussed above, at the time of its release, in July 2006, this project 
focused exclusively on the criminal records and characteristics of the 467 incumbents 
standing for re-election. Due to time and scale constraints, no similar information was 
provided for the challengers (4,943 in total, in 2006) running for political office in each of 
the 27 states.55 The perceived quality of the challengers vis-a-vis that of the incumbents is 
an important determinant of the latter’s electoral performance. In my empirical analysis 
I indirectly control for differences in the quality of the challengers across the different 
states and electoral years through the inclusion of state (or state-year, in the panel 
specifications) fixed effects. However, it remains that the overall effectiveness of the 
Transparencia Brasil’s project in 2006 (and therefore the magnitude of the estimated 
effects associated with “Projeto Excelencias”) is ultimately conditioned by the quality of 
the pool of challengers. In short, the more voters perceive challengers as as corrupt as 
the incumbents in the Transparencia Brasil “black-list” , the lower will be their ability to 
punish the latter candidates based on the project’s information.
A post-election analysis of the elected candidates’ judicial records (which have been 
updated and available in the Transparencia Brasil’s website since 2007) suggests that the 
2006 election might have had a positive impact on the overall quality of the candidates 
selected as far as criminal records are concerned. 92 out of the 165 incumbent candidates 
listed by Transparencia Brasil with criminal charges in 2006 were not re-elected to a 
new term, while “only” 55 among the 231 challengers elected had a previous criminal 
history. The results throughout this paper indicate that the Transparencia Brasil is 
likely to have had a significant impact on this “selection effect” . The overall effectiveness
54 It is true that a few deputies were sacked or forced to withdraw their candidacies (either by law or by 
their own parties) after having been found guilty or deeply involved in some of the corruption scandals 
in this period. However, this type of events are not exclusive of the legislative period under analysis 
(2003-2006) and, as before, affected a small number of federal deputies. It is unlikely that the sackings 
or resignations were a consequence of the Transparencia Brasil project. Instead, they mostly involved 
deputies whose criminal offences had been widely reported by the conventional media and about whom 
the information available in “Projeto Excelencias” would be less likely to represent new evidence for the 
voters.
55 As explained, there were a few exceptions to this rule since the project also listed the criminal records 
of a few selected challengers.
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of this information dissemination project, however, is likely not to be limited to the 
selection of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. Given its estimated impact on the 
candidates’ electoral results in 2006, the project is also likely to have a disciplining effect 
on the deputies’ criminal behaviour during the new legislative term. This hypothesis is 
investigated in my next chapter.
2 .4  C o n c lu d in g  R em a rk s
This paper studies the effect of the Internet release of the criminal records of Brazilian 
incumbent federal deputies in 2006 on their re-election probabilities and overall elec­
toral performance. This information dissemination project was launched in 2006 by the 
NGO Transparencia Brasil, three months before the electoral contest. For its innovative 
character and relevance it was widely reported by the conventional media and achieved 
a record number of more than 2 million individual access within a period of less than 
3 months. Using data I directly collected from Transparencia Brasil, together with in­
formation from the Brazilian electoral commission and from the Chamber of Deputies, 
my econometric analysis suggests that Brazilian voters did make use of the information 
compiled and published by Transparencia Brasil to significantly punish the incumbents 
candidates listed with criminal charges. I show that the project’s estimated effects on 
the candidates’ electoral performance survive the inclusion of several controls. Moreover, 
these estimated effects are of considerable magnitude as compared to estimated effects of 
other significant variables, such as campaign expenditures. For example,my estimations 
suggest that, everything else being constant, the effect of the existence of criminal charges 
on the candidates’ probability of re-election in 2006 is comparable to a decrease in their 
campaign expenditures by approximately 1 million Brazilian Reais in that same election 
(which is as much as 2.4 standard deviations of this variable’s mean).
The analysis in this chapter produce relevant facts and results that contradict the 
common-sense ideas, prevalent in Brazil, that because corruption is so widespread in the 
political class voters became almost apathetic to it and, as a result, unable to duly punish 
the politicians who engage in corrupt activities. On the contrary, the Transparencia 
Brasil information project shows that not all politicians are the same - at least as far as 
corruption (as detected and judged by the competent authorities) is concerned. Moreover, 
my results suggest that it is possible to set up information mechanisms that allow for 
a better identification of the “crooks” in the political class and that voters in Brazil do 
value and make use of that information at the time of the elections.
As the databases available now cover an increasing number of politicians, from differ­
ent levels of government and the new generations of voters are more and more Internet 
savvy, it will be particularly interesting to follow the role played by this (and similar) 
Internet projects in shaping the elections to come (namely the next federal elections, 
that take place later in October 2010). The Internet, different from the traditional media 
vehicles offers an unlimited, almost free and (in Brazil, at least) uncensored space to
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share information. No newspaper, radio or TV channel will be able to, in a single edition 
that can be obtained anywhere in the country, release the criminal records of more than 
160 politicians and provide details of their political life. The “Projeto Excelencias” by 
Transparencia Brasil did and does that. No other medium of communication is able to 
reach so many people so fast - as proved by President Obama’s electoral campaign in 
2007 and 2008, which made an unprecedented use of the Internet to mobilize supporters, 
collect funds and communicate with voters.
This study provides a first assessment of the Internet’s potential in promoting electoral 
accountability in Brazil. The results presented in this paper together with the impressive 
growth that has been registered in Internet access and usage rates in Brazil, offer very 
encouraging prospects for the future role this medium of communication can play in the 
country’s political scenario.
2 INTERNET EXPOSURE OF CORRUPT POLITICIANS 
2 .5  T ab les
Table 2.1: Candidates and Reelection Rates
82
1998 2002 2006
Turnout 79% 82% 83%
Total number of candidates 3,417 4,298 4,943
Total number of elected  FDs 513 513 513
Running for reelection* . 455 467
Reelected 301 282
Reelection rate 66% 60%
Sources:TSE, IPEA,Transparencia Brasil
*Out of the total of directly elected plus stand-in FDs. There were 130 stand-in FDs in 
parliament between 1999-2002 and 115 between 2003-2006.
to
Table 2.2: Differences between groups of incumbents as of 2006
Descriptive Statistics
all
mean s.d
without
criminal
charges
with criminal 
charges difference s.e.
FDs standing for reelection* 467 302 165
Female (%) 8.4 8.9 5.4 3.5* 2.6
FDs with university education (%) 90.4 93.0 88.0 5.0** 0.0
Age 53.8 9.7 53.6 54.1 -0.5 0.9
Number of terms served 2.2 1.3 2.3 2.2 0.1 0.1
FDs running for 3rd+ term (%) 61.7 57.3 69.7 -12.4*** 4.7
Direct owners of media licenses (%) 11.6 10.2 13.9 -3.7 3.1
Campaign contributions ('00,000 BRL) 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.0 0.4 0.4
Members of DEM (%) 10.9 11.6 9.7 1.9 3.0
Members of PMDB (%) 16.7 15.9 18.2 -2.3 3.6
Members of PSDB {%) 10.3 11.6 7.9 3.7 2.9
Members of PT(%) 17.8 22.5 9.1 13.4*** 3.6
Citations in articles about corruption (in hundreds) 2.2 5.8 1.8 2.9 -1.2** 0.6
Visits to FDs page in Transparencia website* 13,761 14,260 13,821 13,651 170.6 1,382
State vote-share (%) 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 0.1 0.2
Change in state vote-share [2006 - 2002] -0.38 1.3 -0.22 -0.68 Q J * * * 0.1
FDs reelected (%) 60.4 • 69.2 44.2 25.0*** 4.6
Source: T ransparencia Brasil, TSE, Camara dos Deputados 
♦Includes 115 stand-in MPs th a t were in power between 2003-2006 
* Accumulated values as of FEB09
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Criminal Charges on the Candidate’s Probability of
Reelection
(1) (2) (3)
Criminal charges -0.250*** -0.247*** -0.247***
(0.0470) (0.0505) (0.0465)
Number of terms served 0.024
(0.0195)
Age i n 2006 -0.004
(0.0026)
Change in party -0.050
(0.0525)
Gender (1 = female) -0.091
(0.0771)
Campaign contributions ('00,000BRL) 0.025***
(0.0071)
Vote share in 2002 0.090***
(0.0151)
Media concession 0.073
(0.0649)
Citations (in hundreds) 0.002
(0.0030)
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Party fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 467 467 463
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.22
* * *  p<0.01; * *  p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
candidate was re-elected in 2006 and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.4: The Effects of Criminal Charges on the Candidate’s Vote-Share
(1) (2) (3)
Criminal charges 
Number of terms served 
Age i n 2006 
Change in party 
Gender (1 = female)
Campaign contributions ('00,000BRL) 
Media concession  
Citations (in hundreds)
-0.120 -0.342** -0.331**
(0.2090) (0.1544) (0.1461)
0.014 
(0.0614) 
-0.027*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.085 
(0.1611) 
0.220 
(0.3372) 
0.102*** 
(0.0222) 
0.311 
(0.2364) 
0.012 
(0.0082)
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Party fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 467 467 463
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.57 0.62
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the candidate's vote-share in her electoral state in 
2006.
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Table 2.5: The Effects of Criminal Charges on the Candidate’s Change in Vote-Share
Between 2006 and 2002
( 1) ( 2) (3)
Criminal charges 
Number of terms served 
Age i n 2006 
Change in party 
Gender (1 = fem ale)
Campaign contributions ('00,000BRL) 
Media concession 
Citations (in hundreds)
-0.463*** -0.328** 
(0.1309) (0.1350)
-0.286**
(0.1281)
0.046
(0.0552)
-0.023***
(0.0073)
0.013
(0.1717)
-0.321
(0.3324)
0.037**
(0.0151)
-0.217
(0.1862)
-0.008
(0.0073)
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Party fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 467 467 463
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.10 0.13
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the candidate's change in vote-share between 2002
and 2006.
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Table 2.6: The Effects of Criminal Charges on the Candidate’s Vote-Share (panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.339** -0.500*** -0.328** -0.334** 
(0.1700) (0.1621) (0.1544) (0.1556)
-0.083
(0.1306)
FD fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No No
State * Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 1222 1222 1222 1222
Number of groups 467 467 467 467
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.81 0.84 0.84
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at federal deputy level.
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results estimated using data for the period between 1998 and 2006. The dependent 
variable is the candidate's vote-share in her electoral state.
Criminal charges 
Change in party
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Table 2.7: The Effects of Criminal Charges by Type of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Criminal charges - Public -0.257*** -0.451*** -0.349*** -0.380**
(0.0479) (0.1492) (0.1349) (0.1639)
Criminal charges - Private -0.073 0.108 0.020 -0.003
(0.0796) (0.3088) (0.2387) (0.2930)
Control variables1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 463 463 463 1222
Number of groups 467
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.66 0.21 0.84
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at federal deputy level.
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, *  p<0.1
Columns 1 to 3 are estimated from the cross-section of 467 candidates to re-election in 
2006. The dependent variable is, respectively, a dummy var. that takes the value 1 if  the 
candidate was re-elected in 2006 and 0 otherwise (1), the candidate's vote share (2) and 
the candidate's change in vote-share between 2002 and 2006 (3).
Column 4 is estimated using candidate-level data for the period 1998-2006. The 
dependent variable is the candidate's vote share.
1 For columns 1 to 3 the controls include the candidate's number of terms in office, age, 
change in party, gender, campaign contrib., media concession, newspaper citations, vote- 
share in 2002, political party and state of election. For column 4: dummy var. for change 
in party and candidate and state-year fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: Falsification Test
89
Dependent variable:
Change in state vote-share [2002-1998] [2006 - 2002]
(1) (2)
Criminal charges+ 0.062
(0.1523)
Criminal charges -0.307**
(0.1388)
FD controls Yes FD controls Yes
State fixed effects Yes State fixed effects Yes
Observations 288 Observations 284
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 Adjusted R-squared 0.25
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05; * p <0 .1 ; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ 1 = FDs with criminal charges in 2006
Sample restricted to candidates that ran for election in three consecutive contests: 1998, 
2002. and 2006
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Table 2.9: Sample Restriction
90
Dependent variable:
Change in state vote-share (1) State vote-share (2)
Criminal charges -0.230* Criminal charges -0.293*
(0.1353) (0.1620)
FD controls Yes FD fixed effects Yes
State fixed effects Yes State * Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 439 Observations 1147
- - Number of groups 439
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 Adjusted R-squared 0.85
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, * p <0 .1;
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at FD level in panel regression in column (2 
Sample excludes candidates with criminal charges for the period 2003-2006 only.
91
3 Internet Scrutiny and Politicians’ 
Criminality
3 .1  In tr o d u c tio n
The mass media can play a fundamental role in addressing political agency problems. By 
providing information about politicians’ profiles and actions, the media can diminish the 
asymmetry of knowledge between voters and their political representatives. An effective 
media allows voters not only to select better representatives, but also to monitor their 
actions in office more efficiently. As a result, an effective media can also promote greater 
discipline among elected politicians by increasing the marginal cost of political corruption.
In this paper I will focus my attention on the Internet, which is currently the fastest 
growing medium and the largest repository of information in the world. In particular,
I will look at the way the use of Internet in Brazil for information dissemination and 
scrutiny of politicians’ actions and profiles has had an impact on the level of political 
corruption detected over the last few years.
The 2006 Brazilian federal elections set a benchmark for the role played by the In­
ternet in shaping the electoral outcomes. In that year an innovative Internet-based 
project launched by the anti-corruption non-governmental organization (NGO hence­
forth) Transparencia Brasil brought to the public the criminal records of all incumbent 
candidates seeking re-election to the federal Chamber of Deputies. By accessing the data 
published online, the voters were able to get information about any former convictions 
and current lawsuits pending against this group of candidates. This project attracted a 
vast audience and reinforced the salience of political corruption in the electoral debate.
The results presented in the previous chapter show that this information dissemination 
project also had a significant impact on the electoral outcomes. The candidates listed 
with criminal charges by Transparencia Brasil registered, on average, a significant reduc­
tion in their total state vote-share as compared both to their peers with a clean criminal 
record and with their pre-2006 electoral performance, and a large proportion were not 
re-elected to a new term. These results suggest that voters did use the information about 
political corruption to make their voting decisions and to punish the politicians with a 
criminal record.56 In this sense, more information on the politicians’ actions and profile 
did seem to enable political accountability.
In this chapter, I will divert my attention from the electoral impact of the Transparen­
cia Brasil’s information project, and I will focus instead on its potential impact on 
the elected politicians’ behaviour. In particular, my aim is to understand whether the
56As mentioned in the previous chapter, the voters’ ability to use the information available from 
Transparencia Brasil’s website to punish and remove from office the corrupt politicians is determined by 
the (perceived) quality of the challengers standing for election. If voters perceive the challengers to be 
at least as corrupt as the incumbents their ability to punish the latter based on the Transparencia Brasil 
information is therefore very limited.
3 IN TERNET SCRUTINY AND POLITICIANS’ CRIM INALITY 92
Transparencia Brasil’ information project might have had an impact on the amount of 
political corruption (and crime, in general) detected during the new legislative term, after 
2007,57 as compared to that detected in the previous term, before the project’s release. 
This comparative analysis will allow me to have a better understanding of the overall effi­
cacy of this information dissemination project in addressing problems of political agency 
and, in particular, in curbing political corruption.
In theory, the Transparencia Brasil’s information project - which since 2006 keeps 
an updated record of all criminal charges brought against members of the Chamber of 
Deputies - can have an impact on the amount of political corruption detected since 2007 
through two main channels: first, by improving the political selection in 2006 - i.e. by 
allowing voters to throw out the corrupt candidates and elect better, less corrupt (ible) 
candidates; and second, by disciplining the politicians in office through a tighter scrutiny 
of their actions.
My survey of the new criminal records available from Transparencia Brasil and from 
the Supreme Federal Court (the institution responsible for the adjudication of cases in­
volving serving federal deputies) reveals that, as compared to the previous term, the 
amount of new lawsuits filed against serving federal deputies has dropped by (at least) 
70% since 2007. The reduction in the number of deputies implicated in criminal offences 
between the two terms analysed is visible both within the group of incumbent deputies 
re-elected and, especially, among the group of challengers elected (as compared to the 
(ex-)deputies who stepped down at the end of the previous term). Provided that there 
has not been any deterioration in the corruption detection mechanisms used by compe­
tent authorities between the two terms in analysis,58 this evidence offers good support 
to the hypothesis that the Transparencia Brasil’s information project might have had 
an important role in curbing political corruption in the Chamber of Deputies during 
the current term. In particular, the observed reduction in the number of prosecutions 
between the terms under analysis within the group of incumbents re-elected should be 
interpreted as capturing the disciplining effects of the information dissemination project 
on the deputies’ behaviour in the new term. And the (even larger) reduction in the 
number of prosecutions observed among the group of challengers elected in 2006 vis-a-vis 
those of former deputies between 2003 and 2007 suggest, on the other hand, that in addi­
tion to the disciplining effect on politicians’ criminal behaviour, the information project 
might also have generated a quality gain (as far as involvement in criminal activities is 
concerned) in the pool of federal deputies elected in 2006.
Overall, the observed reduction in the amount of criminal activity detected among 
federal deputies in the new legislative term, since 2007, is an important achievement and 
particularly so for a country whose judiciary system has been unable to represent enough 
threat to discipline the offenders. Brazil has been the first presidential system to impeach
57The current term started on the 1st of February 2007 when the deputies elected in October 2006 
took office. It will end on the 31st of January 2011.
58And given that no major anti-corruption programme or institutional reform targeting the Chamber 
of Deputies has been introduced since 2007.
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a president (Collor de Mello in 1992), but throughout the years many members of its 
political class have survived unpunished in spite of countless accusations of corruption 
and crime.59 This has damaged the credibility of the political institutions in the eyes of 
the voters and, with respect to the Congress in particular, its ability to fulfil its role of 
checking the executive (Fleischer, 2010).
The results presented in this paper stress the role played by NGOs as intermedi­
aries between elected politicians and civil society to address political agency problems. 
Through their anti-corruption campaigns and information dissemination projects, the 
work of the NGOs in Brazil (Transparencia Brasil and others with a similar project line 
that have been created since 2006 ) not only sensitizes voters to the subject of corrup­
tion but also gives them means to scrutinize politicians’ actions more efficiently and 
to distinguish the “wheat from the chaff” at the time of election. Finally, the results 
also underline the important role of the Internet as the medium of communication and 
mobilization used for this purpose as no other medium would be able to take so much 
information, so fast and to so many people across the country at a lower or similar cost.
The analysis in this paper contributes mainly to the literature that investigates the 
role of information on political accountability. Traditionally, this literature relies on 
the theoretical framework of the political agency models introduced by Barro (1973) 
and Ferejohn (1986). In these models, imperfectly informed voters act as principals 
who select and finance governments and are subject to their political decisions, and 
politicians are the agents in charge of those political choices (Besley, Burgess and Prat, 
2002). The theoretical predictions from this literature do not unambiguously associate 
greater access to information to enhanced accountability and voter welfare (see Besley 
and Smart, 2007, or Prat, 2003, for instance). My aim in this chapter is to provide further 
empirical evidence for a better understanding of this relationship between information 
and accountability. All the evidence presented in this chapter should be interpreted and 
should work as a complement to the results presented in the previous chapter that show 
that voters do seem to use their vote to punish corrupt politicians when information that 
allows them to distinguish the corrupt from the law-abiding candidates is available and 
easily accessible.
A distinctive feature of the analysis presented in this chapter is the focus on the 
Internet as a privileged medium for the promotion of transparency in politics and ac­
countability. Thus, this study closely relates to the growing “niche” of the literature 
on information and accountability that looks at the links between Internet and corrup­
tion. The vast majority of this literature, however, focuses on the impact of different 
e-government initiatives, rather than on NGO or grassroots’ initiatives, on corruption. 
On the whole, it offers evidence - mostly based on case studies - of a positive role played
59 The inefficiency of the judiciary in Brazil can be summarised in the words of the federal prosecutor 
Mario Lucio Avelar, who filed criminal actions against several deputies involved in the corruption scandals 
that stormed the Brazilian Congress in 2005 and 2006, in an interview to the newspaper “O Globo”: “The 
justice is very lenient towards financial crimes in general. In Brazil in order to go to jail one has to rape, 
murder and confess. And have a bad lawyer.” ( “O Globo” , November 2006).
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by the Internet in increasing transparency and promoting political accountability (see 
Bhatnagar, 2003a; Mahmood, 2004; UNDP, 2008; Kim et al, 2009; Liu et al., 2009; 
Andersen et al, 2010).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section I provide back­
ground information on the Transparencia Brasil’s information dissemination project and 
its estimated results. Section 3.3 presents a simple model to guide my analysis of the 
effects associated with the information revelation project started in 2006. In Section
3.4 I describe the data sources used and discuss the evidence found within the proposed 
framework. Section 3.5 concludes.
3 .2  B a ck g ro u n d
In July 2006 the NGO Transparencia Brasil launched an Internet-based anti-corruption 
campaign aimed at preventing the re-election of the federal deputies with a “dirty” crim­
inal record. This campaign was motivated by a series of corruption scandals that hit the 
Federal Congress in 2005 and 2006, during President Lula da Silva first administration, 
involving an unprecedented number of senators and federal deputies as well as several 
top Workers’ Party officials. The evidence of widespread corruption at federal level rep­
resented a major blow to the Workers’ Party reputation of transparency and honesty in 
politics built throughout two decades of municipal and state administrations across the 
country (Hunter and Power, 2007) and accentuated the lack of trust and disbelief in the 
country’s political institutions.60 Political corruption became the most salient issue in 
the political debate and during the electoral campaign, dominating the news coverage of 
politics in the two years up to the election.61
According to Transparencia Brasil’s founder and board member Neissan Monadjem, 
the NGO’s anti-corruption project, which started in 2006, answered to a growing demand 
from the Brazilian electorate for more information on political candidates that was not 
being satisfied by the media. To satisfy that demand, Transparencia Brasil compiled in­
formation from several different regional and federal courts in Brazil in order to assemble 
an accurate picture of the criminal history of each candidate to re-election. From this 
compilation and research work resulted a list of 165 incumbents, out of the 467 standing 
for re-election, either formerly convicted or under criminal investigation, which was made 
available on the Transparencia Brasil’s website under the project name “Projeto Excelen­
cias” (“Excellencies Project”). Together with the information about the criminal records,
60 In a survey by the best-selling weekly magazine “Veja” in 2006, only 3% of those interviewed agreed 
that the country’s congressmen effectively represent and defend the interests of the Brazilian society. 
When asked for a word that would best define the country’s federal representatives the top three results 
given by the surveyees were “dishonest” , “insensitive” (to society’s needs) and “liars”. In line with these 
results, Datafolha public opinion surveys also show that the Brazilian Congress reached its lowest rate of 
public approval in 12 years in the 2005-2006 period.
61 The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate TV channels, for instance, reached record audiences during 
2005 and 2006, as the public followed the development of the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry 
( “CPIs”) that were set up to investigate the different scandals. In a number of days their high audi­
ences rivalled those of main commercial channels (Folha de Sao Paulo, 7 Aug. 2005 in Observatorio da 
Imprensa).
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the project also provided biographical data and details on the political activity of every 
incumbent candidate standing for re-election. These details included information on their 
legislative production, membership in special interest groups or commissions, presences 
and absences from Congress and electoral financing accounts (donors and/or recipients 
and respective amounts). The whole set of data provided by Transparencia Brasil was 
intended to serve as complementary information for voters to separate the “wheat from 
the chaff” among the candidates seeking re-election to the Chamber of Deputies.
The “Projeto Excelencias” was an instant hit in the Internet world. The list with the 
incriminated candidates was widely replicated in online forums, blogs and news sites.62 
For its innovative nature the project also received extensive coverage in the conventional 
media which, according to its coordinators, was fundamental to extend its reach.63 The 
impact evaluation of this Internet-based project on the electoral performance of the can­
didates to re-election in 2006 was presented in the previous chapter. By exploiting within 
and across candidate variation in the existence of criminal charges and electoral perfor­
mance I have shown that the candidates listed with criminal charges by the Transparencia 
Brasil “Excellencies Project” registered a significantly smaller probability of re-election 
and an overall worse electoral performance in 2006, as measured by the candidate’s vote- 
share in the state of election, after the project went online. The results strongly suggests 
that the electorate did value and make use of the information about the candidates’ 
criminal records in order to “throw the rascals out” of office.
Following the unparalleled number of corruption scandals during his first term in of­
fice, President Lula da Silva promised an anti-corruption package specifically aimed at 
curbing corruption in the federal administration. As a result, since 2006 several bills have 
been sent to Congress for debate and voting. However, until the end of 2009 only one 
anti-corruption bill had been approved by the federal legislative. On the other hand, over 
the past years there has been a visible rise in the number of anti-corruption initiatives 
started by civil society groups. Several Internet-based projects have been started which, 
in line with Transparencia Brasil’s “Projeto Excelencias” , aim at keeping an up to date 
record of the elected politicians parliamentary activities and scandals.64 In truth, several 
government bodies have also been using the Internet to promote civic engagement and 
accountability.65 The Chamber of Deputies, for example, has been making increasing
62 The project’s success led to Transparencia Brasil winning an international contest by the United Na­
tions Democracy Fund which resulted in a two-year grant to maintain and extend the project (Monadjem, 
2007).
63Information obtained from personal conversation with the project’s main coordinator, Mr. Claudio 
Weber Abramo.
64 Examples of such Internet projects are:
•  Movimento de Combate a Corrupgao Eleitoral: http://www.m cce.org.br/
•  Contas Abertas: http://contasabertas.uol.com .br/
•  Voto Consciente: http://www.votoconsciente.org.br/
•  Congresso Aberto: http://www.congressoaberto.com .br/
•  Vote na Web: http://www.votenaweb.com .br/
65 The government’s dedicated “transparency portal” (http://portaldatransparencia.gov.br), for in­
stance, was created in 2004 to provide information on budgets and spending across different levels of 
government. In 2008 this Internet portal was awarded as one of the five best governance practices in the
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use of its web space as a privileged medium of its transparency policy. As a result, in 
the current term it is possible to follow each deputy’s legislative output (bills proposed, 
voting patterns, presences/absences from Congress, membership in special program com­
missions) as well as their detailed monthly expenses claims since April 2009. The latter, 
in particular, represents an important step in the Chamber’s own anti-corruption policy. 
It targets a common method used by politicians to pocket undue public money by claim­
ing back expenses unrelated to their political duties.66 All these new initiatives, both 
public and private, allow for an even greater scrutiny of the federal deputies by the elec­
torate and reinforce the role of the Internet as a platform for information dissemination 
and accountability. Although the average Internet penetration rate in Brazil is still fax 
from the levels registered in North America or Western Europe, its usage rates have been 
increasing at a feist speed as a result of the country’s economic growth and of the govern­
ment’s several programs to promote Internet access throughout the country.67 According 
to the “Freedom on the Net 2009” report by Freedom House, between 2006 and 2008 the 
number of Internet users more than doubled in Brazil reaching 70 million people. As 
a result, Brazil currently has the largest population of Internet users in Latin America 
and the seventh largest in the world. This suggests that the impact of Internet-based 
information projects, such like the one by Transparencia Brasil, in curbing corruption is 
potentially even greater now than in 2006 as the information they convey is able to reach 
a larger proportion of voters.
3 .3  T h e o r e t ic a l F ram ew ork
In this section I present a simple model to help guide my analysis and interpret the 
evidence. It sets up a simple theoretical framework for identifying the ways in which the 
Transparencia Brasil’s information dissemination project might have an impact on the 
politicians’ criminal behaviour.
Consider a world where political candidates’ criminal propensity fy) follows a normal 
distribution with average c and variance a. In this world voters dislike political corruption 
but have imperfect information on the candidates’ criminal profile and actions.
At any given moment, the set of politicians in office will correspond to an area of 
the criminal propensity distribution delimited by a minimum (c) and a maximum (c) 
threshold level of criminal propensity <r, as in Figure 3.1. This is because candidates’ 
probability of election is positively correlated with their own criminal propensity (e.g. 
candidates increase their probability of being elected by engaging in vote-buying, illegal
world by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
66 Each deputy is entitled to claim back up to BRL 15,000 each month (or a total of BRL 90,000 
per semester -  roughly USD 49,500 at 2010 exchange rates) to cover expenses related to their political 
activity. However, investigations conducted by journalists from Folha de Sao Paulo based on the receipts 
handed in by the deputies and approved by the Chamber since 2007 have shown that several deputies 
systematically claim back money to cover purely private expenses, such as private maids, security services 
for their properties or electoral campaigns.
67For details on the government’s policies of “digital inclusion” see http://www.inclusaodigital.gov.br
or h ttp ://onid.org.br/portal/program as/
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campaign funding or simply by making “fake promises” ). Hence very honest candidates, 
at the left-hand tail of the distribution, will not be elected.68 However, the most corrupt 
of the candidates, at the right-end tail of the distribution, will not be elected either as 
there will be an upper bound for the level of observable corruption voters are willing to 
tolerate.69
The number of crimes committed by a given politician i in term t will be a posi­
tive function of her own criminal propensity (q) but will also depend negatively on the 
desutility arising from eventual detection and punishment in that term (pt)70:
Cit(s, P) =  b(?i) -  d{pt) (3.1)
The timing of the game is as follows. Candidates are elected to office at the beginning 
of period 1. At the end of this period, an information revelation mechanism reveals to 
voters the amount of crimes committed by each politician. Elections take place and voters 
choose their new political representatives. Once elected, the information mechanism 
keeps tracking and updating the politicians’ criminal records, which are observed by the 
voters. A new election is held at the end of period 2.
The information revelation mechanism can have an impact on the amount of crime 
committed by serving politicians through two main channels. First, the information 
revelation at the end of period 1 is expected lead to a change in the composition of the 
politicians elected to office in period 2. At the time of election voters axe able to identify 
the most corrupt incumbent candidates and use their votes to throw these incumbents 
out of office. In replacement, new politicians (challengers) axe elected to their seats. 
Graphically, this change in the composition of politicians elected can be illustrated by a 
move of the upper and lower bounds of the distribution of the elected candidates to the 
left, respectively, from c! to C2 and from c\ to £2 , as in Figure 3.2. The dashed area in 
this same figure represents the group of incumbents re-elected to office in period 2, after 
the information revelation. On average, due to the information revelation mechanism 
the group of selected politicians in period 2 will be of lower criminal propensity than the 
group of politicians in office in period 1.
Second, the information revelation mechanism is also expected to have a disciplining 
effect on the politicians’ criminal behaviour in period 2. This is because in period 2 
politicians know that any criminal act will be automatically revealed to voters. Thus, 
for every politician, the expected punishment (p) from a criminal act will be higher in
6 8 Alternatively, one can simply think that the most honest people in the society do not even want to  
get involved in politics.
6 9 Alternatively, one can simply consider that people with the highest propensity to corruption in society 
will find other activities rather than politics that maximise their amount of illicit rent extraction (e.g. 
they will prefer drug trafficking).
70At the extreme, punishment means not being re-elected to a new term since politicians like being 
re-elected
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period 2 than in period 1, i.e. p2 > Pi . As a consequence, the total amount of crime 
committed by serving politicians is expected to be smaller in period 2.
Given the change in the composition of politicians in office between period 1 and 2, 
the total variation in the number of crimes committed by elected politicians during these 
two periods can be decomposed in the following manner:
A C fc,p) = (Cincumb -  d ncumb) +  (C2ew -  c f d) (3.2)
where Q ncumb measures the number of crimes committed by the incumbents re-elected in 
period t = {1,2}; C2ew is the number of crimes committed by the newly elected deputies 
during period 2 and C°ld is the analogous measure in period 1 for the deputies who were 
not re-elected for a second term.
In this expression, the first difference (C™cumb—C\ncumb) measures the variation in the 
number of crimes committed between periods 1 and 2 within the group of politicians that 
were re-elected to a new term at the end of period 1. As a result, this difference captures 
the disciplining effect of the information mechanism on the incumbents’ behaviour in 
period 2. Everything else being equal, this effect is expected to decrease the number of 
crimes committed within the group of incumbents between period 1 and 2: C2lcumb —
Qvricumb ^  q
The second difference (C2ew — C f d) measures the variation in the number of crimes 
committed between periods 1 and 2 by, respectively, the group of politicians who were 
not re-elected to a new term at the end of period 1 and the newly elected politicians that 
took their seats in the Chamber in period 2. The difference (C2ew — C°ld) is expected 
to capture not only the disciplining effect of the information dissemination mechanism 
on the politicians’ criminal behaviour, but also the selection effect associated with this 
same mechanism.
The disciplining (or incentive) effect is expected to work for the newly elected politi­
cians in the same way as for the incumbents: as the expected cost of crime goes up in 
period 2, after the introduction of the information mechanism, the number of crimes com­
mitted by any politician in period 2 should be smaller than in period 1. This would also 
be true for the challengers elected had they been in office also in period 1: C2ew < C™™. 
The selection effect, on the other hand, reflects the change in the composition of politi­
cians in office between periods 1 and 2. As the most corrupt politicians axe thrown out 
of office after the information about their crimes is revealed at the end of period 1, new 
politicians with a lower criminal propensity are elected in their place as illustrated in 
figure 3.2. As a result, in any period t = {1,2} it is to be expected that C™ew < C°ld, 
this is, everything else being equal, the number of crimes committed by the new crop of 
elected politicians will be lower than the crimes committed by the old (non-re-elected) 
politicians. Putting both selection and incentive effects together, I expect the number of 
crimes committed in period 2 by newly elected politicians to be smaller than the number
3 INTERNET SCRUTINY AND POLITICIANS’ CRIM INALITY 99
crimes committed by the “old” politicians in period 1, i.e.: C™w — C f d < 0.71 Moreover, 
if the disciplining effect of the information mechanism in period 2 is uniform across the 
elected politicians,72 it is to be expected that
Q in cu m b  Qincumh^ ^  | Q new   Qoldt ^
To sum up, in a world where political candidates have different propensities to cor­
ruption and voters are imperfectly informed about politicians’ actions, the information 
revelation mechanism is expected to decrease the amount of political crime through two 
different ways. First, by allowing voters to select a better pool of candidates at the 
time of election, i.e., candidates with lower propensity to crime (the “selection effect”). 
And, second, by increasing the expected costs of crime for all politicians elected (the 
“discipline” or “incentive effect”).
In the context of this paper’s analysis, this framework suggests that the Transparemcia 
Brasil’s project should lead to a reduction in the total number of crimes detected among 
serving federal deputies. In particular, if the selection and incentive effects hold in the 
direction proposed above I expect to a observe a reduction in the amount of crime detected 
between the 52nd term (2003-2007) and the 53th term (2003-2011) both within the group 
of incumbents re-elected and within the group of challengers elected as compared to the 
former deputies that stepped down at the end of the 52nd term.
3.4 Data and Evidence
3.4.1 A nalysis
The aim of this paper is to understand whether the Transparencia Brasil’s information 
project, which started at the end of the 52nd legislative term, in 2006, has had an 
impact in federal deputies’ criminal behaviour during the new legislative term, from 2007 
onwards. To address this question, I survey the criminal records of the federal deputies 
in office during the terms under analysis in order to estimate the number of criminal 
offences committed in each term and, based on that, compute a measure of the change in 
the deputies’ criminal behaviour between the two terms analysed (this is A C  in section
3.3 above). Therefore, it has to be stressed that any consideration about the evolution 
in the number of crimes between the two terms under analysis is, in fact, based on the 
number of crimes detected by the competent authorities in each period.
It is possible that deputies in office in both legislative periods might have committed 
crimes that went (and axe still going) undetected. This is not unlikely since many crimes
71 Notice that this result is also compatible with an alternative scenario in which the selection of the new 
deputies works in the opposite direction. This is, the challengers elected to office have higher propensity 
to crime than the non re-elected incumbents. Such possibility is not completely unrealistic in my scenario 
given that at the time of the election the Transparencia Brasil’s project did not include information about 
the criminal records of the challengers. Even in this scenario the number of crimes detected in period 2 
could be smaller if the incentive effect is sufficiently strong to counteract the (negative) selection effect.
72 Or, at least, not larger for the challengers than for the incumbents re-elected
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- and particularly crimes involving high-level politicians - take a considerable amount 
of time to be uncovered. In fact, most of the new lawsuits that have been filed against 
federal deputies since 2007 refer to acts committed in previous terms (and previous 
political posts). Likewise, it is possible that crimes committed over the last three years 
will only be detected and become public knowledge in the years to come. To deal with 
this time issue, I will base my comparative analysis on the number of crimes that were 
committed and detected within each legislative period, that is, between 2003 and 2007 
and from 2007 onwards. Provided that the efficiency of the detection mechanisms used by 
the responsible authorities (federal police, public prosecutors, courts) did not deteriorate 
over time this comparative analysis should provide a good estimate of the change in the 
level of the deputies’s criminal behaviour between the two terms under analysis.7374
Finally, another “timing” issue affecting my comparative analysis is that the 53th 
legislative period will only finish in February 2011, when the deputies elected in October 
2010 will take office. My account of crimes committed and detected in the 53rd legislative 
period is defined as of February 2010. Typically, in electoral years several new lawsuits 
are filed against deputies seeking re-election for electoral crimes. For timing reasons and 
in order to make the comparison as valid as possible, any electoral crime committed 
during the 2006 election by the deputies in office during the 52nd term will be excluded 
from the comparative analysis.
In the next subsections I discuss the data sources used and present some descriptive 
statistics to characterise the profile of the elected deputies in each term. Then, I give 
an overview of the main criminal cases detected during the terms under analysis and of 
the number of deputies prosecuted in consequence of them. Following the theoretical 
framework presented in section 3.3 I will separately analyse the variation in the number 
of criminal occurrences detected between the 52nd and the 53rd legislative terms within 
the group of incumbents re-elected and within the group of challengers elected to office 
in 2006 as compared to the ex-deputies they replaced.
73 There are not many reasons to believe that the detection mechanisms used by competent authorities 
have become less efficient since 2007. The Brazilian Federal Police is the main investigative body for 
crimes involving federal deputies. Its operational records show for the period 2003-2010 show that the 
total number of ongoing anti-crime operations (which include also criminal investigations related to  
international drug trafficking and terrorism) has not decreased since 2006/2007. More importantly, this 
same source shows that the number of civil servants arrested in consequence of these operations has 
remained stable throughout the whole period under analysis (more precisely, 991 detentions were made 
between 2003 and 2006, and 896 between 2007 and February 2010). This makes me trust that, on the 
whole, the investigation procedures by the competent official bodies have been at least as efficient in 
detecting corruption among federal agents in the current legislative period as before 2007.
74 Another assumption necessary is that politicians in the Chamber of Deputies did not become able to 
develop more sophisticated, harder to detect crimes after the Transpargncia Brasil’s project went online. 
There are not many ways, other than time, that can prove whether this was a reasonable assumption to 
make. However, the profile of the deputies elected in 2006 suggests that they are, on average, of “lower 
criminal propensity” than the former legislature. Thus, everything else being equal, it is unlikely that 
the politicians with a ‘clean’ criminal record would only decide to engage in criminal activities after 2007, 
when the scrutiny to Congress members is clearly tighter.
3 INTERNET SCRUTINY AND POLITICIANS’ CRIM INALITY 101
3.4 .2  D ata  Sources
My aim in this paper is to measure the change in the number of crimes committed by 
the elected deputies between the two last legislative periods, before and after the launch 
of Transparencia Brasil’s information project. This corresponds to the AC measure in 
section 3.3.
In practice, my measure of A C  will be based not only on the existing criminal convic­
tions but also on existing criminal investigations and accusations against federal deputies 
as long as the legal proceedings were started by the public prosecution service. There­
fore, my measure of AC includes not only sentenced offences but also allegations of crime 
made against federal deputies.75 This approach is justified by the long life cycle of legal 
cases against federal politicians in Brazil until a final sentence is imposed, and is followed 
also by Transparencia Brasil in “Projeto Excelencias” ,76
The data used in this paper comes from two main sources: the Transparencia Brasil 
website and the Supreme Federal Court online database.
The Supreme Federal Court (henceforth SFC) is the only judicial institution in charge 
of judging members of the Federal Congress. This court keeps an online database that 
through keyword based searches allows any Internet user to access a list of any former 
convictions or ongoing cases against the current members of the Chamber of Deputies. 
In the terminology used in section 3.3 the SFC database covers information regarding 
the criminal records of the re-elected incumbents (C incumb), as well as of the challengers 
elected in 2006 (C^6™)-
For each case listed (if any) the SFC provides a summary description which includes 
the name of those involved (defendant, lawyers, prosecutors), the date the proceedings 
were instituted in the SFC and the date of their different legal stages, the origin of the 
case (in case it started and was transferred from a different court) and a brief technical 
description of the typology of the respective crime.
The SFC does not hold information about the former deputies who were not re-elected 
in 2006, this is, C°ld in the terminology used above. As soon as a deputy leaves office any 
pending case is sent back to the respective judicial house of origin.77 My knowledge about 
this group of ex-deputies is mostly based on the information obtained from Transparencia 
Brasil (and discussed in the previous chapter). This NGO provided me with a complete 
list of the federal deputies’ judicial records as of 2006 that resulted from its own research 
for “Projeto Excelencias” .
As described above, Transparencia Brasil’s work in 2006 was aimed at preventing 
the re-election of the candidates with a “dirty” judicial record. Hence its data, as of
75 This means that most of the times I refer to “crimes committed by deputies” it should in fact be 
interpreted as “crimes allegedly committed by deputies” .
76 This is still a prudent approach since the public prosecution can only institute lawsuits against serving 
members of Congress after gathering sufficient evidence of crime.
7 7 Exceptionally an ex-deputies might retain her “last instance” priviledge and her criminal records 
remain at the SFC. This will happen if she is elected as senator, president or vice-president, or appointed 
as a federal minister or as attorney general (Brazilian Constitution Art. 102, I, b).
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2006, did not cover all the deputies in office between 2003 and 2006 but focused only on 
the subset of incumbent deputies standing for re-election.78 In order to learn about the 
criminal records of the ex-deputies who did not stand for re-election in October 2006, I 
had to resort to my own research using news websites such as “Globo”, “Folha de Sao 
Paulo” or “Congresso em Foco” .79 The fact that the period between 2003 and 2006 was 
considerably rich in political scandals makes it easier to find information about the ex­
deputies prosecuted for those events, even if they are no longer serving members of the 
Congress. However, it is still possible that my account of criminal cases detected between 
2003 and 2007 underestimates the real figure if some (probably minor) cases have gone 
unreported by the main media channels that constitute my source of information.
To correctly compute the measure A C above I need to know not only whether crim­
inal charges have been brought against members of the Chamber of Deputies during the 
terms under analysis, but also whether those charges were instituted for offences effec­
tively committed during the term. This is important since for the proposed comparative 
analysis to be valid I need to make sure that I effectively compare the level of criminal 
activity detected in the two terms under analysis only. Therefore, any charges brought 
against federal deputies for offences committed in previous terms (before 2003) and/or 
political posts have to be ruled out.
The information provided by the SFC online database in particular is often too scarce 
to learn about the occurrence date of the cases against federal deputies listed. For each 
case listed, the database provides information about the date when the legal proceedings 
were initiated before the SFC. However, it is not uncommon that between the crime’s 
occurrence date and the date it reaches the SFC a couple years have passed. This is 
especially true for the cases that reach the SFC coming from lower jurisdictions and 
whose original records are usually no longer accessible.80 To overcome this problem I 
had to resort to additional information sources. The news search engine provided by 
Transparencia Brasil, under the project name “Deu no Jornal” (“In the News”), which 
gives online access to thousands of articles about corruption published by newspapers 
across Brazil since 2004, was a fundamental tool for this purpose. Through keyword 
based searches it allowed me to access past newspaper articles about selected politicians 
which provided the necessary details to complement the SFC data whenever necessary. A 
list with the remaining online sources used in this paper is provided in the bibliography.
Finally, for all former and current deputies, the Chamber of Deputies provided basic 
biographical data and the Superior Electoral Court (the Brazilian electoral commission)
78In any case these represented approximately three-quarters of the total number of deputies that were 
in office during the 52nd term.
79More precisely, through the following addresses: h ttp ://g l.g lob o .com /g l/p o litica / ;
http://ww w.folha.uol.com .br/; http://congressoem foco.ig.com .br/.
80 Moreover, it should be stressed that the information available at the SFC website is in general 
very technical and hard to interpret for anyone without a legal background. One of the merits of the 
Transparencia Brasil’s project is precisely the fact that it attempts to make the understanding of each 
case more “accessible” to the average citizen - for example, by providing a non-technical summary of the 
case or weblinks to previous newspaper articles published about it.
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details on the electoral results and campaign accounts.
3.4 .3  D escrip tive S tatistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the group of 513 deputies elected to the 
Chamber of Deputies in 2002 and in 2006. As can be seen, for most of the variables 
considered there are no significant differences between the two periods: candidate’s vote- 
share, gender ratio, average education, political affiliation, ownership of media concessions 
or number of terms in the chamber of deputies are not significantly statistically different 
between the elected legislatures in 2002 and in 2006. The whole group of deputies elected 
is 2006 is on average older than in 2002, which is not surprising given that 55% of the 
deputies in this group are incumbents re-elected in 2006. However, the 231 challengers 
elected at this date were both younger and had less experience in the Chamber of Deputies 
(as measured by the number of previous terms served) than the former deputies they 
replaced. The main difference between these two periods seems to be in the size of the 
electoral campaigns. Evaluated at 2002 prices, the candidates elected in 2006 spent on 
average 14,000 Reais more than the candidates elected in 2002.
At the start of the current legislative term, in February 2007, 125 out of the 513 
deputies elected already had charges against them for crimes committed in the past. 
My knowledge of the equivalent measure for the 513 deputies elected in 2002 is limited 
since I cannot recover the criminal records of all the deputies elected at that date. In 
particular, I do not have information about the pre-2002 records of the 121 deputies 
who did not stand for re-election at the end of term, in 2006. The criminal records of 
the remaining 392 deputies elected in 2002 were surveyed and listed by Transparencia 
Brasil as described above. From this data I observe that 136 deputies already had former 
convictions or pending lawsuits at the beginning of the term in February 2003. I will 
take this figure as a lower-bound for the total amount of deputies elected in 2002 with 
previous criminal charges against them.
An analysis of the federal deputies’ criminal records listed by Transparencia Brasil 
in 2006 and of the existing lawsuits in the SFC against the current members of the 
Chamber reveals that the type of crimes that generated legal action are roughly the 
same in both periods. The majority of the charges are instituted for crimes against the 
public administration, including crimes of embezzlement, fraudulent public procurement, 
managerial wrongdoing, electoral crimes and gang formation. In both periods several 
lawsuits were also filed for crimes not directly related to the deputies’ political functions. 
Among these, crimes of tax evasion or irregularities in tax declarations, and crimes against 
the environment or the national patrimony were the most frequent.
The life cycle of lawsuits against members of the federal Congress is on average quite 
long. It is common to find among the cases listed in the SFC lawsuits filed for crimes 
allegedly committed many years ago. Because the Brazilian electoral law authorizes 
candidates convicted in court to stand for election as long as a court decision is not passed
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into matter adjudged (this is, until their last appeal has not been exhausted), lawsuits 
against elected deputies carry on from previous posts and accumulate over time.81 As 
a result, many of the lawsuits listed in the deputies’ records were not filed for crimes 
committed while serving in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, the majority of the cases 
relate to previous political posts in state or municipal administrations. This is not a 
surprising finding given that political corruption in Brazil is known to be especially 
pervasive at the executive level of local governments, where the detection mechanisms 
are typically less effective82 and the opportunities for fraud more abundant.83
3.4.4 E vidence
C rim e by Legislative P eriod
52nd T erm  (2003-2007) As discussed in section 3.2 during the 52nd legislative 
term, between February 2003 and January 2007, an unprecedented number of criminal 
cases involving federal deputies was detected and became public knowledge. Two scandals 
in particular monopolised the news and generated intense public interest and debate 
for their magnitude and political significance: the “mensalao” and the “bloodsuckers’ 
scandal”, as they were dubbed by the media.
The “mensalao” or “big monthly allowance” was a vote-buying scandal uncovered 
in 2005, two years into President Lula da Silva’s first government. Top Workers’ Party 
officials were accused of paying a monthly allowance of allegedly 30,000 Reais (equivalent 
to USD 12,000 at the time) to a number of federal deputies in return for progovernment 
votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Further police investigations also found out that 
(part of) the money used by the Workers’ Party in this scheme was of illegal origin.84 
The overall scandal threatened to bring down Lula da Silva’s government and resulted 
in the resignation and prosecution of several Workers’ Party members. In the Chamber 
of Deputies, 3 deputies implicated in this scandal were sacked, while 4 deputies resigned 
to avoid expulsion and 12 deputies were subject to criminal investigations for the crimes 
of passive corruption, gang formation and money laundering.
The “bloodsuckers’ scandal”, on the other hand, was uncovered in 2006 and consisted
81 As of January 2010, for instance, the deputy Neudo Campos from the state of Roraima held the 
record number of 21 lawsuits in the SFC.
82 According to Freedom House the Brazilian media gives broad and accurate coverage of corruption at 
the federal level, but less for smaller states and municipalities, as local media outlets are often owned or 
controlled by politicians (Countries at the Crossroads 2010, Freedom House).
8 3 This conclusion is reinforced by the results found by the municipal audits conducted by the Brazilian 
Court of Accounts ( “Controladoria Geral da Uniao”) as part of an anti-corruption program started in 
2003. Having checked the accounts of more than a quarter of the country’s 5,564 municipalities over 
the last 7 years, this Court has detected irregularities in most of them and highly visible evidence of 
corruption in 20% of the audited municipalities (see http:www.cgu.gov.br/sorteios/indexl.asp and Veja, 
ed. 25 Feb. 2009).
84 Police investigations revealed that at least 50 million Reais reached the Workers’ Party or allied 
parties’ funds through illegal means and resulted either from kickbacks from private companies favoured 
in public contracts and from corruption schemes controlled by party officials in state-owned companies 
(Veja, ed. 30 Jan. 2008 and 17 Mar. 2010; Isto E, ed. 27 Feb. 2010).
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of a major procurement fraud for the provision of health equipment across the country. 
Several federal deputies were implicated in the approval of federal transfers to selected 
municipalities where, in articulation with local health officials and fictional companies, 
the money was used for the purchase of over-invoiced ambulances through arranged bids. 
According to the Federal Inspector General Office, as reported by Folha de Sao Paulo 
on 9th May 2008, approximately 1,500 ambulances were purchased at inflated prices 
between 2001 and 2006 through this fraudulent scheme, causing an estimated overall loss 
of 25 million Reais (approximately USD 11.5 million at 2006 prices). As a result of this 
scandal, 70 federal deputies were prosecuted for crimes against the public administration, 
fraudulent public bidding, gang formation and money laundering.
Besides these two major scandals, other cases detected in this period included electoral 
crimes (committed during the municipal elections of 2004, since crimes related to the 
2006 elections are excluded from my analysis as explained above), active and passive 
corruption, crimes of tax evasion, influence peddling and crimes of extortion, crimes of 
enslavement and environmental crimes.
In total, I observe that new lawsuits were filed against 101 deputies for crimes com­
mitted and detected during the 2003-2007 legislative term. The vast majority of the 
crimes detected (roughly 80%) were directly related to the deputies’ political functions. 
In the terminology used in the previous chapter they can be classified as crimes of a 
“public nature”.
This total figure is figure is a close approximation to the number of crimes committed 
and detected during this period since most of the 101 deputies prosecuted appeared 
to be involved in a single offence between 2003 and 2007. In some cases, however, 
a deputy’s involvement in a single scandal can originate several lawsuits. For example, 
many deputies implied in the “mensalao” scandal were charged simultaneously for crimes 
of active or passive corruption, money laundering and embezzlement. Since the quality 
of the judicial information available is not uniform across all deputies in office between 
2003 and 2007,85 I have opted to focus on whether or not the deputies were prosecuted 
for crimes committed during this period rather than on the exact number of lawsuits 
filed against them.
53rd T erm  (2007-2011) The SFC current records together with the information 
available in “Projeto Excelencias” by Transparencia Brasil show that the amount of new 
lawsuits filed against federal deputies for crimes committed since 2007 is considerably 
smaller than in the preceding period.
During the 53rd term, the media coverage of corruption in the Chamber of Deputies 
was mostly dominated by accusations of embezzlement against several deputies in conse­
quence of irregular expenses claims. Federal deputies can claim back up to 15,000 Reais
85 For many of the deputies who were not re-elected in 2006 I observed whether or not they were involved 
in any crime and prosectuted during the period but I have no detail on the precise number of charges 
brought against them.
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every month for expenses incurred as a consequence of their political activities. How­
ever, investigations by the journalists from “Folha de Sao Paulo” found out that several 
deputies had been regularly using this facility to claim back money for purely private 
expenses.8687 As of February 2010, a total of 7 deputies have been identified and crim­
inally investigated for the crime of embezzlement. The debate and public outrage over 
these cases of irregular use of public monies urged the Chamber of Deputies to publish 
on its webpage, since April 2009, details of all the expenses claimed by the deputies -  
including description of the good/service purchased, seller, date and the transaction’s 
fiscal number - as part of an innovative policy of transparency.
Apart from these, the SFC’s records and the information available from Transparencia 
Brasil also show that new lawsuits were filed against deputies for electoral crimes related 
to the municipal elections of 2008 (5 in total, as of February 2010), targeted budgetary 
amendments and federal transfers (6 deputies) and pay-roll frauds such as “ghost” public 
employees88 or illegal accumulation of public benefits (5 deputies).
The remaining cases listed as of February 2010 refer to offences not directly related to 
the deputies’ political activities and include environmental crimes (2 deputies), influence 
peddling (2 deputies), tax fraud (1 deputy) and attempted homicide (1 deputy). These 
cases, which in the terminology of the previous chapter can be classified as of a “private 
nature” , represent approximately 20% of the total number of offences detected in the 
current term.
In total, adding together crimes directly related with the deputies’ political duties 
and crimes of a private nature, I am able to identify as of February 2010 a total of 29 
federal deputies under investigation or accused of offences committed since 2007. As 
compared to the 101 cases registered in the 52nd term (2003-2007) this figure represents 
a decrease of more than 70% in the number of deputies prosecuted between these two 
periods. This result is compatible with the theoretical predictions from section 3.3 that 
suggest that the information dissemination project might have had a positive impact on 
the deputies’ criminal behaviour after 2007 (meaning less propensity to crime) due both 
to selection and incentive effects.
Although the data available does not allow for a clear quantification and separation 
of the latter effects, the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 do suggest that, as measured 
by the observable criminal record at the time of election, the pool of 513 deputies elected
86 As reported by the news, there were cases of deputies claiming back expenses to pay for private 
maids, security services for their own properties, or their own electoral campaigns.
8 7 An associated scandal that made the front page news in this period was related to the misuse made of 
the travel allowance by the federal deputies. The Chamber gives every deputy a weekly travel allowance to 
cover travel expenses from their states of origin to Brasilia. Investigations by the news website “Congresso 
em Foco” found out that roughly half of the Chamber had used their travel allowance to offer flights -  
mainly to international destinations - to friends and relatives. The competent authorities failed to classify 
the act as a crime based on the fact that the existing legislation was not clear enough about the correct 
use for the deputies’ travel quota. However, the public debate generated by the case forced the Chamber’s 
Ethics Commission to start a major review of the regulations regarding the matter.
88 “No show” or “ghost” public employees are a knwon fraudulent practice in Brazil used by politicians 
to claim and pocket extra money or to distribute resources across their networks (Fleischer, 1997).
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in 2006 does seem to be of lower criminal propensity than the ones elected in 2002, in 
line with the expected “selection effect” discussed in section 3.3. Everything else being 
equal, it is reasonable to expect a reduction in the level of criminality in the Chamber of 
Deputies after 2007.
In effect, the existence of previous criminal charges (at the time of election) seems to 
be a powerful determinant of the probability of engaging in criminal behaviour during 
the 53rd term. In Table 3.2 I present the estimation results for the probability of being 
prosecuted for a crime committed after 2007 term based on the following (reduced-form) 
linear probability model:
Crimei — a  4- (3Chargesi 4- OtherS{6 + fa (3.4)
where Crimei is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if deputy i is prosecuted for 
a crime committed in the 53rd term, after 2007, and zero otherwise. Chargesi is an 
indicator variable that takes value 1 if deputy i has a criminal record (previous charges) 
at the time of election, in 2006, and Othersi includes several deputy-level characteristics 
as presented in Table 3.1. The model is estimated from the cross-section of 513 deputies 
elected in 2006, making use of the variation in detected criminal behaviour from 2007 
onwards (more exactly, the fact that 29 out of the 513 deputies in office during the 
53rd term have been prosecuted for crimes committed after 2007, as described above). 
The results in Table 3.2 clearly suggest that, among the several candidate-level variables 
considered, the existence of previous criminal charges is the only variable significantly 
associated with the deputies’ probability of committing a crime during the new term.89
To gain a further insight about the possible effects of the information dissemination 
project, in the next sub-section I follow the framework proposed in section 3.3 and focus 
on the variation in the number of crimes detected between the terms under analysis across 
two different groups of deputies: the group of incumbents re-elected and the group of 
challengers elected in 2006 (as compared to the deputies that stepped down from their 
seats the end of the 52nd legislature).
C rim e by P o litic ians’ S ta tu s: Incum ben ts  vs C hallengers
Incum ben ts  282 incumbents were re-elected for a new term in the Chamber of 
Deputies in October 2006. Among these deputies 29 had been charged during the 52nd 
term for crimes committed in that legislative period (2003-2007).
By tracking their judicial records in the SFC and the information available from 
Transparencia Brasil since 2007 I observe that new lawsuits were brought against 15 
deputies in this group for crimes committed since 2007. In comparison to the 29 deputies 
prosecuted in the previous period, this figure represents a reduction of almost 50% in the
89Using, alternatively, a probit or a logit regression model does not affect this conclusion since statistical 
significance of the variables considered remains the same.
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number of serving deputies involved in crimes between the two legislative periods under 
analysis.
In the framework of the model in section 3.3 this reduction can be interpreted as cap­
turing the disciplining effect of Transparencia Brasil’s information dissemination project 
on the deputies’ criminal behaviour. Since the 282 incumbent deputies were re-elected 
to office after the release of Transparencia Brasil’s information project, the disciplin­
ing effect captured in the reduction in the number of crimes and prosecutions should 
be considered as a “treatment on the treated” effect of the information project on the 
incumbents’ behaviour.
C hallengers 231 challengers were elected to office in October 2006. By tracking 
their current judicial records in the SFC and using information available from Transparen­
cia Brasil I observe that a total of 14 deputies in this group have been prosecuted for 
crimes committed since 2007. Since these deputies did not serve in the Chamber of 
Deputies during the 52nd legislative period, between 2003 and 2007, the analogous mea­
sure of prosecutions is not available for that period. Instead, I observe that during the 
52nd legislative period 72 out of the 231 deputies who were not re-elected for a new term 
in 2006 (or did not even stand for re-election) were prosecuted for crimes committed dur­
ing their term in office.90 Thus, by comparing the criminal records of these two groups 
of deputies - challengers elected in 2006 and (ex-)deputies who stepped down at the end 
of the 52nd legislative term - I observe that there has been a reduction of over 80% in 
the number of serving deputies involved in crimes between the two terms under analysis.
As presented in the theoretical framework in section 3.3 this reduction is likely to 
capture both the disciplining and the selection effect of the Transparencia Brasil’s infor­
mation project on the deputies’ criminal behaviour.
The disciplining effect of the Transparencia Brasil’s project works for incumbents 
and challengers elected in 2006 in a similar way. By keeping an updated record of every 
deputy’s criminal offences the Transparencia Brasil’s project allows for a tighter public 
scrutiny of the deputies’ actions and misdeeds. This is likely to work as a disciplining 
device for the whole group of deputies in office and hence contribute for a reduction in 
the number of crimes committed.
The selection effect of the Transparencia Brasil project, on the other hand, is asso­
ciated with the compositional change in the pool of candidates elected in October 2006 
after the information about the candidates’ criminal records is released. In the framework 
presented in section 3.3 the information revelation mechanism allows voters to throw the 
most corrupt candidates out of office and replace them by politicians with a lower propen­
sity to crime. Thus, everything else being equal this compositional change will result in 
a decrease in the number of crimes committed by serving politicians. The results pre­
90Notice that, as mentioned above, this figure is a lower bound for the total number of prosecutions 
effectively made between 2003 and 2007. This is because my information about the criminal records of 
the deputies who did not stand for re-election in 2006 is limited.
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sented in the previous chapter showed that the Transparencia Brasil information project 
allowed the voters to identify and throw out of office several deputies with a criminal 
record - more precisely, 92 out of the 165 incumbents listed by Transparencia Brasil with 
criminal charges did not manage to get re-elected in October 2006. As explained before, 
Transparencia Brasil did not provide any information about the challengers’ criminal 
records in 2006.91 As a result, the information available to the electorate about the 
challengers standing for election in 2006 was, on average, not significantly better than in 
previous elections. However, as discussed above, the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 
are suggestive of a compositional gain in the pool of candidates elected in 2006 in terms 
of propensity to crime: the number of elected deputies with a criminal record at the 
beginning of the term is smaller in 2007 than in 2003. The fact that the reduction in the 
number of deputies prosecuted between the terms under analysis was clearly stronger for 
the group of challengers (as compared to the (ex-)deputies they replaced in 2007) than 
within the group of incumbents re-elected provides further support to this compositional 
gain hypothesis. It suggests that the selection effect associated with the Transparencia 
Brasil project might, indeed, have been positive, in the direction proposed in section 3.3, 
hence reinforcing the disciplining effect of Transparencia Brasil’s project on the deputies’ 
criminal behaviour.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The last federal elections, in 2006, represent a landmark in the way the Internet was used 
by grassroots’ organizations and by the average voter to fight political corruption in the 
Chamber of Deputies and prevent the re-election of incumbents with criminal records. 
Equipped with objective information about the incumbents’ criminal history, the average 
voter showed at the polls not to be indifferent to political corruption: the majority of 
candidates with a criminal record were not re-elected in 2006 and, on the whole, they 
registered a significantly worse electoral performance as compared to previous elections 
and to the performance of their peers with a clean criminal record.
Since the last federal elections, the use of the Internet for information dissemination 
campaigns and for the promotion of transparency in politics has increased substantially. 
The amount of information available on each deputy’s parliamentary activities and crim­
inal offences has never been so large and, given the fast speed of Internet penetration in 
Brazil, so easily accessible to the average citizen.
In this paper I have provided a comparative analysis of the corruption scandals and 
consequent lawsuits filed against the members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
in the 52nd legislative term (2003-2007) and in the 53rd legislative term (since 2007). 
My aim was to understand whether the information dissemination project started by 
Transparencia Brasil in 2006 might have had any visible impact on the deputies’ criminal 
behaviour in the current legislative term. In theory, there are two main reasons why
91 There were some exceptions though, since a few selected challengers with a known record of political 
corruption also had their profiles listed by the Transparencia Brasil’s project.
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one might expect this to happen. First, since the information project helped voters to 
remove from office (some of) the most corrupt deputies in the 2006 election the deputies 
in office after 2007 are likely to be, on average, of higher quality (i.e. more honest) than in 
the previous period. Second, the greater availability of information about the deputies’ 
misdeeds might work as a discipline device during the term: for fear of the electoral 
punishment consequent of a (known) offence the deputies are less likely to engage in 
criminal activity.
My survey of the deputies’ criminal records showed that the number of deputies 
prosecuted for crimes committed during their term in office has dropped by more than 
70% between the two legislative periods under analysis. The reduction in the number of 
deputies prosecuted has happened not only within the group of incumbents re-elected, 
but also, and especially, among the challengers elected in 2006 as compared to the (ex- 
)deputies whose seats they took over in 2007. Overall, the evidence presented in this 
chapter strongly suggests that greater access to information on the politicians’ actions 
and profile might have a powerful impact not only on the political selection but also on 
the politicians’ behaviour while in office.
As a final remark, it is worth pointing out that political corruption is far from being 
a preserve of the federal government. In fact, the federal deputies’ criminal records offer 
clear evidence that political corruption is also abundant in state and municipal govern­
ments. Therefore, following the promising evidence presented in this paper, it would 
be important to extend the actual policy of transparency and information dissemination 
based on objective facts - be they either criminal records in the Courts, expenses claims 
or details on procurement contracts - that apply to the Chamber of Deputies to different 
government bodies. This could contribute to make the public scrutiny of elected politi­
cians more homogeneous across different levels of government and different regions of the 
country and thus extend the incentives for less criminal activity to a larger proportion of 
the political class.92
92 Transparencia Brasil has been working together with a few state and municipal bodies for this 
purpose. As a result, it is for instance possible to obtain online information on all the procurement 
contracts made by the 293 municipalities from the state of Santa Catarina since 1997, including details 
about negotiated prices and competition.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
F ig u re  3.1: Distribution of Criminal Propensities - Candidates Elected
C c C C rim in a l P r o p e n s i ty  (<;)
Elected Politicians
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F ig u re  3.2: Distribution of Criminal Propensities - Change in Candidates Elected
Incumbents  
Re-Elected
C2 Cj
J
C rim in a l P r o p e n s i ty  (q)
Table 3.1: Differences Between Groups of Deputies (2007-2010)
Descriptive Statistics (as o f beginning o f term)
52nd Legislative period 
(2003-2007)
53nd Legislative period 
(2007-2011) difference s.e.
Total of Deputies 513 513
State vote-share (%) 2.9 2.9 0.02 0.16
Reelected (%) 58.6 55.0 3.59 3.09
With criminal record a t time of election 1361 125
Female (%) 7.1 6.4 0.74 1.96
FDs with university education (%) 91.0 91.4 -0.37 2.23
Age 50.1 51.3 -1.20* 0.65
Number of mandates 1.4 1.4 -0.10 0.09
Owners of media licenses (%) 11.2 13.2 -1.97 2.05
Campaign contributions ('000 BRL, constant prices 2002) 224.9 365.5 -140.54*** 17.02
Members of DEM (%) 16.3 12.7 4.67* 2.20
Members of PMDB (%) 14.6 17.3 -2.76 2.29
Members of PSDB (%) 13.8 12.9 0.95 2.12
Members of PT (%) 17.7 16.2 1.52 2.35
Source: TSE, Camara dos Deputados, STF and Transparencia Brasil 
* * *  p<0.01, **  p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1This figure is a lower-bound as I do not have information about previous criminal charges (this is, before the 2002 election) for 119 out of the 
513 deputies elected in 2002.
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Table 3.2: Probability of Being Prosecuted (after 2007)
114
Dependent Variable
1(Crime after 2007) (1)
Vote-share in 2006 election 0.003
(0.005)
1(criminal record at time of election) 0.079**
(0.031)
1 (female) 0.861
(1.171)
1 (university) -0.893
(1.300)
Age i n 2006 0.001
(0.001)
l(m edia concession) 0.014
(0.037)
1 (incumbent re-elected) 0.015
(0.030)
Number of terms served -0.014
(0.010)
Campaign contributions 0.000
(0.000)
State and Party controls Yes
Observations 513
R-squared 0.12
* * *  p<0.01, * *  p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses
Results estimated from the cross-section of 513 deputies elected in
2006. The dependent variable is the dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the deputy is prosecuted for a crime committed in or after
2007, and 0 otherwise.
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